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PREFACE 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Since long before I began reading any academic literature on philosophy, I have been 
interested in the question of how we could have the free will required for moral 
responsibility. More recently, however, the key question has at times seemed to be 
not so much how we could have this kind of free will, but more fundamentally 
whether we have it. Before becoming exposed to (some might say corrupted by) the 
work of professional philosophers on this subject, it had not so much as crossed my 
mind that the possibility of possessing the free will required for moral responsibility 
might be called into question. I took it as read that libertarianism—with its belief 
that, in a given set of circumstances an agent is able to take more than one possible 
course of action—was the correct theory. However, upon sustained exposure to the 
seductive arguments of compatibilist philosophers, urging that the kind of ‘open’ 
futures libertarians posit are not necessary for free will, I saw my pre-philosophical 
intuitions begin to founder. When to these compatibilist arguments was added the 
influence of Spinoza and his remorselessly logical case for necessitarianism, there 
was nowhere left for my libertarian leanings to hide. In spite of myself, my 
Damascene conversion to determinism was effected. 
Only then, once I had disavowed libertarianism, did the issue of whether we could 
have the free will required for moral responsibility really come into play. During my 
undergraduate career, I continued to wrestle with a dilemma that seemed to me to 
have no satisfactory solution. On one horn of this dilemma was compatibilism, with 
its various plausible-sounding but ultimately (I felt) specious explanations of how 
determinism posed no problem for our free will and moral responsibility. On the 
other horn was hard determinism, which, while it seemed more intellectually 
satisfying, demanded the impossible in the form of a repudiation of belief in moral 
responsibility. The dilemma remained disquietingly unresolved as I embarked on an 
MA thesis in Buddhist philosophy. Once again, my focus remained on questions of 
free will, determinism, and moral responsibility, although the task at this point was 
as much hermeneutical as it was purely philosophical. 
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The present PhD thesis, then, represents an opportunity to return to the purely 
philosophical task of resolving the dilemma I unwittingly found myself caught on 
the horns of, and marks the culmination of my thinking so far on this most 
absorbing, contentious, and intractable of philosophical issues. Still, it is merely that: 
the culmination of my thinking so far. I am conscious that it is a long way from 
being the finished product as it stands. In any case, even if I never revisit this topic in 
writing—which seems a welcome prospect after having just written the 77,777 
words contained here—these certainly do not represent my final thoughts on it. 
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Introduction 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis came into being from a desire on my part to achieve three interrelated 
goals. The first of these was to help rekindle a general interest in a principle that I 
felt has come to be undeservedly neglected in recent times.1 The principle at issue is 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter the PSR), first expressly formulated in 
the 17th century by Leibniz, and implicitly appealed to on occasion prior to that 
point. To quote one of Leibniz’s formulations, the principle holds that “there can be 
no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a 
sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise.”2 In the present day, it is rare to 
find the PSR being explicitly invoked in the way that figures such as Spinoza and 
Leibniz did not hesitate to do, yet implicit appeals continue to be made to just such a 
principle in the arguments of many contemporary philosophers. In other words, even 
as the principle is looked upon as evidence of rationalism having overreached itself, 
the intuition to which it gives expression remains alive and well, and as such I 
believe that its relative neglect is unwarranted. 
My second goal in writing this thesis went beyond the first, in that I sought not only 
to ‘raise awareness’ of the continuing importance of the PSR to our philosophical 
debates, but also, and unfashionably, I resolved to come down on the side of the 
principle and affirm its truth. As a consequence of embracing the truth of the PSR, I 
would thereby be committing myself also to affirming the truth of determinism—at 
least, I would be if I were to embrace the principle in the form that Spinoza and 
Leibniz present it, which is indeed what I had in mind. I wished to make the case, 
then, that the PSR, as articulated by Leibniz in the preceding paragraph, was true, 
and that this entailed the truth of determinism (the thesis that the laws of nature, 
conjoined with any proposition accurately describing the complete state of the world 
at some instant, entails any other true proposition).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Although it is heartening to note that Pruss’s (2011) The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A 
Reassessment was published soon after I began this thesis, providing the first monograph devoted to 
the principle for at least half a century. 
2 Leibniz (1956a), p. 646. 
2!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!REPSONSIBILITY!
!
While the first two goals are metaphysical in their concerns, my third goal shifts the 
latter part of this thesis into the territory of ethics. The question I had in mind to 
answer was: what, if any, are the consequences of embracing determinism in terms 
of our ability to legitimately ascribe one another with the free will required for moral 
responsibility? More particularly, I wanted to know whether, as incompatiblists 
argue, the truth of determinism precludes the possibility of legitimately ascribing 
moral responsibility, or whether instead a compatibilist solution can be found. The 
short answer, as my thesis reveals, is that I concluded that it is possible to provide a 
satisfactory compatibilist solution to this problem, although the compatibilist 
solution I offer is by no means an orthodox one. While I accept that ascriptions of 
moral responsibility are sometimes justified, I argue that they can only be so on 
consequentialist grounds, since incompatibilists are right to think that no-one is truly 
deserving of the praise, blame, reward, or punishment they receive. 
The pursuit of these three goals spans the course of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is 
essentially a work in the history of philosophy, offering a survey of the PSR from 
antiquity to the present day. We begin by looking at figures such as Anaximander 
and Archimedes, to see how explicability intuitions informed the arguments of the 
ancient Greeks at a time when the PSR had yet to be afforded the status of a 
principle. Following this, we proceed chronologically to the Middle Ages, then on to 
the era of Spinoza and Leibniz in the 17th century as Leibniz provides the first 
formulation of the principle. Finally, we move into the present day, and a time when 
the PSR’s stock appears somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, the principle remains in 
use by contemporary philosophers, sometimes appearing explicitly (for instance as a 
premise in certain cosmological arguments) and at other times implicitly (such as in 
a thought experiment by Parfit that examines personal identity). 
Chapters 2 and 3 together provide the case for thinking that the PSR is true. Chapter 
2 examines a clutch of arguments both for and against the principle in a bid to 
determine whether it should be accepted or rejected. Arguments in favour of the PSR 
are adduced by Leibniz, Wolff, and Pruss, while the case against is represented by 
arguments from Hume and van Inwagen, as well as an argument that our knowledge 
of quantum theory demonstrates that the principle must be false. Although the 
arguments both for and against are found to fall short of providing either 
confirmation or refutation of the principle, the case is made that there is evidence 
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enough for its truth that we should adopt a presumption in its favour. This chapter 
also makes the case for adopting the sort of robust reading of the PSR of which 
Spinoza and Leibniz would no doubt approve, and argues that any such reading 
entails a commitment to the truth of determinism. Finally, it is proposed that the PSR 
sceptic’s best hope for undermining the principle lies in offering empirical evidence 
for some demonstrably non-deterministic event. 
It is the possibility of establishing the reality of non-deterministic events that 
motivates Chapter 3, which considers the theory of libertarianism as a potential 
counterexample to the principle. The subject matter of this chapter—i.e. 
libertarianism—heralds an imminent change in direction for this thesis as we shift 
from the metaphysical concerns of the PSR to the ethical concerns of theories of free 
will. Before making this shift, however, the truth of the PSR remains in the balance, 
since if libertarians can provide a convincing case for the indeterminism that their 
theory posits then we can infer from this the falsity of the principle. To cut a long 
story short, it is found that libertarianism cannot offer a convincing case for 
indeterminism, and so the presumption in favour of the PSR that was established at 
the close of Chapter 2 prevails.  
A slightly less abridged version of the same story is that the libertarian theories of 
Ginet and Kane are subjected to two arguments, the first of which does not depend 
on the truth of the PSR while the second one does, and it is found not only that each 
argument on its own provides sufficient reason for rejecting Ginet’s and Kane’s 
particular theories, but that these arguments can be used as ammunition against any 
and all libertarian theories. In response to any accusations that, in assuming the truth 
of the PSR, the second argument is committing the cardinal philosophical sin of 
begging the question against the libertarian, the response is that no such 
transgression takes place: the libertarian’s empirical evidence for indeterminism is 
simply too weak to justify their rejection of the principle, and hence its employment 
as a premise in an argument against libertarianism is justified. It cannot be said that 
the deliberations of Chapters 2 and 3 deliver to us the verdict that the PSR is 
incontestably true; but they certainly tip the balance in its favour. Not only that, they 
also provide us with sufficient reason to ponder the ramifications of the truth of a 
corollary of the principle, namely determinism. 
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The fourth chapter marks the beginning of what can be considered the second half of 
the thesis, as the focus shifts from the metaphysical to the ethical. The question now 
at stake is what implications the truth of determinism has for our moral responsibility 
practices, with this chapter focusing on arguments for the sceptical conclusion that 
moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. Van Inwagen’s famed 
Consequence Argument is the first to be appraised, and, in spite of the ingenious 
critiques of Lewis and Slote, the argument is judged to be sound: as the argument’s 
conclusion expresses it, no one has power over the facts of the future, including 
one’s own actions. It is argued that such an admission is equivalent to a repudiation 
of the claim that we enjoy the free will required for moral responsibility, which in 
turn suggests that we should abandon our moral responsibility practices so as to 
reflect this reality.  
As if this were not enough, a further argument provides grounds for believing that 
moral responsibility is impossible irrespective of whether determinism is true. The 
argument in question is Galen Strawson’s aptly named Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility Argument, which makes the case that, since we act as we do because 
of our character, and since we cannot be held ultimately responsible for our 
character, neither can we be held ultimately responsible for our actions. Once more, 
and notwithstanding an interesting critique from Hurley, it is concluded that the 
argument is successful. At the close of Chapter 4, then, there seems to be a strong 
case for favouring the abandonment of our moral responsibility practices. Another 
finding from this chapter is that what unites these two anti-compatibilist arguments 
is an intuition in favour of what has been termed the origination condition, which 
states that, in order to be morally responsible for an action, the source of that action 
must be in the agent performing it rather than in something external. While 
compatibilists can and do deny the need for origination, I argue that the denial of 
such an intuitive condition is simply not credible: the origination condition must be 
met if we are to be ultimately morally responsible. 
Chapter 5 finds us stuck between a rock and a hard place: the arguments of the 
previous chapter suggest that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible; 
yet simply dispensing with moral responsibility seems a drastic and unappealing 
course of action to recommend. With traditional compatibilist theories looking 
indefensible in the light of the arguments of Chapter 4, and hard determinist theories 
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looking impracticable and undesirable in equal measure, the next two chapters are 
devoted to finding a way of steering a course between these compatibilist and hard 
determinist poles. Doing this involves examining what may be called ‘mixed views’ 
on moral responsibility, a name that derives from the fact that each view combines 
elements of both compatibilist and incompatibilist thought. The hope is to find a 
theory that offers both a satisfying response to the origination problem (unlike 
traditional compatibilist theories), and at least some justification for our moral 
responsibility practices (unlike hard determinist theories).  
With these goals in mind, Vargas’s revisionism is the first theory under discussion. It 
is argued that Vargas is right to make the case that we are folk libertarians, and that 
we are mistaken in this regard; but his prescription is flawed, since this turns out to 
be little more than the recommendation that we adopt the kind of compatibilism that 
involves denying the necessity of meeting the origination condition. However, 
Vargas also offers the helpful proposal that our responsibility norms serve an 
essentially utilitarian function, which is to improve us morally over time. While 
Vargas himself stops short of adopting a consequentialist justification of moral 
responsibility, I argue that this approach allows us to acknowledge the necessity of 
origination for ultimate responsibility without this obliging us to abandon our moral 
responsibility norms.  
The other mixed view examined in Chapter 5 is Double’s free will subjectivism, 
according to which judgements concerning moral freedom cannot be objectively 
true. While free will subjectivism certainly offers a simple justification for our moral 
responsibility judgements—that is, in the absence of any objective measure of moral 
freedom we are at liberty to pick and choose when to ascribe it—this approach turns 
out to be too permissive to be satisfactory. For one thing, Double’s theory fails to 
provide an adequate response to the origination problem, effectively saying that it is 
up to us whether we choose to make a connection between it and moral 
responsibility. 
The final mixed view under consideration is Smilansky’s, to whose theory most of 
Chapter 6 is devoted. Smilansky makes two separate proposals, the first of which is 
that we must adopt a ‘fundamental dualism’ with regards to the theories of 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, while the second is that we recognise and 
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embrace what he terms ‘illusionism’ with respect to free will. Dealing first with 
fundamental dualism, this is the notion that neither compatibilism nor 
incompatibilism is adequate on its own, although both have aspects that are 
indispensable. Therefore, he argues, we must retain those parts of each that cannot be 
discarded, and abandon the common assumption that either compatibilism or 
incompatibilism must be correct in its entirety.  
I contend that, although Smilansky is right that we need a fundamental dualism, we 
should not adopt one in the form that Smilansky himself suggests. Smilansky’s 
approach is too equivocal about the success or otherwise of arguments that view 
origination as a necessary condition for ultimate responsibility, and so he adopts a 
position whereby lack of origination is sometimes a crucial factor while at other 
times it is not. There is no clear case for thinking that origination is sometimes not 
necessary, and so Smilansky’s fundamental dualism falters. However, I propose that 
the idea that motivates Smilansky’s fundamental dualism—that neither 
compatibilism nor incompatibilism is adequate on its own—is worthy of 
consideration, and that we should maintain a dualism while changing the details. 
Briefly put, I argue that compatibilist judgements of moral culpability provide a 
consequentialist justification for our moral responsibility practices, while 
incompatibilist judgements show that no-one is ever ultimately deserving of being 
held morally responsible.  
As for Smilanksy’s proposal of illusionism, this combines the claim that the majority 
of people have illusory beliefs concerning free will with the further assertion that this 
situation is for the best. Smilansky’s first claim, like Vargas’s, is simply that folk 
libertarianism is prevalent and that they are mistaken on this point. This much can be 
accepted. The further assertion that this is for the best, however, is less secure, as the 
supposed threat posed by the unmasking of this illusion is somewhat overstated. 
Still, the possibility that illusion might play a useful part in a theory of moral 
responsibility is conceded, if knowing the truth should prove to be too much to bear. 
We end the chapter with a brief consideration of Smart’s consequentialist 
justification of moral responsibility practices, whose theory allows us to affirm the 
necessity of the origination condition for true desert without abandoning hope that 
we can continue to hold one another morally responsible. 
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, and makes the positive case for adopting a 
consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility norms in the face of the 
most compelling reasons for not doing so. This chapter also summarises how and to 
what extent aspects of the various mixed views surveyed in Chapters 5 and 6 might 
be useful in developing the present account of moral responsibility, an account that 
avoids going down either traditional compatibilist or incompatibilist routes. 
I finish this introduction by offering something of a disclaimer. This is to 
acknowledge that the connection between what I have referred to as the first and 
second halves of my thesis (Chapters 1-3 and Chapters 4-7 respectively) is not as 
seamless as it might have been. A more pleasing thesis structure would certainly 
have been achieved if Chapter 4 had delivered the result that moral responsibility is 
impossible because of the truth of determinism. While van Inwagen’s argument 
certainly makes this connection between determinism and moral responsibility, 
whereby the truth of the former precludes the possibility of the latter, Galen 
Strawson’s argument has it that moral responsibility is impossible regardless of the 
truth or falsity of determinism. Given that I accept the soundness of Galen 
Strawson’s argument as well as van Inwagen’s, one might be forgiven for asking: 
what need is there to attempt to establish the truth of determinism via a defence of 
the PSR before outlining a theory of moral responsibility?  
In response, I think establishing the truth of determinism before outlining a theory of 
moral responsibility finds a measure of justification in the fact that there will be 
some readers who will deem van Inwagen’s argument persuasive but not Galen 
Strawson’s. For such readers, establishing the truth of determinism will be necessary 
in order to convince them of the need to pursue a mixed view theory of moral 
responsibility. Equally, of course, some may find Galen Strawson’s argument the 
more persuasive of the two, especially those who have reservations about the 
strength of the case for the PSR and determinism. In accepting Galen Strawson’s 
argument, these readers should still be able to agree with my account of how to 
proceed in developing a viable theory of moral responsibility. Each argument is 
useful, in other words, where misgivings exist regarding the other one.  
!!!!
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A survey of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
  
It is a truth frequently affirmed that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter 
PSR) is as old as philosophy itself. Indeed, ever since the time of the Ancient Greeks 
the intuition has been invoked that, given some particular fact or event, there must 
necessarily be a reason for its obtaining or occurring. Still more often, the intuition 
that facts and events are in principle explicable has simply been implied although left 
unstated. This intuition which the PSR seeks to formalise persists through the Middle 
Ages, during which era such great philosopher-theologians as Abelard and Aquinas 
appeal to it, respectively, in arguments for ‘optimality’ (the idea that this is the best 
of all possible worlds), and in proofs for the existence of God.   
However, it is not until Leibniz in the enlightenment era that the intuition that facts 
and events should be explicable becomes promoted to the status of a principle. It was 
Leibniz who duly coined the term ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason,’ which was judged 
by the great polymath to be one of two great principles upon which all truths rest (the 
other being the Principle of Contradiction, according to which a truth is necessary 
just in case its negation is a contradiction). Additionally, Leibniz can be credited 
with having devised the first known argument for the principle, which seeks to 
demonstrate that whatever is—and whatever is true—must have a sufficient reason. 
At last, the intuition that philosophers have for centuries appealed to finds itself 
articulated clearly and explicitly by Leibniz, and, what is more, an argument is 
adduced as evidence of its proof. 
Sadly, as is so often the case in philosophy, matters did not remain simple and settled 
for long. A generation later, Hume led the charge against the PSR and the intuitions 
undergirding it by claiming that there is no contradiction in the idea that a thing 
might lack a cause or reason for its existence, and hence that the common intuition 
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that this is not possible is false. Since then, as Della Rocca remarks despondently, “it 
sometimes seems as though […] a great deal of the best efforts of the best 
philosophers have been devoted to a direct frontal assault on the PSR.”1 
Nevertheless, despite the common presupposition among contemporary philosophers 
that the PSR is false, the situation is far from a consensus. In fact, philosophers 
continue to construct arguments that appeal, whether implicitly or explicitly, to 
Leibniz’s great principle. Parfit’s famous discussion of personal identity and fission 
involves an implicit appeal to the PSR, while contemporary philosophers of religion 
such as Reichenbach appeal explicitly to the PSR when arguing for the existence of 
God. 
In this first chapter, then, let us perform a brief survey of the PSR, looking in 
particular at how the principle has been applied. While there is not space to present 
an exhaustive history of the PSR’s application, I do hope to achieve the more modest 
aim of providing an understanding of many of the key uses of the PSR, from the time 
of the ancient Greeks up until the present day.  
 
1.1 Ancient Greeks 
Anaximander is usually credited with being the first person to employ the PSR. 
Aristotle’s De Caelo records Anaximander as arguing that the earth remains 
stationary in space since it is indifferent between motions in any particular 
direction.2 It is indifferent since it is “equably related to the extremes,” and so there 
can be no reason for it to favour movement in one direction rather than another. So, 
in the absence of a reason why it should move in one direction rather than in any 
other, Anaximander concludes that it “necessarily remains at rest.” More generally, 
Anaximander seems to be assuming that motion in the absence of a reason is 
impossible.3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Della Rocca (2010), p. 2. 
2 Aristotle (1939), b12 295b10–16. 
3 Aristotle does not uncritically report Anaximander’s argument – on the contrary, he considers 
Anaximander’s reasoning to be “ingenious, but not true.” However, it is not that Aristotle denies the 
PSR-type assumption that motion in the absence of a reason is impossible: he simply identifies a 
different reason from Anaximander for the earth’s being stationary, which is that “motion to the centre 
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This same assumption—that motion in the absence of a reason is impossible—is 
employed to different effect by Archimedes. This became Leibniz’s favoured 
example of a historical application of the PSR, one that he would often cite in 
correspondences and other philosophical writings.4 Leibniz reports of Archimedes: 
“[He] takes it for granted that if there is a balance in which everything is alike on 
both sides, and if equal weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole 
will be at rest. That is because no reason can be given why one side should weigh 
down rather than the other.”5 Archimedes thus appeals to the thought that, in the 
absence of a reason why one side should weigh down rather than the other, the whole 
will be at rest. 
Parmenides’ use of the PSR is more ambitious than that of his contemporaries.6 
While Anaximander and Archimedes were concerned to derive the consequences of 
the claim that motion in the absence of a reason is impossible, Parmenides concerns 
himself with the altogether bolder claim that existence in the absence of a reason is 
impossible. Since there could be no reason (Parmenides argues) for something to 
come from nothing, we can be assured that nothing does—or even could—come 
from nothing. This is a statement of the ex nihilo nihil principle, which simply states 
that no entity comes into existence out of nothing. 
So what argument is offered for this assertion that there could be no reason for 
something to come from nothing? Of the putative thing that comes from nothing, 
Parmenides asks: “[W]hat need would have driven it later rather than earlier, 
beginning from the nothing, to grow?”7 The rhetorical point Parmenides seems to be 
making is that, if (per impossible) something were to come to exist from nothing, we 
would require an explanation as to why it came to exist when it did, rather than, say, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!
is peculiar to earth” (as opposed to, say, fire, whose nature is to move to the extremes). From our 
vantage point, of course, we can see that both Anaximander’s and Aristotle’s explanations are faulty, 
since the supposition that the earth is stationary in space is false.  
4 Two reasons can be adduced for Leibniz favouring this Archimedean usage of the PSR above other 
prospective candidates: first, it seems like a particularly uncontroversial application of the PSR; 
second, Archimedes’ application involves no faulty assumptions. Regarding the first point, 
Parmenides’ application of the PSR, for example, is manifestly more controversial than Archimedes: 
whereas Archimedes assumes that motion – or, more specifically, the movement of a balance—
requires an explanation, Parmenides is committed to the prima facie stronger claim that the existence 
of things must be explicable. As to the second point, we can note that Anaximander, ingenious though 
his argument may be, is of course incorrect in his assumption that the Earth is stationary in space.  
5 Leibniz (1989), p. 31. 
6 In actual fact, a good 350 years separate Anaximander and Archimedes; but since this gulf in time is 
far less apparent from our vantage point I feel justified in describing them as “contemporaries”! 
7 Parmenides (1986), Fr. 8, 9-10. 
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twenty minutes earlier. But of course no such explanation could be given, since all 
empty times are homogenous.  
Note that, although Parmenides’ application of what we might call an “explicability 
argument” is bolder than either Anaximander’s or Archimedes’, it is clear that their 
arguments possess a similar form and give expression to a similar intuition: 
Anaximander makes the claim that the earth is indifferent to motion in any 
direction—and so lacking a reason to move, it naturally remains motionless; 
Archimedes describes a balance in which two sides are identical in every respect 
(they have the same object, of the same mass, placed at the same distance from the 
fulcrum)—and so lacking a reason to tip one way or the other, it naturally rests in 
equipoise; Parmenides makes the observation that empty times are identical in every 
respect—and so lacking a reason to come into existence at one empty time as 
opposed to another, nothing can come into existence from an empty time. In short, 
for everything from the mundane to the remarkable, reasons are required. The 
intuition is: explicability rules. 
This intuition also finds expression in Plato and Aristotle. Plato offers us what can be 
considered a proto-PSR when he states: “It is necessary for everything that happens 
to happen through a cause; for how could it happen without this?”8 Similarly, 
Aristotle provides the following reflection: “We think we understand everything 
perfectly when we think we know the cause whereby the thing exists, namely that it 
is the cause of that thing, and that this could not possibly be otherwise.”9 Of course, 
both of these statements speak of causes as opposed to reasons; but as I shall argue 
later in this chapter, the term ‘cause’ can be considered synonymous with the term 
‘reason’, at least insofar as concerns the reasons for spatiotemporal events.10 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Plato (1971), 28a, 4–5. 
9 Aristotle (1994), I, 2. 
10 In fact, Barnes’s translation of Aristotle (1994: p. 2) renders ‘cause’ as ‘explanation,’ which seems 
unobjectionable, since in the quoted passage Aristotle is concerned with our understanding of things. 
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1.2 Middle Ages 
Use of the PSR continues into the medieval period. Abelard, the French scholastic 
philosopher, theologian, and logician, is responsible for conceiving of the notion that 
we inhabit the best of all possible worlds (a full 500 years before Leibniz, whose 
name is most commonly associated with the idea, proposed the same idea).11 His 
argument is that we must inhabit the best of all possible worlds because God, 
naturally wanting the best for his creation, would have no reason to fail to create the 
best of all possible worlds. In the absence of any reason not to create the best of all 
possible worlds, the best of all possible worlds is therefore created.12 
Unfortunately for Abelard, his rational bent had the effect of antagonising church 
council members of a more mystical leaning, who objected (among other things) to 
his predilection for quoting gentile philosophers.13 Abelard’s defence of this practice, 
following a church council at Sens in 1141 at which Bernard of Clairvaux charged 
him with heresy, came in a screed arguing for the legitimacy of these sources. The 
following passage is particularly noteworthy, as it illustrates both his apparent 
commitment to the PSR and to the doctrine of ‘optimality’ (or, as Leibniz would 
later refer to it, the Principle of the Best): 
[The Greeks] postulate ‘the highest good’ (summum bonum). This is God, the beginning of all things, 
the origin and efficient cause of everything. Thus they insist that from love of Him all goodness, just 
as everything else, must proceed. We, in a similar way, call God alpha and omega, the beginning and 
the end, from Whom are all things, and on Whose account all things are in being. Plato calls Him the 
highest and ineffable Creator of all natural things, Who is able to do everything and from Whom all 
evil is removed. He has formed all good, each thing according to its nature or as its order and 
harmony required. 14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 My phrasing here (stating that Abelard is “responsible for” optimality theory) is intentionally 
ambiguous. Many would argue that it is to Abelard’s discredit that he argued that this is the best of all 
possible worlds, although it is an idea that continues to have some currency. For modern defences of 
this theory, see Leslie (2001); and Rescher (2000). 
12 Abelard’s theology is reflected not only in his philosophical prose, but also in some of his poetry. 
The following stanza from the poem Morning Hymn is further illustration of his belief in optimality 
and the rule of reason: “Perfect in every part / Thy perfect world began; / In every part endures / In 
reason’s faultless plan.” (quoted in McCallum (1976)  p. 114) 
13 One of those ‘other things’ to which his fellow philosophers of religion took exception was in fact 
the doctrine of optimality, here expounded. The mainstream view among medieval philosophers was 
that God enjoys freedom of indifference with respect to his creation. As such, God is not generally 
seen as being compelled by his nature to create the ‘best of all possible worlds.’ 
14 Abelard, quoted in McCallum (1976), p. 61. 
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There are two key points to note from this passage. First, there is Abelard’s implicit 
commitment to the PSR as revealed in the assertion that all things “must proceed” 
from God: that is, God is declared to be the origin and efficient cause of everything - 
and hence also the sufficient reason for the existence of everything. Second, we can 
observe Abelard’s endorsement of the doctrine of optimality, according to which 
God, being the summum bonum or highest good, has “formed all good, each thing 
according to its nature or as its order and harmony required.” In other words, the 
sufficient reason for God creating what he in fact creates is that, in keeping with his 
character as the highest good, it is the best creation possible. We will see that 
Abelard’s claim—that the truth of the PSR, together with the existence of a perfectly 
good God entails optimality—is reiterated by Leibniz in the 17th century, and we 
shall see also how Leibniz struggles to reconcile this claim with the notion of 
contingency. Before this, however, there is another medieval philosopher who makes 
notable use of the PSR, and whose influence as a forebear to Leibniz is also 
apparent. That philosopher is Thomas Aquinas, and his arguments for the existence 
of God—which all fall under the general rubric of ‘Cosmological Arguments’—will 
now be briefly examined. A more recent statement of the cosmological argument 
will also be examined presently, when we consider contemporary applications of the 
PSR. 
Aquinas presents ‘Five Ways’ of demonstrating the existence of God. The general 
form of each argument is the same: first, some fact about the world is cited; second, 
it is claimed that this fact requires an explanation; third, the conclusion is that the 
only sufficient explanation for the fact in question is God. So, the PSR appears as a 
premise in each of the Five Ways, in the form of a demand for an explanation for 
each particular fact. The Five Ways are as follows: the first way concerns change, 
arguing that there must be an Unmoved Mover that originates all change; the second 
way argues that there must be a first cause to explain the existence of all other 
causes; the third way argues that because contingent beings exist (e.g. humans) there 
must be a necessary being who explains the existence of contingent beings; the 
fourth way notes the existence of degrees of excellence, and so posits a perfect being 
as the explanation as to the source of these excellences; lastly, the fifth way asserts 
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that the harmony of nature requires explanation, and that only a divine designer 
could sufficiently explain such a fact.15 
These cosmological arguments have come under attack in a great variety of forms 
since being propounded by Aquinas. However, for many critics, it is the truth or 
falsity of the PSR that is the key to the arguments’ success or failure. Perhaps the 
most durable of the Five Ways is the third, which offers an argument from 
contingency—Leibniz and Clarke both develop versions of this, and the debate 
continues today as to the soundness of some such formulation of the cosmological 
argument. 16 
As can be seen, none of the Five Ways in fact invokes the PSR in its full generality: 
that is, rather than baldly stating the general claim that every fact or event has a 
sufficient reason, Aquinas instead appeals to our intuition that, for this particular 
fact or event, there should be a complete explanation. Still, it seems likely that 
Aquinas himself would assent to the full-blown PSR, given the wide array of facts 
and events that he seems to assume do require an explanation. By contrast, Spinoza 
and Leibniz, enlightenment-era philosophers of a distinctly rationalist cast of mind, 
affirm the PSR explicitly and unashamedly, and afford the principle a central place in 
their respective philosophies. We will now examine how they applied the PSR, and 
the conclusions they derive from the principle. 
 
1.3 Spinoza and Leibniz 
Spinoza, while he cannot be credited with coining the term ‘Principle of Sufficient 
Reason,’ certainly makes extensive and explicit use of the principle. Spinoza phrases 
the PSR as follows: “For every thing a cause or reason must be assigned either for its 
existence or for its non-existence.”17   The most striking feature of Spinoza’s 
application of the PSR is that he takes it to entail necessitarianism. This is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The Five Ways appears in both Aquinas’s Summa Theologica (I, q.2) and his Summa Contra 
Gentiles (I, 13). For a concise summary of Aquinas’s cosmological arguments, see Pojman’s (2003) 
anthology, pp. 3-5. 
16 Leibniz (1991) develops the cosmological argument in The Ultimate Origination of Things (G VII 
302–3; L 486–8); and in Monadology (§37). See Rowe (1975: pp. 60-167) for a detailed account and 
critique of Clarke’s exposition of this argument. 
17 Spinoza (1992), p. 37. 
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metaphysical thesis that denies all mere possibility, and says that there is only one 
way that the world could be (i.e. how it in fact is). 
According to Spinoza, one class of objects (A) necessarily do not exist, the reason 
being that their very nature involves a contradiction. Examples of such things 
include square circles, or female bachelors. Next, we are told that another class of 
objects (B) exist of necessity on account of their nature, and these objects Spinoza 
terms ‘substances’. In fact, there is only one substance, and that is God. To say that 
God exists on account of his nature is to say that God’s very nature involves 
existence (since substances are self-caused, their essence necessarily involves 
existence).18  Further, there is nothing external to God that could prevent him 
existing, because “a substance of another nature would have nothing in common 
with God, and so could neither posit nor annul his existence.”19  
The last two classes of objects are those for which the reason for their existence or 
non-existence follows from “the order of universal, corporeal Nature.”20 That is, 
these objects are ones whose nature—and hence their existence—does not involve a 
contradiction; but neither does their non-existence involve a contradiction (unlike in 
the case of God). For such objects, it either “necessarily follows” that they exist, or 
else their present existence is “impossible” if there be some reason or cause 
preventing their existence. 21  In short, their existence or non-existence is fully 
determined by external factors. These two categories, then, comprise (C) every 
single existing object in the world—people, houses, animals, trees, planets etc.—or, 
to use Spinoza’s terminology all the various ‘modes’ of God, and (D) every non-
existent but not by nature contradictory object in the world—unicorns perhaps, or the 
Loch Ness monster, or spaghetti trees, and so forth. 
In summary, Spinoza uses the PSR to posit four categories of object, thereby creating 
the basis for his ontology. The four categories are: 
(A) Objects that are logically impossible (for example, square circles), whose 
nature involves a contradiction. 
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18 Ibid., Pr. 7 Proof, p. 34. 
19 Ibid., Pr. 11 Second Proof, p. 37. 
20 Ibid., Pr. 11 Second Proof, p. 37. 
21 Ibid., Pr. 11, Second Proof, p. 37. 
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(B) Objects that are logically necessary (that is, God), whose non-existence 
would involve a contradiction. 
(C) Objects that are logically possible (for example people and books), and 
whose existence necessarily follows from the order of universal corporeal 
nature. 
(D) Objects that are logically possible (again, people, books, and the like), but 
whose existence necessarily does not follow from the order of universal 
corporeal nature.22 
For Spinoza, we can see that it is a consequence of the PSR that everything that 
exists does so of necessity; and conversely, everything that does not exist, does not 
exist of necessity. Objects in categories (B) and (C) exist of necessity; objects in 
categories (A) and (D) necessarily do not exist. 
As Spinoza had done just a few decades before him, Leibniz also affords the PSR a 
central place in his philosophy—and as Spinoza had, Leibniz also uses the principle 
to argue for the existence of God.23 But Leibniz also makes novel use of the PSR. 
For example, he employs it to derive the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, a 
principle which precludes the possibility of there being two or more things that are 
exactly alike. The reason Leibniz adduces for the impossibility of there being two 
indistinguishable things is that, if (per impossible) two indistinguishable things were 
to exist, then God should have no reason to put them in different relations to the rest 
of the world from each other. Since nothing could explain their different relations to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The claim that the objects of categories (C) and (D) either exist or fail to exist necessarily despite 
not being logically necessary begs the question (in the non-philosophical sense of that phrase): in 
what sense are they presumed to be necessary? The answer, I believe, is that the objects of categories 
(C) and (D) should be considered metaphysically necessary. This option is advocated by Pruss, a 
present day PSR proponent. Precisely how the notion of the metaphysical necessity of some objects is 
to be elucidated, however, beyond simply stating that they follow from the order of universal 
corporeal nature, is not so clear. 
23 Spinoza’s basic idea is as follows: if God did not exist, then there would be some cause or reason 
for his non-existence; no cause or reason, either internal or external to God, could prevent him from 
existing; therefore, God necessarily exists. For an excellent exposition of all four of Spinoza’s 
arguments for the existence of God (three of which employ the PSR) see Lin’s (2007) article 
“Spinoza’s Arguments for the Existence of God.” Leibniz’s line of thought is somewhat different, and 
is more in keeping with traditional cosmological arguments. We can summarise his argument thus: as 
the PSR insists, contingent things require an explanation; the explanation of the series of contingent 
things cannot itself be part of this series, since then it would be self-explanatory (and contingent 
things by definition cannot be self-explanatory); so, the explanation must be something necessary and, 
given that any necessary being is God, it must be God. See fn. 16 for citations of Leibniz’s 
cosmological argument. 
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the world, it simply cannot be the case that two indiscernible things exist.24 A further 
novel use of the PSR, and one that is in fact a consequence of him adopting the 
principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, is that Leibniz infers from it that space is 
relational. According to Leibniz, space and time cannot themselves be substances, 
but must rather be merely a system of relations that obtain between bodies. The 
reason for this is that, if space were to be absolute, then it would be the case that 
different points in space would be exactly alike: that is, they would be indiscernible 
from one another.25 Once again, God could have no reason to treat one point in space 
differently from another, indiscernible, point in space. In such a situation, God 
would have to make an arbitrary decision about how to order the universe, and this 
(as per the PSR) cannot be countenanced.26 
How exactly did Leibniz express the PSR? Throughout his philosophical career 
Leibniz offers many statements of the principle, a characteristic one being:  
“[T]here can be no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient 
reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases.”27 
This statement of the PSR is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the scope of 
the PSR construed here is extremely broad, since not only does Leibniz state that 
there is a sufficient reason for the existence of things (as does Spinoza), but he 
declares further that there is a sufficient reason for any true proposition (a claim not 
explicitly made by Spinoza). In the case of propositions that refer to “necessary”28 
truths (such as mathematical and metaphysical truths), the sufficient reason for their 
truth, Leibniz claims, is that their negation is a contradiction. 29  The second 
noteworthy point about Leibniz’s formulation here is the last nine words, which 
serve to qualify the sentence. These make it clear that the PSR is not a claim that we 
can know the reason for any given event or truth, simply that there is a reason—that 
is, it is an ontological claim rather than an epistemic one.30 The PSR as construed by 
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24 Leibniz (1989), p. 42. 
25 Leibniz (1956b), 3.5. 
26 For an aggravatingly obtuse discussion of Leibniz’s relational theory of space, see Belot (2001), pp. 
62-70. 
27 Leibniz (1956a), p. 646.  
28 I use this term advisedly, since Spinoza of course maintains that all truths are necessary, those 
which refer to ostensibly contingent facts every bit as much as mathematical and metaphysical truths. 
29 See, for example, Monadology §36. 
30 This is not how the PSR has always been understood, which is why it is important to make it clear 
that this it is the Leibnizian definition which is of relevance to this thesis. An example of an epistemic 
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Leibniz, then, does not entail that we can (even if only in principle) always discover 
the sufficient reason for some truth or other: however, it does entail that, if some 
truth is known then there must be a sufficient reason for its being known.  
While Leibniz of course affirms the PSR and derives some interesting conclusions 
from it as detailed, he denies that it entails necessitarianism. Leibniz argues, as 
Abelard had before him, that our world is but one among many other possible 
worlds, chosen by God on the basis of the much-ridiculed Principle of the Best.31 
This Principle of the Best governs all “contingent” truths, as God supposedly created 
this world for the reason that it was the best among all possible worlds. This claim 
enables Leibniz (or so he believes) to avoid necessitarianism, since other, non-actual, 
worlds were potential candidates for actualisation. Leibniz elaborates as follows: 
propositions, he claims, are either true by absolute necessity (in which case their 
negation is a contradiction), “or by a kind of certainty which depends upon the 
supposed decree of a free substance in contingent matters, a decree, however, which 
is never entirely arbitrary and free from foundation, but for which some reason can 
always be given. This reason, however, merely inclines and does not truly 
necessitate.”32 (My italics) 
In response to this attempt to avoid necessitarianism, we should note that if God 
chose this world according to the Principle of the Best, then the choice was surely a 
necessary one, since the fact that this world is the best among possible worlds would 
necessitate God’s choice. A further point to note is that Leibniz’s assertion that 
sufficient reasons often incline without necessitating runs counter to a definition that 
he offers for the term ‘sufficient reason’ in the context of an argument for the PSR. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!
reading of the PSR is Wolff, who, according to Kant, “defines reason (or ground) as that from which 
it is possible to understand why something is rather than is not.” (Longueness (2001) p. 69) A further 
example of an epistemic reading of the PSR comes from Kiesewetter: “Logical ground or reason 
(reason of knowledge) is not to be confused with the general ground or reason (cause). The principle 
of sufficient reason belongs to logic, the principle of causality belongs to metaphysics. The former is 
the fundamental principle of thought, the latter that of experience. Cause concerns actual things, 
logical reason or grounds concerns only representation.” (cf. Schopenhauer (1974), p. 30) 
31 Most famously ridiculed by Voltaire of course, whose 1759 novel Candide satirises Leibnizian 
optimism by showing Dr. Pangloss, a teacher of Leibniz’s doctrine, blithely proclaiming the platitude 
that “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds” in the face of mounting evidence to the 
contrary. Hilarity ensues. 
32 Leibniz (1956a), p. 226. 
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Here, it is defined as follows: “A sufficient reason is that which is such that if it is 
posited the thing is.”33  
In summary, according to Leibniz himself, sufficient reasons never merely incline 
but rather by definition entail their explananda. Furthermore, if the Principle of the 
Best does indeed govern all supposedly contingent phenomena as Leibniz claims, 
then it seems to be impossible to avoid the very conclusion that Leibniz is so anxious 
to avoid - namely that everything happens of necessity.  Further discussion of this 
issue will be offered when it comes to examining van Inwagen’s modal argument 
against the PSR; but let us leave the discussion of necessitarianism for now and 
move on to investigate the use of the PSR in contemporary philosophical arguments. 
 
1.4 Modern Day 
The PSR has fallen out of favour somewhat since the era of Spinoza and Leibniz, a 
situation alluded to earlier when quoting Della Rocca’s observation that the PSR has 
faced a “direct frontal assault” in both recent and not-so-recent years. Some of these 
arguments against the PSR will be appraised shortly, but before examining these we 
would do well to note that, notwithstanding this “assault,” the PSR is still very much 
in use. This usage is either explicit or else it is implicit, and an example of each will 
now be sketched. 
For a well-known argument in which commitment to the PSR (or to some sort of 
explicability principle at least) is in evidence, we need look no further Parfit’s 
writing on personal identity.34 Parfit presents us with a thought experiment, which he 
terms “My Division.” We are asked to imagine that Parfit is an identical triplet, to 
whom the following unbelievably dire situation occurs: 
My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two brothers. My brain is divided, and each half is 
successfully transplanted into the body of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people believes 
that he is me, seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every other way 
psychologically continuous with me.35 
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33 Adams (1994), p. 68. 
34 Parfit (1984), pp. 239-259. 
35 Ibid., pp. 254-5. 
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In response to the obvious thought that such a scenario is impossible (after all, no 
such brain transplant has ever been—or likely could ever be—performed) Parfit 
justifiably responds that this impossibility is “merely technical.”36 That is, it is not 
logically impossible that such a procedure should happen, and in fact “[t]he one 
feature of the case which in fact might be considered deeply impossible—the 
division of a person’s consciousness into two separate streams—is the feature that 
has actually happened.”37 
So, if we accept this hypothetical scenario as Parfit urges we must, we are faced with 
the question of what has become of Parfit. The options, Parfit suggests, are as 
follows: 
(1) Parfit does not survive. 
(2) Parfit survives as one of the two people. 
(3) Parfit survives as the other person. 
(4) Parfit survives as both. 
It is options (2) and (3) that interest us here, as it is to these options that the PSR is 
employed in order to conclude that neither one provides a satisfactory answer. In 
Parfit’s own words: 
Consider the next two possibilities [i.e. (2) and (3)]. Perhaps one success is the maximum score. 
Perhaps I shall be one of the two resulting people. The objection here is that, in this case, each half of 
my brain is exactly similar, and so, to start with is each resulting person. Given these facts, how can I 
survive as only one of the two people? What can make me one of them rather than the other?38 
Parfit seems to be asking: what could possibly count as a reason for claiming that he 
should survive as one of these two people rather than as the other? Since each half of 
his brain is exactly similar, there cannot be any reason to plump for (2) as opposed to 
(3), or vice versa. And, in the absence of any reason, it cannot be that Parfit is one of 
them but not the other. Such an admission of a brute fact would be unacceptable.39 
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36 Ibid., p. 255. 
37 Ibid., p. 255. I am taking Parfit at his word when he says that the division of a person’s 
consciousness into two separate streams has actually happened, since I am unaware of the case 
myself. 
38 Ibid., p. 256. 
39 It should be noted however that, shortly after presenting his argument, Parfit does consider the 
possibility that he might become one or another of the two people at random: “In my example, there 
would be no reason why the particular ego that I am should wake up as one of the two resulting 
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We move now from an example of the implicit application of the PSR to its explicit 
use, in the form of modern variants on the cosmological argument. It is Aquinas’s 
third way that has proved most resilient, and which receives a contemporary 
formulation from Reichenbach, who states the argument as follows:40 
(1) A contingent being exists. 
a. This contingent being is caused either (i) by itself, or (ii) by 
another. 
b. If it were caused by itself, it would have to precede itself in 
existence, which is impossible. 
(2) Therefore this contingent being (ii) is caused by another, i.e. it depends on 
something else for its existence. 
(3) That which causes (provides the sufficient reason for) the existence of any 
contingent being must be either (iii) another contingent being, or (iv) a non-
contingent (necessary) being. 
c. If (iii), then this contingent cause must itself be caused by another, 
and so on to infinity 
(4) Therefore that which causes (provides the sufficient reason for) the existence 
of any contingent being must be either (v) an infinite series of contingent 
beings, or (iv) a necessary being. 
(5) An infinite series of contingent beings (v) is incapable of yielding a sufficient 
reason for the existence of any being.  
Therefore a necessary being (iv) exists. 41 
The PSR is central to this argument since, as premise (2) states, a contingent being 
must be caused by something else, which is to say something else provides the 
sufficient reason for the contingent being’s existence. For present purposes, this 
argument is of interest on account of the debate that it has engendered not only as to 
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people. But this might just happen, in a random way, as is claimed for fundamental particles.” (pp. 
258-9) It thus seems that Parfit takes consideration of the PSR to count as reasonable grounds for 
rejecting the claim that he would survive in the body of one or the other of his identical triplet 
brothers; but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that he should survive in one or the other of his 
brothers for no reason whatsoever. Explanations are to be preferred, then, but cannot for all that be 
presumed. 
40 Although I have chosen to present Reichenbach’s formulation of the cosmological argument, his is 
by no means the only recent formulation to rely on the PSR. Others include: Gale and Pruss (1999); 
Leftow (1988), and; Meyer (1987). For recent formulations that avoid the PSR, see White (1979), 
and; Katz (1997).   
41 Reichenbach (1972), pp. 19-20. 
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whether the PSR is true, but also as to what kind of a truth the PSR would be were it 
to be true.   
To examine this latter point first, Clarke, an earlier proponent of this variety of 
cosmological argument, appears to believe that the PSR is a necessary truth. He 
declares: 
‘Tis easy to conceive, that we may indeed be utterly ignorant of the reasons or grounds, or causes of 
many things. But, that anything is; and that there is a real reason in nature why it is, rather than not; 
these two are as necessarily and essentially connected, as any two correlates whatever.42 
But Clarke’s contention no longer holds so much sway, since it is plausible that only 
analytic truths are also necessary truths, and the PSR does not appear to be analytic.43 
Taylor suggests a different account of the status of the PSR, arguing that its truth is 
not necessary but is, nevertheless, a fact that we inevitably presuppose in our 
thinking. In Taylor’s words: 
One can deny that [the PSR] is true, without embarrassment or fear of refutation, but one is apt to find 
that what he is denying is not really what the principle asserts. We shall, then, treat it here as a 
datum—not something that is provably true, but as something which all men, whether they ever 
reflect upon it or not, seem more or less to presuppose.44 
Taylor’s characterisation of the PSR—that it is a truth that is presupposed in our 
thinking—leads us onto discussion of the former point, which was the issue of 
whether the PSR is in fact true. First, Taylor’s claim that we do presuppose the PSR 
in our thinking is challenged by Rowe, who contends that it is in fact perfectly 
natural to doubt its truth. Rowe highlights the example of the scientist whom he 
thinks might very well not presuppose that everything has an explanation in terms of 
a cause (this possibility will be explored in more depth when we examine the current 
state of quantum theory).45 Second, Russell also challenges the assertion that the 
PSR is a presupposition of thought, as he counters that we need not suppose that 
there is any explanation for the universe as a whole, even if it turns out that there are 
always explanations within it: in his words, the universe is “just there, and that’s 
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42 Clarke (1998), p. 490. 
43 Rowe (1975: p. 83) expresses this intuition as follows: “The idea of an event, of something 
happening—a leaf falling, a chair collapsing—does not seem to contain the idea of something causing 
that event. If this is so, then PSR is not analytically true.”  
44 Taylor (1963), pp. 86-7. 
45 Rowe (1975), p. 88. 
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all.” 46  Third, Rowe argues that, even if it is conceded that the PSR is a 
presupposition of reason, this is no guarantee of its truth: “The fact, if it is a fact, that 
all of us presuppose that whatever exists has an explanation of its existence does not 
imply that nothing exists without a reason for its existence. Nature is not bound to 
satisfy our presuppositions.”47 
As stated earlier, this survey is not intended as an exhaustive account of the history 
of the PSR’s application, although it is hoped that it will provide an indication of 
many of its most important uses. In any case, now that the history of the principle 
has been sketched, we can move on in the following chapter to examining the 
arguments both for and against it in more detail.  
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46 Russell, in Hick (1964), p. 175. This assertion can be traced back to Hume, who argued in a similar 
vein that the universe as a whole required no explanation over and above its constituent parts, and has 
been charged (rightly or wrongly) with committing the fallacy of composition (the assumption that 
explanation of the parts of a thing is sufficient as an explanation of the whole).  
47 Rowe (1975), p. 93. 
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2 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arguments For and Against the PSR 
 
While the job of the previous chapter was to offer a brief historical survey of the PSR 
in order to understand its uses, the present chapter aims to answer the following 
crucial question: is the PSR true? To that end, a total of six arguments will be 
considered, three of which conclude that the PSR is true, while the other three 
conclude the opposite. Arguments in favour of the PSR will be considered first, 
beginning with the first known formal argument for the principle, articulated by 
Leibniz. Arguments against include Hume’s influential attack on the PSR, and an 
argument that causeless quantum phenomena provide evidence for the falsity of the 
principle. 
The hope is that, by careful examination of the arguments, we might come to know 
whether we should embrace the PSR or else reject it. Not only that, but we should 
have a clearer idea of what else is entailed by the rejection or acceptance of the PSR. 
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2.1 Arguments For the PSR 
In his Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Schopenhauer remarks:  
[T]o seek a proof for the principle of sufficient reason in particular is especially absurd and is 
evidence of a want of reflection [since] whoever requires a proof for this principle, i.e., the 
demonstration of a ground or reason, already assumes thereby that it is true; in fact he bases his 
demand on this very assumption. He therefore finds himself involved in that circle of demanding a 
proof for the right to demand a proof.1 
At the risk of being charged with absurdity and betraying a pitiable absence of 
reflection, seeking proofs for the PSR is precisely what I intend to do in the first half 
of this chapter! This small act of rebellion against Schopenhauer does not imply that 
the issue he raises here is not worthy of addressing. On the contrary, there is a 
seeming absurdity and circularity to the question: is there a sufficient reason for the 
truth of the principle of sufficient reason?2 What I would wish to claim, though, is 
that it is just that—i.e. it is a seeming absurdity and circularity, and not an actual 
one.3 Schopenhauer is not correct to state that “whoever requires a proof for this 
principle […] already assumes thereby that it is true,” as it is of course common to 
demand proofs for all sorts of claims without such demands being construed as tacit 
acceptance of the PSR. In this respect, requiring a proof of the PSR is no different to 
requiring a proof for any other putative truth. 
With this in mind, let us turn to our arguments in favour of the PSR. There are three 
to be examined: first, an argument courtesy of Leibniz, who offers us definitions 
followed by a demonstration of the supposed fact that, whatever is has a sufficient 
reason; second, a Wolffian argument, originally presented in his Ontologia, to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Schopenhauer (1974), pp. 32-3. Schopenhauer’s choice of language in the above passage is 
somewhat ambiguous: is he simply opposed to the idea that we should demand a proof for the PSR; or 
is he making the altogether stronger claim that even to seek a proof is misguided? We can certainly do 
the latter without being committed to the former, although Schopenhauer fails to acknowledge this. 
Still, from the context in which Schopenhauer writes—a brief diatribe against the “fruitless attempts” 
of others to prove the PSR—and his explicit statement earlier in the same chapter that he “[hopes] to 
show […] that the principle in general cannot be proved,” we can be left in no doubt that it is the 
stronger of the two claims that Schopenhauer wishes to advance. 
2 A similar point is made by Leibniz (1956a: p. 717) who, after describing the PSR as a principle that 
states the “want” of a sufficient reason for any truth or event, asks: “Is this a principle that wants to be 
proved?” 
3 Aside from the seeming absurdity and circularity of providing a proof for the PSR, a further 
explanation for the comparative lack of arguments for the principle is that its truth is considered so 
evident that it simply requires no defence. Pruss (2011: pp. 13-4) writes: “[T]hose philosophers who 
accept the PSR typically do so because they take it to be self-evident and hence only in need of 
refinement and defence from attempts at disproof, but not in need of proof.” 
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effect that the falsity of the PSR would entail a contradiction, and hence the PSR 
must be true; and finally, a contemporary line of defence presented by Pruss, who 
argues that the PSR cannot be denied except on pain of irrationality. Each argument 
will be followed by critical discussion. 
 
2.1.1   Leibniz’s Argument 
Leibniz provides the very first argument for the PSR which, accordingly, we shall 
examine first. This argument makes its initial appearance in the early 1670s, 
relatively early in Leibniz’s philosophical career, and is restated a couple of times 
hence, the final time in 1716.4 We are first provided with a couple of definitions, and 
following on from these, a demonstration of the truth of the PSR is presented: 
Definition 1: A sufficient reason is that which is such that if it is posited the thing is 
Definition 2: A requirement is that which is such that if it is not posited the thing is 
not 
Demonstration: 
(1) Whatever is, has all its requirements (for, by def. 2, if one of them is not 
posited, the thing is not). 
(2) If all its requirements are posited, the thing is (for if it is not, it will be kept 
from being by the lack of something, that is, a requirement). 
Therefore all the requirements are a sufficient reason by def. 1. 
Therefore whatever is has a sufficient reason.5 
Leibniz’s strategy, then, is to define the terms ‘sufficient reason’ and ‘requirement,’ 
and employ these definitions to support both his premises and conclusions. Another 
way of phrasing Leibniz’s conclusion would be to say: if and only if a thing has all 
its requirements—or, what amounts to the same thing, has a sufficient reason—then 
it exists. Leibniz supports this conclusion by the use of seemingly acceptable 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The initial statement of the argument is to be found in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (1986: VI, ii, 
483); it is then repeated in the same source (VI, iii, 118); and finally it makes an abridged appearance 
in Leibniz’s last letter to the redoubtable Samuel Clarke (V, 18). 
5 I understand Leibniz’s use of “is” in the statement “whatever is has a sufficient reason” to have the 
broadest application. In other words, I take it not only to mean that the existence of any particular 
thing requires explanation, but also that changes in state of any thing requires explanation. 
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definitions and premises that together lead ineluctably to the PSR. Nevertheless, 
many have found problems with both Leibniz’s definitions and his premises, and we 
shall consider some of these now. 
A first criticism to mention—and one which will be examined in greater detail when 
considering arguments against the PSR—comes from Hume. This criticism questions 
the truth of premise (1): Hume’s contention is that, while Leibniz correctly defines a 
‘requirement’ as anything that, if it is not posited, renders the ‘thing’ in question 
non-existent, he groundlessly assumes that all ‘things’ must in fact have 
requirements. So, while any existent thing must possess all of its requirements for 
being if it has any (and the mere definition of ‘requirement’ is a testament to this 
truth), this does not entail—and indeed it is not the case, says Hume—that all things 
actually have requirements.  
How might the claim that all things have requirements be undermined, according to 
Hume? The answer is: by questioning the veracity of the law of causality. Hume 
argues that, contrary to what is generally assumed, we can easily conceive of a thing 
coming into being without any cause at all: “ ‘Tis a general maxim in philosophy, 
that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly 
taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded […] But 
we shall discover in this maxim no mark of any such intuitive certainty.”6 And if a 
thing can come into existence in the absence of any cause, that thing plausibly lacks 
any requirements for its existence, and will therefore provide a counterexample to 
premise (1). 
In fact, it is not that Hume provides a concrete example of any particular thing that 
causelessly exists; but that providing one is not necessary for his argument, as far as 
Hume sees it at least. Instead, what Hume wishes to claim is that it is possible to 
conceive of a thing’s coming to exist causelessly; and anything that can be conceived 
of without contradiction or absurdity is “therefore incapable of being refuted by any 
reasoning from mere ideas; without which ‘tis impossible to demonstrate the 
necessity of a cause.”7 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Hume (1972), pp. 78-9. 
7 Ibid., p. 80. 
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As mentioned, Hume’s critique of the PSR will be exposited and critiqued at greater 
length when we come to examine arguments against the PSR. For now, it is 
sufficient to note that one possible line of attack on Leibniz’s argument available to 
the PSR sceptic is to deny premise (1) on the grounds that it falsely assumes that all 
things have requirements.  
A second criticism of the argument, rather unsurprisingly, questions premise (2). The 
claim advanced in premise (2) that, if all the requirements of a thing are posited then 
that thing exists, is called into question by evidence from contemporary physics. 
Again, this line of attack will be examined in greater detail in the succeeding section 
(‘Arguments against the PSR’), although the criticism can be sketched here. 
According to many—perhaps the majority—of quantum physicists, experimental 
results from this field establish the fact that there is a certain degree of randomness 
to some quantum events. And if this is correct, if experimental results do indeed 
establish the fact that there is randomness at the quantum level, then it must surely be 
correct to say that there are some instances in which all the requirements for some 
thing are present, yet that thing fails to occur. 
To offer a concrete example in order to make the objection to Leibniz’s second 
premise clearer, we need look no further than the famous Schroedinger’s Cat thought 
experiment.8 According to this scenario, devised by Schroedinger in 1935, a cat is to 
be placed in a steel chamber together with a Geiger counter and a tiny amount of 
radioactive substance. In the course of one hour, there is a 50% chance of one of the 
atoms from the radioactive substance decaying. If an atom does decay, then the 
counter tube will discharge, which will release a hammer that will in turn shatter a 
flask of hydrocyanic acid, thus killing the cat. 
What makes this scenario a potential counterexample to premise (2) is that, 
according to the PSR critic, no explanation can be proffered as to why an atom 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 However, it should be noted that Schroedinger himself would not necessarily consider his thought 
experiment to be a counter-example to Leibniz’s second premise. This is because the purpose of 
Schroedinger’s thought experiment, as he saw it, was to provide a reductio of the prevailing 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, according to which the cat remains in what is 
known as a ‘superposition’ of states (i.e. both dead and alive) until an experimenter opens the steel 
chamber containing the cat. So, Schroedinger’s thought experiment is designed to highlight the 
absurdity of describing the cat as remaining in a superposition of dead and alive states until the box is 
opened, although the example also serves as a vivid illustration of supposed indeterminacy at the 
quantum level. 
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either decays or fails to do so. All that can be said—and, indeed, all that there is to 
it—is that over the course of one hour there is a 50% chance of one of the atoms 
decaying, and a 50% chance that no atom will decay. This chance event at the 
quantum level translates into a chance event at the macroscopic level, with 
potentially catastrophic consequences for the unsuspecting cat. And the thought now 
is: it seems reasonable to characterise this situation as one in which all the requisites 
are in place to kill the cat, yet the cat might get lucky and live. Note, crucially, that 
the fortuitous feline’s survival would be entirely providential, and not due to the 
absence of any requirement to kill it. In this way, Schroedinger’s Cat presents a 
challenge to Leibniz’s claim that, if all requirements for some thing are posited, then 
that thing is. 
A further question is whether this objection should be taken as a challenge not just to 
premise (2), but also to the very definition of the term ‘sufficient reason.’ Pruss 
certainly thinks that this is a possibility, and thinks that by doing so one can thereby 
rescue the PSR itself. Pruss says of quantum systems such as that described in the 
Schroedinger’s Cat thought experiment: “[we can] say that the system’s initial state 
and its randomly causing A explain why A occurred.”9 On this interpretation of the 
thought experiment, then, all the requirements for the cat being killed provide the 
sufficient reason for the cat’s being killed, although, contrary to Leibniz’s definition 
of sufficient reason, these being posited do not entail that the cat will in fact be 
killed. Only after the fact can we know whether the cat will survive, since this will 
be determined by the chance event of an atom of radioactive substance decaying 
within the allotted timeframe. This defence of the PSR would be of no comfort to 
Leibniz, we can safely imagine, since it comes at too high a price: that is, it requires 
a fairly radical redefining of the concept of sufficient reason, one that admits of 
arbitrariness. 
As mentioned earlier, this quantum mechanical objection will be examined in further 
detail when we look at arguments against the PSR. For now, and by way of 
summary, I want to add simply that Leibniz’s argument is particularly useful since it 
spells out so clearly what the originator (and to those that believe, the discoverer!) of 
the PSR understood the principle to mean, and upon what assumptions it is founded. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Pruss (2011), p. 168. 
30!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
Both Leibniz’s assumptions and definitions have been questioned, and we shall 
revisit these soon in the section on ‘Arguments against the PSR’ to see whether 
either his understanding of the PSR was faulty, or indeed whether the PSR is just 
plain false. Before we do, though, there are a couple more arguments to consider in 
favour of the PSR, the following one propounded by Wolff, the most eminent 
German philosopher to follow Leibniz.  
 
2.1.2   Wolff’s Argument 
In §70 of his Ontologia, Wolff provides the following statement of what he is setting 
out to prove: 
“Nothing exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist. That is, if 
something is posited to exist, something must also be posited that explains why the first thing exists 
rather than does not exist.”10 
We can see from this quote that Wolff takes an epistemic reading of the PSR, 
according to which not only do all things have reasons for existing, but these reasons 
must be knowable by us. Note how this stands in contrast to Leibniz who, more 
circumspectly, qualified his statement that all things have reasons by admitting: “we 
cannot know these reasons in most cases.”11  
Nevertheless, Wolff’s argument does not depend on understanding the PSR 
epistemically—it can just as profitably be used in defence of Leibniz’s non-
epistemic interpretation. Here is the argument as stated by Wolff: 
(1) Either (i) nothing exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather 
than does not exist, or else (ii) something can exist without a sufficient 
reason for why it exists rather than does not exist (§53). 
(2) If (ii), then some A exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather 
than does not exist (§56). 
Therefore nothing is to be posited that explains why A exists: A is admitted to 
exist because nothing is assumed to exist. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Wolff (1736), pp. 47-9. 
11 Leibniz (1956a), p. 646. 
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But this is absurd (§69). Therefore, nothing exists without a sufficient reason; 
and if something is posited to exist, something else must be assumed that 
explains why that thing exists.12 
The crucial step in this argument, it is widely considered, is the conclusion preceding 
the reductio, which is drawn from the two premises. In fact, Wolff draws two 
conclusions: while the sentences appear, on the face of it, to be articulating the same 
point in slightly different words, an equivocation is in fact revealed on analysis. The 
first—and incontrovertibly correct—conclusion is that, if some A is posited which 
lacks a sufficient reason for why it exists (as the PSR critic is bound to maintain), 
then “nothing is to be posited that explains why A exists.” The second conclusion is 
the part that all of Wolff’s critics have seized on as false, which is: “A is admitted to 
exist because nothing is assumed to exist.” This amounts to an equivocation since 
Wolff is using the word ‘nothing’ to mean different things in these two sentences, 
the first time legitimately and the second time not so. The first time, Wolff correctly 
concludes that, if the PSR is false then there is at least some thing (A) for which 
nothing can be posited that would explain its existence. The second time Wolff uses 
the term ‘nothing’, he claims that this nothing is (absurdly) what the PSR critic must 
posit in order to explain A’s existence; but of course the PSR critic can justly counter 
that this is a flagrant misunderstanding of what he means by saying that “nothing can 
be posited” to explain a certain thing’s existence. He means, of course, that no thing 
can be posited, and not that nothing must be considered to be something. 
In brief then, Wolff purports to reveal a contradiction that follows from the 
assumption that something exists without a sufficient reason: ‘nothing’ must 
absurdly be assumed to exist. Since this flouts the Principle of Contradiction (the 
PoC), the conclusion (which is the PSR) is claimed to follow.  
In summary of Wolff’s argument, there are two main points that I wish to note. 
Firstly, it is perplexing that Wolff should present such a bad argument. The 
seemingly wilful misuse of the notion of ‘nothing’ admits of no ready explanation, 
and Hume’s assessment of the argument as “sophistical” is surely correct.13 Still, 
perhaps we can understand why Wolff might construct such an argument if we 
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12 Wolff (1736), p. 47. 
13 A judgment Kant appears to borrow when he concludes: “It is not difficult to escape the sophistry 
of the argument.” (NE 1:398) 
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consider the context in which it was created. For Wolff, the issue of philosophical 
first principles was a pressing one, and he was keen in particular to resolve the issue 
of the relation between the PoC and the PSR, the two great principles handed down 
to him from Leibniz. And so the second point to note is that, in constructing his 
argument for the PSR, Wolff felt that he had found a means not only of 
demonstrating his conclusion, but also of showing how the PSR follows from the 
PoC, thereby neatly solving the problem of the hierarchy of principles. Now, with 
the failure of Wolff’s argument, we are left with the question of what to conclude 
regarding both the relation between and the veracity of these two principles. Perhaps 
the failure of Wolff’s argument indicates that the PSR cannot be derived from the 
PoC, and that both principles should simply be considered as axiomatic and not 
amenable to proofs.14 Perhaps the most modest and therefore reasonable conclusion 
would simply be that the jury is out on whether the PSR is derivable from the PoC—
Wolff’s attempt was unsuccessful; but this does not preclude the possibility of future 
success on this score. Or perhaps, as Hume would argue, it is evidence (one piece 
among many) that the PSR is false. Certainly this latter conclusion would be far too 
hasty a one to draw yet, especially given that we have one more argument to 
examine in favour of the PSR. This final argument is suggested by Pruss, a modern-
day PSR advocate. 
 
2.1.3   Argument from Rationality 
Pruss presents an argument for the PSR from rationality. It is extremely 
straightforward and is often only presented, says Pruss, as a straw man argument by 
the PSR critic for the purposes of being swiftly refuted. Nevertheless, Pruss thinks 
that there is more to the argument than is commonly suspected, and he goes on to 
defend it after presenting it. I shall follow suit here by stating the argument and then 
offering a defence. The argument runs as follows: 
(1) The PSR says reality is rational, and denying the PSR is to admit to some 
degree of irrationality in reality. 
(2) It is irrational to suppose reality to be in any degree irrational. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 This line of thinking would certainly appeal to Schopenhauer, who as we saw argued that the PSR 
is an innate principle that cannot be further analysed without descending into absurdity. 
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Therefore it is irrational to deny the PSR.15 
The argument as presented is valid. The first premise is not really contestable either: 
it is hard to think of a clearer statement of a belief in the all-encompassing rationality 
of our world than the PSR, since it affirms as an exceptionless fact that nothing can 
be true in the absence of a sufficient reason. The burden must then fall on the second 
premise, which does indeed require considerable justification. 
The first and most obvious thing to say about the second premise is that the PSR 
sceptic might well claim that there is nothing prima facie irrational about supposing 
that reality is not fully rational. The belief in the (partial) irrationality of reality 
might be compared to the belief that some individual (Kim Jong Il, say) is irrational: 
just as it is not irrational to claim that Kim Jong Il is irrational (on the contrary, he 
manifestly is), so is it not irrational to claim that reality is irrational. 
While the PSR critic must surely accept the fact that it need not be prima facie 
irrational to think that reality is not always rational, I think the analogy is sufficiently 
disanalogous to allow the PSR proponent to further motivate the second premise. 
The purpose of the analogy was to show that it is not in all instances irrational to 
judge something to be irrational: just as it is prima facie rational to judge Kim Jong 
Il to be irrational, so too is it rational to judge reality itself not to be—at least not at 
all times—rational. Accepting this point, however, it is still open to the PSR 
proponent to provide reasons for thinking that, on reflection, it is irrational to 
suppose reality to be irrational.  
A first consideration is that the irrationality imputed to persons such as Kim Jong Il 
and the irrationality imputed to reality as a whole are in fact two very different 
things. To say that a person is irrational can mean any number of things: that they are 
sometimes unpredictable; that they act in ways that go against the interests of 
themselves or others; or that their actions are often capricious or ill considered. It 
only takes a moment’s reflection to note that reality cannot sensibly be considered to 
be irrational in all of the above ways: reality, not being a person, has no will and thus 
cannot act at all, either in ways that help or hinder its own or others’ interests; 
similarly, lacking personhood, irrationality cannot be imputed to reality in the sense 
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15 Pruss (2011), p. 249. I have adapted Pruss’s own rendering of the argument slightly in order to 
ensure its validity. 
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of it acting capriciously or in an ill-considered manner (although for poetic purposes 
we occasionally talk as though it can, as when we bemoan being ‘dealt a cruel hand 
by fate’ and so forth). 
Nevertheless, while different, there is overlap between the two usages, and this 
overlap consists in the notion of unpredictability. The PSR sceptic will want to claim 
that, just as certain people’s behaviour can be irrational in the sense of being 
unpredictable, so too is reality as a whole irrational in just this sense. But in fact the 
claim is stronger than that: it is not just that reality is considered by the PSR sceptic 
to be unpredictable in practice, but rather that it is unpredictable in principle. That is, 
the unpredictability of reality is not merely a reflection of some epistemic weakness 
on our part—it is not a consequence of our inability to discern the connections 
between things, as it were—but is instead a reflection of the ontological fact that 
reality does not always conform to laws. The PSR proponent can hardly deny that 
aspects of reality are, at least at the present moment, beyond our capacity to fully 
explain or predict, with quantum mechanical events providing one such example of 
our epistemic limitations. But the PSR proponent will deny what the sceptic urges, 
that from this and other examples it should further be inferred that reality is irrational 
in the sense that there are some facts that are not amenable to explanation even to an 
omniscient mind. So here we come to the crux of the debate between the PSR 
proponent and sceptic: while the former affirms that all things are in principle 
explicable even if not in practice, the latter believes that there are at least some 
things which are explicable neither in principle nor in practice. 
What can we say in favour of the PSR proponent’s assertion that all things are at 
least in principle explicable, and that it is irrational to suppose otherwise? A first 
point to make is to suggest that an attitude of assuming that all things are explicable 
given enough inquiry is one that is bound to prove more beneficial to science and to 
making new discoveries. If we believe, on the other hand, that it is the case that some 
facts of nature simply have no explanation, such an attitude will surely be prejudicial 
to the search for truth and explanation. In fact, if we assume that the PSR is false, 
then the worry might be that this could open the door to a profoundly anti-rational 
scepticism. 
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While it is true that, from the point of view of scientific discovery it is better to err 
on the side of assuming that a given fact or event is explicable, this is not argument 
enough to support the conclusion that it is positively irrational to suppose that our 
universe might not always conform to law-like behaviour. The additional claim that 
assuming the PSR to be false leaves the way open for an anti-rational scepticism is 
unfair also, since the PSR sceptic can say that there are principled reasons for 
thinking that in specific instances—such as regarding events at the quantum level - 
the universe defies rationality.16 In summary, if the PSR proponent’s argument for 
the second premise rests solely on the claim that assuming the truth of the PSR will 
prove beneficial to science, then the PSR sceptic is entitled to respond that, while this 
may be true, it in no way implies that all facts and events do in fact conform to 
reason. The PSR proponent’s point here is a merely pragmatic one, counselling an 
attitude of open-mindedness regarding the possibility of uncovering the universe’s 
secrets. Acceptance of this approach in no way compels the PSR sceptic to forsake 
the belief that our universe will at times defy rationality. 
More can be said, however, in defence of premise (2), besides urging the pragmatic 
benefits of assuming that our universe conforms to reason. A further important point 
to note is that we typically have a desire to seek explanations. The fact that we 
possess this desire indicates (it could be argued) that there are explanations to be 
sought, since we do not normally form desires for things that do not exist.17 In 
response to this, of course, the PSR sceptic would certainly counter that a desire for 
explanation can simply be seen as an evolutionarily useful trait, and not as evidence 
that there are in all instances explanations to be uncovered. Again, the desire for 
explanation is of pragmatic benefit, since in instances in which there are 
explanations to be found, having the desire to uncover these is a prerequisite to 
actually uncovering them. In this way, our desire is for explanation can itself be 
explained by the PSR sceptic without them needing to concede that all things without 
exception must yield an explanation. 
As has been shown, the second premise of this argument is certainly its most 
contentious feature, and this discussion unfortunately leaves the debate concerning 
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16 The principled reason might be something along the lines of: after extensive observations and 
experiments, certain facts or events seem to resist all rational explanation. 
17 For further discussion of this point, see §72, §73, and §74 of Wolff (1736), and Gurr (1959), pp. 41-
2. 
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its truth unresolved. However, we can see more clearly now a central bone of 
contention between the PSR proponent and sceptic, which is the issue of whether the 
unpredictability of certain features of our world should be characterised as epistemic 
or ontic. That is, do apparent violations of the PSR simply reflect our ignorance 
regarding the workings of our world as the PSR proponent insists (and thus are these 
violations merely apparent), or do they rather provide evidence that sufficient 
reasons are not to be found in all instances as the PSR critic believes? This is a 
question which we will be in a better position to answer at the end of the following 
section, which deals with arguments against the PSR. Certain supposed non-
deterministic events, such as those posited by “standard interpretation” of quantum 
phenomena, will be considered as counter-examples to the claim that the PSR is an 
exceptionless truth. The first argument to consider in detail against the PSR, 
however, is Hume’s, which we will revisit having already briefly assayed his 
challenge to Leibniz’s claim that whatever is has all its requirements.  
 
2.2 Arguments Against the PSR 
Three more arguments are to be considered in this section, this time for the opposite 
conclusion: that the PSR is false. The first argument, both historically and in the 
order in which we shall examine them, is Hume’s, which relies on the idea that there 
is nothing contradictory in the notion of a thing existing or something happening 
without a reason or cause. A second argument, a good deal more contemporary this 
time, comes from van Inwagen, who argues that the PSR is false since assuming its 
truth involves accepting an absurd consequence: namely, that everything happens of 
necessity and thus that all modal distinctions are an illusion. The final argument can 
actually be considered as a cluster of arguments possessing the same form. The idea 
is that there is some actual event or phenomenon in the world that can be shown to 
lack a sufficient reason for its happening. Contenders for this status of ‘Reasonless 
Event or Phenomenon’ include quantum phenomena, certain freely willed human 
actions, and even the universe in its entirety. In this section, it is quantum 
phenomena that will be under the microscope. 
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2.2.1   Hume’s Argument 
Hume’s sceptical view of causality has proved hugely influential. In fact, regarding 
Hume’s attack on common sense metaphysical views of causation, no lesser person 
than Kant was to declare:  “I freely admit that it was the remembrance of David 
Hume which, many years ago, first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my 
investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a completely different 
direction.”18 Still, not all have been so quick to praise Hume’s work in this area, with 
Schopenhauer dismissively claiming: “Everyone at once feels the fallacy [of Hume’s 
argument].”19 The task before us now is to set out Hume’s argument, whose 
conclusion is that the common belief in the necessity of a cause to all things is false, 
and then to judge whether to side with Kant or Schopenhauer in our assessment of it. 
Hume’s challenge to the PSR lies in the claim that we can easily conceive of a thing 
coming into being without any cause at all. He asserts:  
“‘Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence. 
This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded […] But 
we shall discover in this maxim no mark of any such intuitive certainty.”20  
Here we have Hume’s conclusion: that, contrary to popular wisdom, it is not the case 
that whatever begins to exist requires a cause to explain its existence. And how does 
he justify this conclusion? By arguing that the proposition that ‘whatever has a 
beginning has also a cause of existence’ is incapable of being demonstrated, as 
follows: 
We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of 
existence, without showing at the same time the impossibility there is, that anything can ever exist 
without some productive principle; and where the latter proposition cannot be proved, we must 
despair of ever being able to prove the former.21 
Hume goes on to argue that we cannot prove the latter: 
[A]s the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy for us to conceive any object to 
be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause 
or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of 
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18 Kant (2004) 4, 260; 10.  
19 Schopenhauer (1974), p. 29.  
20 Hume (1972), pp. 81-2. 
21 Ibid., p. 82. 
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existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these 
objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction or absurdity; and is therefore incapable of 
being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which ‘tis impossible to demonstrate the 
necessity of a cause22  
We can state Hume’s argument as follows: 
(1) If causes are demonstrably necessary, then we must be able to demonstrate 
the impossibility of anything coming to exist without some productive 
principle. 
(2) It is easy to conceive of some object being non-existent one moment and 
existent the next. 
(3) Whatever we can conceive of—those things that imply no contradiction or 
absurdity—is possible. 
Therefore it is possible for something to come to exist without some 
productive principle (contra premise (1) consequent). 
Therefore it is not the case that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of 
existence (contra premise (1) antecedent).23 
Premises (1) and (3) of Hume’s argument will be questioned, beginning with 
Premise (1). Hume asserts that, if causes are demonstrably necessary, then it must be 
possible to demonstrate the impossibility of anything existing without a cause. In 
fact, there is nothing objectionable about this assertion: it is true that, were it 
possible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause, then this would entail the 
impossibility of anything existing in the absence of a cause. The objection, rather, 
lies in Hume’s demand that the PSR proponent must be able to demonstrate the 
necessity of a cause: in response we can observe that, even though we remain unable 
to provide any demonstration as to why it is the case, causes might very well be 
universally necessary. If this is correct, then it must equally be the case that, despite 
being unable to demonstrate the impossibility of anything coming to exist in the 
absence of a cause, such an occurrence is as a matter of fact impossible. The 
accusation here, then, is that Hume sets the bar too high for the PSR proponent: he 
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22 Ibid., p. 82. 
23 For the sake of a humorous aside I shall now quote the ancient Greek philosopher Chrysippus (in 
Cicero (1991: pp. 20-1)), whose dire prognostications on the consequences of uncaused movement 
show him to be the antithesis of Hume: “Nothing exists or has come into being in the cosmos without 
a cause. The universe will be disrupted and disintegrate into pieces and cease to be a unity functioning 
as a single system, if any uncaused movement is introduced into it.” 
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demands that the necessity of a cause be demonstrable, and thus (conversely) that the 
impossibility of anything existing without a cause must be demonstrable. The PSR 
proponent can reasonably claim that Hume’s first conclusion (that it is possible for 
something to come to exist without some productive principle) does not follow from 
his denial of the consequent of the first premise, by consideration of the fact that 
perhaps not all things that are necessary are at the same time demonstrable. It is true 
that all things require causes in order to exist, the PSR proponent will claim, 
although this cannot be demonstrated. 
In fact, a way to turn the first premise on its head might be to highlight the difficulty 
of demonstrating that any particular thing lacks a cause, rather than having to 
demonstrate that all things must have a cause, a difficulty to which Hume seems to 
be oblivious. Since there is no reason to think that causes cannot on occasion be 
spatially or temporally remote events, it seems that the entire universe would need to 
be scoured before it could be declared beyond any doubt that some particular event 
or thing lacked a cause. If, therefore, there must always remain a possibility that any 
particular event has a cause, then Hume cannot conclude that it is not the case that 
whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence.24 
The next challenge to Hume’s argument concerns the claim made in premise (3), 
which is that whatever we can conceive of is possible. Kant rejects this claim, 
writing in his Lectures on Metaphysics: 
The Principle of Contradiction is the criterion of possibility, and one can also say of truth, only not a 
sufficient one but rather a necessary condition. If that is so, can I reverse: what does not contradict 
itself, is not impossible? That is false, for otherwise all fantasies that do not contradict themselves 
would be possibilities.25  
Kant is saying that, while abiding by the PoC is a necessary condition for 
possibilities, it is not also a sufficient condition for them (although it is both 
necessary and sufficient for conceptions). So, while whatever does not contradict 
itself is conceivable, it is not the case that such a thing is in all cases possible. Recall 
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24 In fact, however, nowhere does Hume declare that the PSR is undoubtedly false—all we know for 
certain was he believed it is not provably true. Nevertheless, given his insistence on the possibility of 
causeless things and events, it seems natural to conclude that he believes that, on occasion, such 
causeless things and events do actually occur. And if he does believe this, then he is guilty of a double 
standard in requiring a proof for the necessity of a cause from the PSR proponent, while at the same 
time being unable himself to provide a proof that any particular thing lacks a cause. 
25 Kant (1997), 29:791. 
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also Spinoza’s assertion that there are some things that imply no contradiction or 
absurdity, yet their existence is not possible on account of the fact that it would not 
follow from the workings of corporeal nature. This, too, amounts to a denial of the 
equivalence of conceivability and possibility. Armed with this distinction, the PSR 
proponent can accept that causeless existence is conceivable (since such an event 
would not violate the PoC), but nevertheless deny the inference made in premise (3): 
that causeless existence is possible. Another way to put the same point is to say that 
not all things that are necessary are analytically so: some things are necessary 
because of the concepts involved (the oft-cited example that all bachelors are 
unmarried springs to mind), whereas other things are necessary despite their negation 
not involving a contradiction. The fact that everything necessarily has a cause falls 
into this latter category, and if we can only elaborate on this by saying that causes 
follow from the order of corporeal nature, or that causes are metaphysically 
necessary, while this is not entirely satisfactory it is nonetheless perfectly clear what 
is being stated. It is also more plausible, I would argue, than the claim that the 
bounds of the possible are identical to the bounds of the conceivable. 
To conclude our remarks on Hume’s argument, the first point I wish to urge is that 
Hume is wrong to assume that the idea of the necessity of a cause arises purely 
through observation and experience. It is this that motivates him to assert that the 
PSR proponent must demonstrate that causes are necessary—a feat that (it must be 
confessed) cannot be achieved. However, the PSR proponent need not be able to 
demonstrate the necessity of a cause, since it is more correct to consider this idea of 
the necessity of a cause to be an a priori assumption that is borne out by experience. 
Further, Hume fails to convincingly illustrate the possibility of causeless existence: 
on the contrary, I have argued, causeless existence is certainly impossible, even if it 
is (arguably) conceivable. 
In short, the PSR proponent need not be able to demonstrate the impossibility of 
something coming to exist causelessly (since they do not claim that they can 
demonstrate the necessity of a cause); and Hume fails to demonstrate the possibility 
of something coming to exist causelessly. Premises (1) and (3) thus let the argument 
down. Hume’s challenge is valuable, though, since it helps us to clarify why we 
might hold the PSR to be true. Hume claims: “Since it is not from knowledge or any 
scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every 
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new production, that opinion must necessarily arise from observation and 
experience.”26 However, the reality is that people hold the PSR to be true not solely 
on account of observation and experience (although observation and experience do 
indeed corroborate the principle), but rather because it is a judgement that we seem 
to be hardwired to hold, unless, as seems to have been the case with Hume, excessive 
philosophical speculation unseats it. 
 
2.2.2   Van Inwagen’s Modal Argument 
The second argument against the PSR to consider brings us up to the twentieth 
century. It is presented by van Inwagen, who charges that the PSR has the “absurd 
consequence” of requiring the collapsing of all modal distinctions.27 The argument 
runs thus: first, van Inwagen notes that the PSR requires that any contingent state of 
affairs must have a sufficient reason for its obtaining (that is, the sufficient reason for 
that state of affairs must lie in some other state of affairs that is necessary). Then, he 
asks us to imagine that P is the conjunction of all contingently true propositions into 
a single proposition. Now, according to the PSR, there must exist some state of 
affairs S that is a sufficient reason for P. We are then faced with a dilemma, since S 
must be either contingent or necessary; but it seems that it cannot be either. It cannot 
be contingent, because then it would be a part of P (since P is the conjunction of all 
contingently true propositions); and it cannot be necessary, since this would render P 
necessary also (since P necessarily follows from S). Van Inwagen concludes: “Since 
S cannot be either necessary or contingent, it cannot exist, and the PSR is false.”28 
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26 Hume (1972), p. 80. 
27 Van Inwagen is not the first person to present such an ‘argument from contingency’. Rowe (1975: 
pp. 99-100) advances a similar argument against the PSR, which runs as follows: 
 
(1) The PSR implies that every state of affairs has a reason either within itself or in some other 
state of affairs 
(2) There are contingent states of affairs 
(3) If there are contingent states of affairs then there is some state of affairs for which there is no 
reason 
Therefore the PSR is false 
 
I present van Inwagen’s argument here, however, since his has received more attention in the 
philosophical literature and is perhaps the slightly more straightforward presentation of the two. 
Bennett (1984: p. 115) also offers a very brief presentation of the same argument, but adds nothing of 
interest over and above Rowe’s and van Inwagen’s presentations. 
28 Van Inwagen (1983), p. 203. 
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(1) If the PSR is true, then everything happens of necessity. 
(2) It is not the case (on pain of absurdity) that everything happens of necessity. 
Therefore the PSR is false.29 
Both of van Inwagen’s premises can be challenged. Beginning with the first premise 
recall how, in response to Leibniz’s argument for the PSR, there was a worry that 
quantum events such as the one described in the Schroedinger’s Cat thought 
experiment might present a challenge to the claim that, when all the requirements of 
a thing are posited then that thing is. In that particular instance, all the requirements 
might reasonably be said to have been in place for an atom of radioactive substance 
to decay within the course of an hour, yet an atom might nonetheless fail to decay (if 
the cat gets lucky). This then led us to consider Pruss’s suggestion, which was that 
Leibniz’s definition of ‘sufficient reason’ might be at fault, and that, once this 
definition had been amended, the PSR could be rescued. Rather than defining the 
term ‘sufficient reason’ in such a way that its presence entails the existence of the 
explanandum, Pruss favours loosening the connection between explanans and 
explanandum somewhat, in order to allow for the possibility of indeterminism, 
whether this be indeterminism at the quantum level, in human action, or in some 
other domain. Pruss suggests: 
We could understand the phrase randomly caused to be analogous to freely chose and say that the 
system’s initial state and its randomly causing A explains why A occurred. Here, we can invoke the 
principle that when we have given the causes of an event, we have explained why the event 
occurred.30 
If we were to reinterpret the term ‘sufficient reason’ as Pruss recommends, then this 
would allow for the possibility of indeterminism and thereby enable us to avoid the 
spectre of necessitarianism (that is, the thesis that everything happens of necessity). 
Van Inwagen’s argument would fail, since the entailment relation posited in premise 
(1) would no longer hold. Another consideration in favour of this approach is that 
Leibniz himself seemed to vacillate between endorsing the definition for ‘sufficient 
reason’ given in the preceding argument, and adopting an altogether less strict 
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29 Van Inwagen presents much the same argument in his book Metaphysics (2009: pp. 119-122). The 
only difference in the treatment of the argument this second time is that he begins with the assumption 
that there are contingent states of affairs, and from this he deduces the falsity of the PSR. 
30 Pruss (2011), p. 168. 
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understanding of the term, according to which a sufficient reason “merely inclines 
and does not truly necessitate.”31 
However, the cost of reinterpreting the notion of a sufficient reason along these lines 
is fairly high, I would argue, not least because of the difficulties of explaining in 
what sense a reason can be said to be ‘sufficient’ for some thing or event if it does 
not in fact entail that that thing or event obtains.32 There is also a question mark over 
Leibniz’s motivation for redefining the term ‘sufficient reason’ in some of his later 
writings so as to suggest that, on occasion, a sufficient reason “merely inclines”: 
rather than being moved by philosophical conviction, it could well be an expedient 
measure to avoid being charged with the heretical opinion that God lacks free will.33 
In conclusion, while the PSR proponent could choose to adopt the above response to 
van Inwagen’s argument, I think a better approach is to accept the entailment relation 
in premise (1) and focus instead on undermining premise (2). 
According to premise (2), the collapsing of all modal distinctions entailed by 
adherence to the PSR is an “absurd consequence,” one that renders acceptance of the 
PSR itself absurd. But I argue that the PSR proponent can counter that what van 
Inwagen’s argument demonstrates is not the falsity of the PSR, but rather the 
impossibility of there being contingent truths.  So, rather than seeing the collapsing 
of all modal distinctions as an absurd consequence of commitment to the PSR, the 
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31 Leibniz (1956a), p. 226. 
32 On the question of how to define the word ‘sufficient’, we see Kant protesting against the 
ambiguity of this designation in his New Elucidations, and preferring instead to talk of grounds that 
‘determine’. In Kant’s own words: “…the expression ‘sufficient’ is ambiguous, for it is not 
immediately clear how much is sufficient.” (NE I:393) Using the term ‘determining’, by contrast, is 
supposed to make it clear that the ground in question entails that the thing or event obtains. As for the 
term ‘ground’, it is likely that Kant also favours this over ‘reason’ out of a desire to avoid ambiguity 
or downright error. Kant’s problem with the term ‘reason’ is that he perceives its use as encouraging 
an epistemological reading of the PSR, according to which a reason is that which enables us to know 
something. The term ‘ground,’ meanwhile, fits more readily with an ontological reading of the PSR: 
in other words, the ground is that which makes it the case that something is. Evidence that it is indeed 
for these reasons (or on these grounds!) that Kant opted for the term ‘ground’ over ‘reason’ comes 
from his critique of Wolff, whom he admonishes for understanding reasons “in terms of that by 
reference to which it is possible to understand why something should be rather than not be.” (NE 
I:392, my italics) To sum up, I agree with Kant both that: (a) reasons/grounds should be understood as 
determining the thing or event in question, and that; (b) reasons/grounds should be understood to 
mean the reason/ground why something is simpliciter, as opposed to the reason/ground for 
understanding or knowing that something is. However, I also think that the term ‘sufficient reason’ is 
not as ambiguous as Kant fears, and that it has enough historical standing to warrant its retention. 
33 The urge to carve out his own philosophical niche, distinct from Spinoza, must also have been an 
influencing factor on Leibniz. And the infamy attaching to Spinoza on account of his necessitarianism 
makes it quite understandable that Leibniz should want to avoid a similar fate—holding such views 
did not just make one unpopular, it was potentially dangerous given the intolerance of the time. 
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PSR proponent can counter that assuming the existence of contingent states of affairs 
is an unwarranted supposition. What the argument seems to come down to, then, is 
the question of which is the more reasonable supposition: that (as van Inwagen 
asserts) since there exist contingent truths the PSR must be false; or that (as the PSR 
proponent asserts) since the PSR is true there must exist only necessary truths.  
I would argue that the PSR proponent’s position is more defensible, for two reasons. 
First, we can understand van Inwagen’s unwillingness to abandon the idea of the 
existence of contingent truths as a consequence of the importance of contingency as 
a feature of our psychology. When making decisions, for example, it is necessary to 
deliberate as if the future exhibits genuine openness. Also, given our extremely 
limited knowledge of things, it is hardly surprising that some things will appear to us 
as brute facts. In other words, to say that something might happen, or could happen, 
merely reflects a lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker.34  
Second, necessitarianism makes for a much neater ontology in that it bypasses 
worries about the ontological status of possible worlds.35 If contingency is allowed 
for, then we are faced with the problem of deciding how it is that possible worlds are 
supposed to exist, whereas necessitarianism faces no comparable problem: there is 
one world, the actual one, and there is simply no such thing as a possible world. A 
further worry is that, if there are possible worlds, then in virtue of what fact is this 
possible world the actual world? Perhaps the difficulty in answering such a question 
would not trouble van Inwagen: he might feel disinclined to supply a reason in this 
case, since as a critic of the PSR he openly doubts that reasons always exist. 
Nevertheless, to those who have an intuitive inclination towards belief in the PSR, 
the lack of potential explanation is a problem, and van Inwagen’s bald assertion that 
necessitarianism is absurd will do little to persuade the PSR proponent to concede 
the argument.  
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34 This is an idea endorsed by history’s most famous necessitarian, Benedict Spinoza. In his Ethics 
(1992: Pr. 33, Sch.1, p. 54), Spinoza asserts: “If we do not know whether the essence of a thing 
involves a contradiction, or if, knowing full well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, we 
still cannot make any certain judgment as to its existence because the chain of causes is hidden from 
us, then that thing cannot ever appear to us either as necessary or as impossible. So we term it either 
‘contingent’ or ‘possible.’”  
35 We must judge, for example, whether some version of modal realism is the correct view, whereby 
all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. (See Lewis (1986) for an exposition of modal 
realism.) 
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Instead of hoping to persuade the PSR proponent through the use of more conceptual 
arguments such as those of Hume and van Inwagen, perhaps only hard evidence of 
events that demonstrably lack any sufficient reason would do the trick. We have 
briefly examined quantum events already, and we shall return to them now to see if 
they yield counterexamples to the claim that the PSR is true.  
 
2.2.3   Non-Deterministic Events 
Let us remind ourselves of how those two arch-rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz 
understand the PSR. Spinoza says: “From a given determinate cause, the effect 
follows necessarily. Conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for 
an effect to follow.”36 And Leibniz offers the following definition of ‘sufficient 
reason,’ as we saw earlier: “A sufficient reason is that which is such that if it is 
posited the thing is.”37 It seems that both of these statements amount to an 
endorsement of determinism, and so of course rule out the possibility that there 
could be any non-deterministic events. We can state the situation as follows: the 
notion that (a) the PSR is uniformly true, allied to the understanding that (b) the term 
‘sufficient reason’ is to be defined in such a way that sufficient reasons necessitate 
their explanandum, entails the truth of determinism. And therefore, if some non-
deterministic event can be discovered, this will provide a counterexample to the 
claim that the PSR is true.  
Quantum theory is one such candidate for providing a counterexample to the claim 
that the PSR is true. There are two major respects in which quantum theory is 
thought to represent a departure from classical physics: first, it does not seem to 
require locality of causation; second, it is apparently non-deterministic. It is this 
second feature of quantum theory that is of interest to us in this context—the 
apparent non-locality of causes presents no threat to the PSR since the PSR 
proponent need not stipulate that all causes be local. 
We are now in a position to state the argument against the PSR: 
(1) If the PSR is true, then determinism is the case. 
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36 Spinoza (1992), Ia, 3. 
37 Leibniz (1986), VI, ii, 483. 
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(2) Quantum theory provides evidence that some events are non-deterministic. 
Therefore, the PSR is false. 
The argument structure recalls van Inwagen’s modal argument: the first premise 
makes a claim about what the truth of the PSR would entail, and the next premise 
claims that we have reason to think that the thing entailed by the PSR is false. Thus, 
it is concluded, the PSR must itself be false. Still, the present argument is somewhat 
stronger, I would argue, for a couple of reasons. First, it is less contentious to argue 
that the PSR entails determinism than that it entails necessitarianism (although both 
of these claims are, I think, correct). Second, and more crucially, the present 
argument cites particular events—namely, quantum ones—that purportedly 
demonstrate the falsity of the consequent (i.e. determinism), whereas van Inwagen 
simply proclaims that to accept the consequent (i.e. necessitarianism) would be 
absurd. 
In discussing responses to van Inwagen’s modal argument, I dismissed the idea of 
denying that the PSR entails necessitarianism. Of course, if we accept that the PSR 
entails necessitarianism then a fortiori we must accept that it entails determinism, 
and so premise (1) is secure.38 Instead, our efforts should be focused on undermining 
premise (2) with its claim that there is evidence for indeterminism from quantum 
theory. It must be admitted that some august names in quantum physics have 
believed the evidence tells against determinism, as illustrated by Heisenberg’s quote: 
“Since all experiments are subjected to the laws of quantum mechanics, the 
invalidity of the law of causality is definitively proved by quantum mechanics.”39 
Nevertheless, equally august names (not least Einstein) have argued that the 
evidence is far from conclusive. David Bohm is among those who have believed that 
the evidence for indeterminism at the quantum level is questionable, and he created 
his own “hidden variable” theory as a rival account to the “standard interpretation.” 
According to “hidden variable” theories such as that of Bohm, “there is some 
additional factor (a hidden mechanism) such that once we discover and understand 
this factor, we would be able to predict the observed behaviour […] with 
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38 See Pruss (2011: pp. 103-13), however, for an attempt to make the case that the PSR does not entail 
determinism. 
39 Heisenberg (1927), p. 197.  
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certainty.”40 The essence of all “hidden variable” theories, then, is the idea that the 
indeterminism we perceive at the quantum level is a consequence of epistemic 
limitations. As such, the indeterminism perceived is simply that—a mere 
perception—and so we are not entitled to infer that events at the quantum level really 
are non-deterministic.41 
This approach to evaluating our understanding of quantum phenomena has a 
precedent in another area of science. Statistical mechanics is a branch of physics that 
applies probability theory to the study of the thermodynamic behaviour of systems 
comprised of a large number of particles. Classical mechanics, on the other hand, 
encompasses a broader spectrum, concerned as it is with discovering the set of 
physical laws that describe the motion of bodies under the action of a system of 
forces. Statistical mechanics is thus a probabilistic science that exists within the 
framework of classical mechanics. Bohm hoped and predicted that the statistical 
description in quantum theory would come to take within a completed quantum 
theory “an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the 
framework of classical mechanics.”42 This was Einstein’s hope also.  
It might be suggested that the key question to ask regarding the relative merits of the 
“standard interpretation” and Bohm’s “hidden variable” theory is: which is superior 
in terms of its ability to make correct predictions? Unfortunately, answering this 
question does not help us to adjudicate between the two since they are empirically 
evenly matched, with both able to offer reliable predictions. Despite their 
equivalence in terms of predictive power, however, in other respects the Bohmian 
theory is certainly the superior of the two. For example, some experiments and 
experimental issues are dealt with much better by the Bohmian theory, examples of 
which include experiments on quantum chaos, scattering theory, dwell and 
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40 Bishop (2002), p. 117. 
41 Bohmian theory can be seen as a response to Heisenberg’s “Uncertainty Principle” which states 
that, for certain pairs of physical properties, the more precisely we know what the one is, the less 
precisely are we able to measure the other. The Bohmian theorist’s response is to declare that there is 
always a matter of fact about both the position and momentum of any particle—each and every 
particle has a well-defined trajectory. However, it is added, observers have limited knowledge as to 
what this trajectory is (and thus a limited knowledge of the particle’s position and momentum). It is 
the lack of knowledge of the particle's trajectory that accounts for the uncertainty relation. To put the 
statement differently, while the particle’s position and velocity can only be known statistically, this 
does not imply that the particle’s trajectory is indeterminate. 
42 See Dürr et al. (1992), p. 269.  
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tunnelling times, and escape times and positions.43 Interestingly, there do not seem to 
be any examples to illustrate the converse: in other words, there are no examples to 
illustrate how in some instances the “standard interpretation” handles experiments 
and experimental issues better than Bohmian theory. This consideration of Bohmian 
theory’s superiority in certain experimental settings is thus a real point in its favour. 
It is worth noting also that Schroedinger’s famous thought experiment was not 
devised for the purpose of demonstrating that quantum indeterminism could result in 
macro-level indeterminism. Rather, it was intended as a reductio of the “standard 
interpretation” of quantum physics, according to which the cat, prior to the 
experimenter opening the steel chamber in which it is contained, should be described 
as existing in a “quantum superposition” of dead-and-alive states.44 Since the 
“standard interpretation” seems to absurdly imply that the cat remains in some sort 
of limbo state between death and life until being observed by the experimenter, we 
must conclude that the understanding it affords of quantum mechanics is 
incomplete.45 
Now that Bohmian theory has been mooted as a viable, deterministic alternative to 
the “standard interpretation,” let us consider a couple of hurdles it must still 
overcome. First, we have the following worry presented by Pruss: 
If all we want is to see that it is conceptually possible to have a deterministic theory that gives the 
same observational results as quantum mechanics, it is easy to see that this can be done. For instance, 
take a neo-Leibnizian theory that says that every point of space is a monad, and this monad has 
encoded within it a list of all the events that will happen throughout time at that point, and through an 
internal causal process it goes deterministically through these events as time passes.46 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 For experiments on quantum chaos, see Cushing (2000); for experiments on scattering theory, see 
Dürr et al. (2000); for experiments looking at dwell and tunnelling times, see Leavens (1996); and for 
experiments on escape times and positions, see Daumer et al. (1997). 
44 Elaborating on the intention behind his thought experiment, Schroedinger (1936: p. 328) writes: “It 
is typical of these cases [i.e. cases such as the one outlined in Schoedinger’s Cat thought experiment] 
that an indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transformed into 
macroscopic indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct observation. That prevents us from 
so naively accepting as valid a "blurred model" for representing reality.” Schroedinger’s intention is 
thus clearly to question the possibility of indeterminism rather than affirm it. 
45 And, it must be added, Bohmian theory offers a sorely needed response to this conceptual flaw in 
the “standard interpretation.” As the highly respected physicist John Stewart Bell (1987: p. 160) 
notes: “Bohm showed explicitly how parameters could indeed be introduced […] with the help of 
which the indeterminate description [of the “standard interpretation”] could be transformed into a 
determinate one. More importantly, in my opinion, the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the 
necessary reference to the ‘observer’, could be eliminated.” 
46 Pruss (2011), p. 167. 
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The challenge is that, if one is determined enough to deny that determinism’s false 
(no pun intended) then this can always be done since, strictly speaking, no amount of 
evidence can falsify it.47 Even a profoundly ludicrous deterministic theory, as 
Leibniz’s monadic theory assuredly is, can be argued to be consistent with 
observations from quantum mechanics. Pruss wishes to argue, then, that the defender 
of Bohmian theory is in fact in an analogous position to the neo-Leibnizian—they 
are backing a theory purely out of a dogged determination to affirm determinism in 
the face of all countervailing evidence. Determinism’s unfalsifiability, it is charged, 
is being guilefully exploited as a licence to ignore the reasoned arguments of others. 
To my mind, this charge does not stick. It is true, as Pruss notes, that it is 
conceptually possible to devise any old deterministic theory that will be concordant 
with the observational results of quantum mechanics, and if someone held to a neo-
Leibnizian theory such as is sketched above then that could be quite justifiably be 
dismissed as being unreasonable (although not provably false). However—and as 
has been discussed already—there are good reasons to prefer Bohmian theory over 
the “standard interpretation,” as not only do the two have equal predictive power, but 
Bohmian theory is superior in many experimental setups, and does not face the same 
troubling subjectivity that the “standard interpretation” faces with its necessary 
reference to an observer.48 The analogy is therefore unfair, since it likens a 
discredited theory with no predictive power to one which any dispassionate observer 
would agree is very much reputable. 
A second difficulty to consider is as follows: if Bohmian theory is a genuine 
contender for the theory that best describes what happens on the quantum level, why 
is the “standard interpretation” still just that: i.e. the interpretation which scientists 
consider the standard, and to which they most regularly refer? As Bell observes: “the 
Bohr interpretation [i.e. the “standard interpretation”], in its more pragmatic, less 
metaphysical forms remains the “working philosophy” for the average physicist.”49 
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47 It is always possible, for example, that any putatively causeless thing or event may in fact have 
either a hidden or a (spatially or temporally) remote cause. 
48 Bell (1987: p. 160), in a critique of the tendency to accept the “standard interpretation” 
unquestioningly, makes the point that we need not uncritically accept this position with all of its 
troublesome consequences: “vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by 
experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice.”  
49 Bell (1987), p. 189. 
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In response to this, the first thing to say is to highlight that the “standard 
interpretation” is described as a “working philosophy” for most physicists. In other 
words, it would probably be misleading to regard its use as representing an 
endorsement of the philosophy that underlies it. It is used simply because it works. 
Another point to note is that, while the “standard interpretation” remains the working 
philosophy for most physicists, there has been increasing interest in what have been 
termed “many worlds” theories.50 Such theories also come under the banner of 
“hidden variable” theories, and so also typically involve an attempt to reconcile 
quantum phenomena and determinism. There is not the space for further discussion 
of these here, and I think that all “many worlds” theories face serious conceptual 
problems that make championing them an unattractive proposition.51 Nevertheless, 
their increasing popularity over the last decade or so provides evidence that serious 
interest in “hidden variable” theories remains. Yet another response to this difficulty 
is to suggest that it might not be wise to be too respectful of scientific orthodoxy. 
Evidence for this assertion comes from the fact that in 1932, a paper was published 
by a certain von Neumann, claiming to prove that all “hidden variable” theories were 
impossible. It was generally decreed that von Neumann’s reasoning was 
unimpeachable, and that all “hidden variable” theories were indeed impossible. 
However, three years later, Grete Hermann discovered that von Neumann’s result 
was flawed. To the scientific community’s discredit, this fact went unnoticed for a 
further fifty years. The moral of the story seems to be that current scientific 
orthodoxy does not always provide a reliable guide to truth. 
A final point to note on the issue on the likelihood of Bohmian theory becoming 
orthodoxy is this: quantum mechanics is comparatively in its infancy, and so the fact 
that the dominant theory at the moment is non-deterministic should not be afforded 
too much significance. Whatever one’s opinion on the likelihood of quantum theory 
eventually being reconciled with determinism, there must surely be a consensus that 
our current understanding of quantum phenomena admits of improvement.52 Quite 
simply, we should expect at this stage not to have a full understanding of events at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Deutsch’s (1997) provides an overview of the “many worlds” interpretation of quantum physics 
from its leading exponent. 
51 See Wallace et al. (2012) for an excellent collection of essays examining the pros and cons of 
“many worlds” theories. 
52 As Bell (1987: p. 201) urges: “To admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in 
my opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to metaphysics.” 
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the quantum level. And the further expectation of the Bohmian theorist is that an 
improved understanding can and will vindicate their belief that determinism and 
quantum phenomena go hand-in-hand. 
The crux of the quantum theory debate can be summarised by Hodgson’s quote: 
“The key question is whether to understand the nature of [the probability in quantum 
theory] as epistemic or ontic.”53 My answer is that it is epistemic. The supposed 
indeterminism that quantum phenomena exhibit is a persistent fiction which, given 
time, will be revealed as such. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Six arguments have been examined, three for and three against the PSR. Leibniz’s 
argument for the PSR is excellent as a jumping-off point, as its premises illustrate 
very clearly two key potential avenues of objection, enabling us to map the 
arguments against the PSR that we have considered onto it. First, as Hume objects, it 
is wrong to assume that all things have requirements. Second, it is possible that 
something might fail to happen despite all its requirements being posited, as the 
“standard interpretation” of quantum theory would suggest. However, in response to 
the first objection, I have argued that Hume fails establish his conclusion, which is 
that requirements (or, what amounts to the same thing, causes) are not always 
necessary; and to the second objection, I suggested that Bohmian theory is superior 
to the “standard interpretation,” and its adoption would allow us to maintain that, as 
Leibniz asserted, if all the requirements for some event are posited then that event 
will of necessity occur.  
Both of these avenues of objection, against Leibniz’s first and second premise 
premises, counsel a loosening of the bonds between the existence of a thing on the 
one hand, and the explanation for its existence on the other. Van Inwagen, it can be 
presumed, would object to one or other – or indeed both – of Leibniz’s premises in 
order to allow for contingency and to avoid the “absurdity” of necessitarianism. 
Without van Inwagen offering any clearer idea of how contingency enters the 
picture, however, I argued that the PSR proponent is entitled to reject the supposition 
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53 Hodgson (2002), p. 99. 
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of contingency and embrace necessitarianism instead. Granted, it is a consequence of 
the PSR; but it is not an absurd one. 
A second argument for the PSR, presented by Wolff, turned out to be ineffective due 
to an embarrassingly transparent equivocation. Nonetheless, the argument was useful 
in that it encouraged consideration of whether the PSR might be derived from some 
yet more fundamental principle such as the PoC. The answer appears to be: if it is so 
derived, it is not obvious how it is so. 
The final argument in favour of the PSR was Pruss’s “Argument from Rationality.” 
The key premise was the second one, which stated that belief in the irrationality of 
our world is itself irrational. The contention—that our desire for explanations might 
indicate that, in all cases, there are in fact explanations to be had—turned out to be 
too contentious; the conclusion was that, on the basis of this argument alone, no 
conclusion could be reached. However, discussion again proved fruitful as it helped 
to clarify the central issue at stake between PSR proponent and critic. This issue is: 
are events or phenomena that appear random, or that are beyond our present 
understanding, evidence for the falsity of the PSR? To this question, the proponent 
would respond that there is no such event or phenomenon, however ostensibly 
inexplicable, which provides a counterexample to the PSR. The critic, on the other 
hand, answers that, at least in some instances, events or phenomena do provide 
counterexamples to the PSR.  
While the arguments remain inconclusive, I submit that the case for the truth of the 
PSR appears stronger at present than the case against. Leibniz’s argument spells out 
most clearly the case for the PSR, and in the absence of proof that his premises are 
faulty—since, against the first premise, Hume fails to demonstrate that anything 
might come to exist without requirements, while, against the second premise, our 
knowledge of quantum physics does not provide reason for thinking that something 
might fail to happen despite all of its requirements being posited—I am inclined to 
accept the conclusion, and suggest we adopt a presumption in its favour. 
In terms of what follows from the truth of Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s understandings of 
the PSR, these were seen to entail the truth of determinism: everything has a 
sufficient reason, and sufficient reasons necessitate their explananda. Consequently, 
any demonstrably non-deterministic event (as certain quantum events were held to 
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be, for instance) would provide a counterexample to the PSR, and it is the possibility 
of finding such an event that remains the PSR sceptic’s best hope for challenging the 
principle. Thus, in our next chapter, we shall be looking at just such a potential 
counterexample, at a theory that deals with a domain much closer to everyday reality 
than the rarefied world of quantum mechanics: the domain is that of human action, 
and the theory is that of libertarian free will. 
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3 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Is Libertarianism a Counterexample to the 
PSR? 
 
Towards the end of the previous chapter, it was noted that the PSR critic’s best hope 
of establishing the principle’s falsity would be to identify some event, phenomenon, 
or theory that acts as a counterexample to the PSR. In this chapter, the thesis of 
libertarianism will be considered as just such a counterexample. 
The thesis of libertarianism holds that free will is logically incompatible with a 
deterministic universe and that, since we have free will, it follows that determinism 
is false. In particular, libertarians maintain that human actions must be undetermined 
if we are to have the free will that they believe we do. Where classical quantum 
mechanics threatened the truth of the PSR by virtue of positing undetermined events 
at the quantum level, libertarianism does so by positing undetermined events in the 
realm of human action instead. It is these undetermined events in the realm of human 
action, libertarians assert, that demonstrate the falsity of the PSR, since, as has been 
argued, the principle entails the truth of determinism.1 
In order to establish whether the libertarian challenge to the PSR has merit, we will 
examine two particular libertarian theories—Ginet’s and Kane’s. From our 
evaluation of these, we can extrapolate to make conclusions concerning the success 
of libertarian theories in general as counterexamples to the PSR. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  In fact, there is a strong case, I believe, for thinking that the PSR entails the truth of 
necessitarianism. This point will not be pressed here, however, since in the present dialectical 
situation it merely needs to be established that determinism follows from the PSR. 
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3.1 Ginet’s Libertarianism 
As with all libertarians, Ginet argues that free will is not compatible with 
determinism. What he understands by ‘free will’ is the following: 
By freedom of the will is meant freedom of action. I have freedom of action at any given moment if 
more than one alternative action is then open to me. […] Two or more alternatives are open to me at a 
given moment if which of them I do next is entirely up to my choice at that moment: Nothing that 
exists up to that moment stands in the way of my doing next any one of the alternatives.2 
So, for Ginet, freedom of will is the same thing as freedom of action, and possessing 
freedom of action amounts to the ability to act in one of a variety of ways at any 
given moment. Another way of phrasing this would be to say that, according to 
Ginet, free will requires that the state of the world at any given moment (a state that 
includes not just all facts about the external world but also all facts about the agent’s 
inner state) must not determine how that agent decides to act. Freedom of will—and 
so by extension freedom of action—amounts to an agent’s having alternative 
possibilities open to them, and an agent freely wills or acts when this willing or 
action is not determined, whether by facts about themselves or the world.3 This 
insistence that all free acts must be ones for which an agent has alternative 
possibilities means that Ginet’s libertarianism is more demanding than some other 
libertarian theories: for instance Kane (whose theory we will be examining shortly) 
does not insist on this point; rather, he argues that free will merely requires that not 
all an agent’s acts are determined.4 
What does Ginet think that an action is? Put simply, all actions can be classified as 
being one of two things: either an action is a “simple mental act,” or else it is a 
“voluntary exertion.”5 The latter of these, Ginet explains, is in all cases preceded by 
the former, because all voluntary exertions must begin with volition, and volition is 
always a causally simple mental action. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Ginet (1990), p. 90. 
3 Ginet is very clear on the necessity of alternative possibilities for an action to be free. As a definition 
of a free action, Ginet (1990: p. 17) offers the following: “By a free action I mean one such that until 
the time of its occurrence the agent had it in her power to perform some alternative action (or to be 
inactive) instead.” 
4 See Fischer et al. (2007), pp. 5-7. 
5 Ginet (1990), pp. 14-15. 
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Ginet goes on to describe simple mental acts as having “an actish phenomenal 
quality,” by which he means to convey that it feels “as if I directly make [these 
simple mental acts] occur, as if I directly determine [them].”6 Ginet is keen to stress 
the importance in this description of the qualifying phrase “as if,” as he does not 
want to give the impression of there being a causal relation between the agent on the 
one hand and the mental occurrence on the other. If there were such a causal relation 
then Ginet’s libertarianism could be classified as an ‘agent-causal’ view, according 
to which an agent is a persisting substance, an uncaused cause of their free decisions. 
But Ginet rejects agent-causal accounts of libertarianism, primarily because he 
believes that such accounts cannot explain what they need to explain: “It cannot, for 
instance explain [a mental act’s] timing. The mere fact that I was there cannot 
explain why this mental act occurred just when it did rather than earlier or later, 
when I was also there.”7 Similarly, Ginet rejects the idea that simple mental acts are 
‘event-causal,’ on the grounds that the simple mental act “fails to have a sufficiently 
complex structure.”8 In other words, if event-causation were the correct analysis of 
human action we would expect simple mental acts to appear much more complex 
than they do in fact appear.  
Agent-causal and event-causal views thus both fail to do justice to the nature of 
simple mental acts, according to Ginet, who views such acts as “counterexamples to 
the thesis that acting is causing.”9 In place of these, Ginet presents his own ‘non-
causal’ account of action, which he sums up as follows: 
<<S’s V-ing at t>> designates an action if and only if either (i) it designates a simple mental 
occurrence that had the actish phenomenal quality or (ii) it designates S’s causing something, that is, 
an event consisting in something’s being caused by an action of S’s10 
So on Ginet’s view, any action—whether it be (i) a simple mental act or (ii) a 
voluntary exertion—must be uncaused by virtue of the fact that all actions begin 
with an uncaused simple mental act. Nothing up until the moment of action 
determines how an agent will choose to act—it is instead simply a spontaneous 
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6 Ibid., p. 13. 
7 Ibid., pp. 13-4. 
8 Ibid., p. 14. 
9 Ibid., p. 14. 
10 Ibid., p. 15. 
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choice on their part. Here is how Ginet elaborates on what it is for an action to be 
uncaused: 
It seems evident to me that, given that an action was uncaused, all its agent had to do to make it the 
case that she performed that action was to perform it. If my deciding to vote for the motion, for 
example, was uncaused (that is, nothing other than me determined or made it the case that I raised my 
hand), then I made it the case that I raised my hand simply by raising my hand.11 
In summary, we have seen that Ginet is a libertarian on account of the fact that he 
believes that the existence of free will requires the falsity of determinism, and 
specifically that it requires that there be indeterminacy in human action. In contrast 
to some libertarians, however, Ginet further believes that for any action to be free it 
must be the case that, up until the time of its occurrence, the agent had it within their 
power to perform some alternative action or perhaps no action at all. Ginet further 
argues that all actions are in fact free in this sense, due to the fact that they are 
uncaused—as he says, all an agent must do to make it the case that they perform an 
action is to perform it.  
So while Ginet believes in indeterminism in the sphere of human action as do all 
libertarians, he differs with his agent-causal and event-causal peers as to how this 
indeterminism occurs. While agent-causal libertarians propose that the agent is an 
abiding substance with the ability to initiate causal chains without being determined 
by the state of the world immediately prior to that instant, and event-causal 
libertarians locate indeterminacy within the agent at some stage during the decision-
making process, Ginet’s non-causal libertarianism is perhaps simpler: his assertion is 
that all actions, beginning as they do with an uncaused mental act, are themselves 
uncaused, and so of course remain undetermined up until the time the agent chooses 
to act.12 It is “as if” the agent directly causes the simple mental act—although of 
course the agent is no substance on Ginet’s view, and no allegedly freedom-
compromising causation is involved in the process. 
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11 Ginet (2007), p. 247. 
12 Describing Ginet’s non-causal libertarianism as simple is not intended to be pejorative. In fact, 
Ginet himself dubs his non-causal account of human action “simple libertarianism” in his (1997) 
article “Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency.” 
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With Ginet’s non-causal libertarianism sketched, we can examine a couple of 
objections to his view. In evaluating these objections, our discussion of the PSR from 
the previous two chapters will prove relevant.  
 
3.2 Criticisms of Ginet’s Libertarianism 
3.2.1   The Luck Objection 
The first objection to consider can be termed the ‘luck objection.’ The basic thought 
is that, regarding the uncaused acts that Ginet posits, it must be concluded that it 
could only be a matter of pure luck as to how an agent chooses to act. The further 
conclusion to draw from this is that the agent cannot be responsible for any act that 
is subject to chance in the way that Ginet’s uncaused actions appear to be. Ginet 
would respond that, far from being a bar to ascribing moral responsibility to agents, 
the uncaused actions he posits are instead a prerequisite for a world peopled with 
morally responsible agents. Note that this luck objection can be applied to any theory 
insofar as it posits indeterminism in human action, and thus to all libertarian 
theories: to all of these the objection can be levelled that indeterminism in human 
action cannot be posited without at the same time conceding that these actions are 
subject to luck, and, insofar as this is the case, the agent cannot therefore be held 
responsible for them.13 
What does Ginet have to say in response to this objection? He responds that it is 
possible to draw a distinction between uncaused events on the one hand, and 
uncaused actions on the other, and that in drawing this distinction his critic’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This objection has indeed been regularly levelled at the libertarian throughout the centuries of 
debate on the free will issue. For example, Hume (2007: sect. 8, pt. 1) asserts: “[L]iberty, when 
opposed to necessity, is the same thing as chance.” A.J. Ayer (1954: p. 275) makes what is essentially 
the same point: “Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an accident, then 
it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance 
that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to hold me morally responsible for choosing as I 
did. But if it is not an accident that I choose to do one thing rather than another, then presumably there 
is some causal explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism.” Closer to 
the present day, we have Galen Strawson (1994: p. 7) echoing this line of thought in his claim that “it 
is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way 
responsible, can themselves contribute in any way to one’s being truly morally responsible for how 
one is.” Finally, Mele (1999: p. 99) argues that if nothing about an agent (e.g. their capacities, powers, 
states of mind, moral character etc.) causally determines how they will act, then their acting in one 
way rather than another is “just a matter of luck.” 
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conclusion that undetermined actions must be subject to luck can be blocked. While 
an uncaused event (if there are any) could indeed be characterised as random, Ginet 
questions the legitimacy of characterising an uncaused action as random also, and 
will only concede them to be so if this characterisation does not entail that these 
actions are not “up to” the agent (that is to say, that they are not the agent’s 
responsibility). In short, if by “random” we mean only that an event is not 
predictable from antecedent causes, then Ginet is happy to accept that the uncaused 
actions he postulates are “random” events; but he insists that “it is very far from 
evident […] that it cannot have been up to the agent whether a “random” action 
occurred and cannot have been the case that the agent made a “random” action 
occur.”14 As such, Ginet remains unconvinced that the ‘luck objection’ presents him 
with any difficulty in ascribing moral responsibility to agents for their uncaused 
actions. 
The challenge Ginet lays down to the supporter of the ‘luck objection’ is thus to 
demonstrate how one of Ginet’s postulated uncaused actions—one that is “random” 
in the sense that it is not even in principle predictable from antecedent causes—can 
be proved to be “random” in the further sense that its occurrence is (a) a matter of 
luck and (b) therefore not truly anyone’s choice or responsibility. Taking up that 
challenge, van Inwagen offers a thought experiment designed to elicit from us the 
intuition that an uncaused action must be random in this sense. We are asked to 
suppose that a girl called Alice is faced with a choice between lying and telling the 
truth, and that when faced with this choice she decides to tell the truth. We are 
further asked to assume that this decision was undetermined. Following this 
unremarkable event, we must then suppose that God decides to cause the universe to 
revert to the precise state it was in one minute before Alice told the truth. When 
asked what will happen this second time, it seems that we can only say that she 
might lie or she might tell the truth. Van Inwagen continues: 
Suppose that God a thousand times caused the universe to revert to exactly the state it was in [one 
minute before Alice told the truth]. Suppose that [after a thousand replays] Alice has told the truth 
four hundred and ninety-three times and has lied five hundred and eight times. Is it not true that as we 
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14 Ginet (2007), p. 248. 
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watch the number of replays increase, we shall become convinced that what will happen in the next 
replay is a matter of chance?15 
Van Inwagen clearly presents this rhetorical question expecting the answer to be 
“yes”: we will become convinced that what happens in the next replay is a matter of 
chance. Ginet, however, is not willing to accept this conclusion from van Inwagen’s 
thought experiment. Ginet responds as follows: 
If I contemplate just one Alice making an uncaused choice, I fail to see how the proposition that the 
choice was causally undetermined entails that it was random and not up to Alice which choice she 
made; and I quite fail to see how supposing there to be a great many duplicates of Alice in duplicate 
situations, sometimes making the same choice as Alice and sometimes making a different one, should 
make me any more inclined to think with regard to any one of these choices that its being 
undetermined entails that it is random and not up to its subject.16 
Broadly speaking, I side with van Inwagen on the question of the implications of the 
above thought experiment. Since Alice’s choice over whether or not to lie is causally 
undetermined, it seems that whether or not she lies on any given occasion can surely 
be considered a mere matter of chance; and consequently, it is at least debatable 
whether it would be fair to hold her morally responsible for her choice over whether 
or not to lie (although her supposed lack of moral responsibility in such a situation is 
much harder to establish, I think, than that her choice is subject to chance: this issue 
will be discussed shortly).  
Dealing first with the issue of whether Alice—an agent with the capacity for 
uncaused action, living in a libertarian world of the type Ginet postulates—makes 
choices that are subject to luck, it seems to me obvious that she does. If we suppose 
that there are “duplicates” of Alice, as Ginet suggests, living in different yet identical 
worlds, and that some of these duplicates tell the truth as our original Alice did while 
others lie, how can we avoid the conclusion that whether or not any one of them lies 
is a matter of luck? Since Ginet is unwilling to concede that Alice’s decision in the 
above scenario is subject to luck, perhaps we can make van Inwagen’s conclusion 
more compelling by altering the scenario slightly: let us imagine instead that 99% of 
these identical Alices choose to tell the truth, while a mere 1% choose instead to lie; 
let us imagine further that telling this lie, whatever it is, has the catastrophic 
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15 Van Inwagen (1983), p. 128. 
16 Ginet (2007), p. 249. 
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consequence of leading to the deaths of millions (telling the truth, meanwhile, had no 
deleterious effects, either for the 99% of Alices or for the populations of the worlds 
which they inhabit). Since, according to the hypothesis, all of these Alices were 
exactly alike in every respect, it seems not only natural to say of the 1% who lied 
and thus suffered the dreadful consequences of this that they were extremely 
unlucky, but in fact this admission seems completely unavoidable. 
What this thought experiment also highlights, besides the fact that undetermined 
actions are by their nature subject to luck, is the role that the PSR plays in helping us 
reach this conclusion. If we take one of the 99% of worlds in which Alice tells the 
truth, and then take one of the 1% of worlds in which Alice lies, and then ask 
ourselves the question regarding these two worlds: “what is the reason that in this 
world Alice told the truth, whereas in this other world Alice lied?,” it is clear that 
there can be no answer. There can be no sufficient reason why in one world Alice 
tells the truth while in another identical world she lies. And because there is no 
sufficient reason—because nothing fully explains why some Alices choose to lie 
while others choose to tell the truth—it is true to say that the 1% of Alices that 
choose to lie and must then suffer the consequences are terribly unlucky. 
We saw how Ginet sought to respond to the ‘luck objection’ by drawing a distinction 
between uncaused events and uncaused actions, and then arguing that only the 
former are (a) subject to luck, and (b) not anyone’s choice or responsibility. I think it 
is clear from the thought experiment developed from van Inwagen that this 
distinction simply does not hold, at least when it comes to the issue of luck. An 
uncaused action is one that is not determined by antecedent causes: as such, it lacks a 
sufficient reason for its occurrence; lacking a sufficient reason, whether it happens is 
subject to chance or luck, a fact that the above thought experiment inescapably leads 
us to conclude. 
It is less obvious, however, that we can further conclude from the fact that uncaused 
actions must of necessity be subject to luck, that they cannot therefore be anyone’s 
responsibility. In fact, it seems clear that we can construct a scenario in which we 
certainly would consider an agent responsible for their uncaused action. We can 
imagine an agent called Jim who, while on his morning route to work, comes across 
a man lying injured in the street. Since Jim is by nature a good man, he is 100% 
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likely to stop and see what is wrong (or to put the same point slightly differently, 
multiple Jims living in different yet identical worlds would all choose to stop). 
Further, upon finding that the injured man has lost a significant amount of blood, Jim 
is fully prepared to risk the ire of his boss by turning up late for work in order to call 
an ambulance to take this man to hospital. On top of that, there is an 85% chance that 
he will decide to give blood to this man, which would be not merely a commendable 
action but a supererogatory one. By contrast, an altogether less civic-minded 
gentleman called Jon, when faced with this same situation, might choose to stop only 
10% of the time, while the remaining 90% of the time he would instead opt to 
continue on his way to work out of a selfish desire for financial advancement.17  
The upshot of this thought experiment is that, if we concentrate on just one of the 
85% of those Jims who take the heroic step of deciding to undergo a blood 
transfusion for this wounded stranger, it seems natural to suppose that he deserves 
credit for this act despite its being uncaused and subject to luck. Equally, it is natural 
to feel that any one of the 90% of Jons who fail to so much as stop for the injured 
man is deserving of censure, although once again this failure to act is uncaused and 
subject to luck. I think the moral to draw from this example is that, as long as there 
is some relationship between a person’s character and their actions, it is natural to 
think that they are (at least to some extent) morally responsible for these actions. 
And since it is possible to sketch an account of uncaused actions without entirely 
severing the relationship between character and action, it would be a mistake to 
conclude from the mere fact that uncaused actions are subject to luck that uncaused 
actions cannot therefore be to some extent the agent’s responsibility.18 
What are we entitled to conclude from all this? One thing that cannot be 
concluded—or at least that I have not attempted to press for in the preceding 
discussion—is that the libertarian’s metaphysical picture must be false. Perhaps if 
we were able to establish the premise that we definitely possess the free will required 
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17 Jon is the manager of a hedge fund staffed exclusively by ex-Lehman Brothers employees. 
18 Note that the claim here is that it is natural to ascribe moral responsibility to someone whose acts 
are representative of their character; but this is not to say that it is also correct. Galen Strawson’s 
argument, to be examined in the following chapter, argues that an agent should not even be 
considered morally responsible for actions that are expressive of their character, since they cannot be 
considered morally responsible for their character. For now, however, all I wish to note is that, while 
we can conclude that the occurrence or non-occurrence of undetermined actions is subject to luck, it is 
much less obvious that the presence of indeterminism precludes the possibility of moral responsibility 
also.  
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for moral responsibility, and were then able to demonstrate that the ‘luck objection’ 
precludes the possibility of us having this free will, then this objection would be 
decisive. However, whether we do have the free will required for moral 
responsibility is an open question at this stage. At any rate, it seems natural to think 
(as our Jim and Jon thought experiment shows) that, even if the uncaused events 
Ginet posits are of little help in securing moral responsibility, at least they do not 
preclude it.  
Still, while we cannot conclude on the strength of the above that the libertarian’s 
metaphysical picture is plain wrong, that is not to say that the ‘luck objection’ is not 
damaging. On the contrary, it throws into question whether the libertarian’s primary 
objective can be achieved: namely, to present a picture of human action that affords 
us a freedom and/or responsibility that we would otherwise lack in a world of 
determined action. The crucial question for Ginet and his fellow libertarians is: if—
as the luck objection suggests—it is a mere matter of luck whether one undetermined 
action happens rather than another, how can positing undetermined actions (whether 
these are the uncaused actions that Ginet posits or some other type of indeterminism) 
add one iota either to our freedom, or to the responsibility for our actions that we are 
said to enjoy? The answer, I contend, is that Ginet does not and cannot explain this 
supposed connection. 
In conclusion, the ‘luck objection’ reveals that if, like Ginet, you wish to argue for 
indeterminism, you must also of necessity be committed to denying the PSR; and 
you cannot deny the PSR without accepting that any given event to which the PSR 
does not apply is undetermined and hence subject to luck (and that is true as much of 
human actions as it is of events). The charge against Ginet and his fellow libertarian, 
then, is this: there is nothing to be gained in terms of increased freedom or 
responsibility for one’s acts by denying determinism. 
The libertarian’s commitment to PSR denial has passed without comment throughout 
the discussion of this ‘luck objection.’ That is to say, the legitimacy of the 
libertarian’s commitment to denying the PSR has not itself been queried, but instead 
an unacknowledged—and what must also be for the libertarian an unacceptable—
consequence of its denial has been brought to light (which is that any action lacking 
a sufficient reason must be subject to luck). The next objection to consider, however, 
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does question the legitimacy of denying the PSR. If the objection is successful it will 
not merely demonstrate (as the ‘luck objection’ has) that the libertarian is unable to 
make the case for the necessity of denying determinism in order to secure the 
freedom and/or responsibility they believe us to have—rather, it will simply 
demonstrate the falsity of the libertarian metaphysical picture. Let us examine this 
second objection now, using Ginet’s non-causal libertarianism once more as the 
target of our critique. 
3.2.2 The Lack of Explanation Objection 
The ‘luck objection’ will be revisited when we come to examine Kane’s theory of 
libertarian free will. Now, however, let us direct a second criticism towards Ginet’s 
libertarianism, which is that his account allows for no adequate explanation of 
human action, and that therefore his account must be wrong. While this objection is 
similar to the previous one insofar as both reveal unwelcome implications to Ginet’s 
indeterminism, its focus is slightly different: the first objection does not undermine 
the libertarian’s metaphysical picture in any way, but rather seeks to demonstrate 
that this metaphysical picture does not provide what the libertarian hopes and 
expects of it (i.e. the extra choice and control over one’s actions that would 
otherwise be lacking in a deterministic world, and that makes possible true freedom 
of the will); the second objection, however, does seek to directly undermine the 
libertarian’s metaphysical position. It does so by appealing to the truth of the PSR, 
whose truth is thus central to the argument. 
Ginet himself gives consideration to a version of the ‘lack of explanation objection,’ 
first formulating the argument, and then attacking it. Here is a (slightly reworked) 
presentation of the argument he considers: 
(1) Incompatibilism entails that (at least) some free actions are not 
determined by an antecedent state of the world. 
(2) If an action is not determined by an antecedent state of the world, then it 
has (at best) a partial explanation in terms of its antecedents. 
(3) All free actions have complete explanations in terms of their antecedents. 
Therefore incompatibilism is wrong.19  
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19 Ginet’s (1990: p. 129) own formulation is as follows: 
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The success or failure of the argument hangs on premise (3), which is essentially a 
statement of the PSR. The question is: does Ginet have convincing evidence for its 
falsity? Ginet himself certainly believes he does, as he offers the following 
counterexample to the premise: 
When I cross my legs while listening to a lecture, that action (usually) has no explanation in terms of 
reasons for doing it that I had antecedently. I just spontaneously do it. A spontaneous action, not 
arising from any antecedent motive, can even be undertaken with a further intention that begins to 
exist just when the action does. For example, a bird catches a person’s eye and, without having 
antecedently formed the intention to keep watching it, she moves her head when the bird moves in 
order to keep her eyes on it.20 
It can hardly be doubted that both of these examples are fairly characterised by Ginet 
as examples of spontaneous action, just in the sense that neither the act of crossing 
one’s legs nor of having one’s attention caught by a bird in flight are in any way 
planned or premeditated. However, if we are supposed to infer from these examples 
that the acts in question lack explanation or causal antecedents, then I see no reason 
to accept this inference—and in fact I see quite good reasons to reject it. First, in the 
case of the bird catching a person’s eye, it is patently not true that no explanation can 
be given in terms of causal antecedents. While the act of following the flight of a 
bird is spontaneous, unbidden, and capricious (in the sense that it cannot be 
predicted), it is very clear that it is an act with a causal story, which involves the 
flight of the bird and the subsequent passing of the bird into the person’s field of 
vision. It is not an act that springs from nowhere and admits of no explanation. As 
for the first example, this is perhaps a more promising candidate for an act that truly 
lacks explanation in terms of its antecedents, since there is nothing external to the 
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(1) Incompatibilism entails that an action cannot be both free and determined by an antecedent 
state of the world. 
(2) If an action is not determined by an antecedent state of the world, then it has no explanation 
in terms of its antecedents. 
(3) But some free actions do have explanations in terms of their antecedents. 
Therefore incompatibilism is wrong. 
 
Premise (1) has been altered to reflect the fact that some incompatibilists (such as Kane) do not hold 
that all free actions must be undetermined. Ginet’s premise (2) is also too categorical, in that the critic 
of libertarian need not claim undetermined acts have no explanation in terms of their antecendents, 
merely that any explanation they do have must be at best partial. Conversely, premise (3) is needs to 
be more categorical to capture the PSR proponent’s intuition: it is not merely that some free actions 
have explanations in terms of their antecedents, but rather that all do. Notwithstanding these tweaks to 
Ginet’s premises, the basic issue at stake remains the same, namely the status of the PSR. 
20 Ibid., p. 130. 
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agent that can be said to cause—or even to be part of a causal explanation of—the 
act of leg-crossing. Additionally, we are all familiar with the experience of 
performing some spontaneous action or other, whether crossing our legs, tilting our 
head, or folding our arms, and it must be said that the phenomenology of such acts is 
that they just happen, unconsciously and without forethought. 
So it is an easy step from this to concluding that acts of these kinds lack explanations 
in terms of their antecedents; but it is nevertheless a completely unwarranted one. 
The assumption is that, just because we are unaware of the processes by which 
something comes to be, it must be the case that there is no explanation for why it 
should come to be. The examples with which Ginet intends to demonstrate that some 
free actions lack explanations fail to do this, and so we are entitled to demand more 
in the way of evidence before accepting this claim. 
Ginet believes he does have more evidence. In the context of an attack on the 
necessitarianism of J.S. Mill, who makes the case that psychological laws are every 
bit as unvarying as physical laws, Ginet argues that it is sometimes the case that 
“when the same set of conflicting motives recurs, a different one prevails from the 
one that prevailed earlier.”21 By way of example, he cites the conflict that often 
arises within him between his desire to watch football and an opposing desire to 
work, as well as the occasional conflict between his desire to get an early start on the 
day and a desire to sleep in a bit. Ginet concludes from these examples: “If there are 
laws of nature that explain why the prevailing motive does prevail in such cases, that 
explain this in terms of antecedents of the action, it is far from obvious what the 
contents of those laws are.” Rather than viewing an agent’s actions as subject to laws 
of nature, Ginet surmises: “The agent had the conflicting motives, and it seemed a 
tossup which one to satisfy.”22 
Regarding Ginet’s criticism of Mill’s necessitarianism, there is a disanalogy between 
psychological and physical laws that makes the dispute impossible to settle 
conclusively. To pick one of Mill’s own examples, whereas it is obvious how we go 
about testing the claim that a heavier weight will always lift up a lighter weight when 
each is placed on opposite ends of a pair of scales, there is no comparable method of 
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21 Ibid., p. 134. 
22 Ibid., p. 134. 
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demonstrating beyond dispute that, given identical antecedents the same choice will 
always be made.23  It is this difficulty that enables Ginet to present apparent 
counterexamples to Mill’s assertion that a prevailing motive would always prevail in 
any situation in which the antecedents were the same.  
However, for the same reason that Mill has difficulty in proving his assertion that all 
human actions are antecedently determined, so too does Ginet struggle to convince 
us of his conclusion to the contrary. It is simply not possible to engineer two 
situations in which all the antecedents are truly identical, in order to provide any 
accurate test of the proposition that, given identical antecedents, identical actions 
will follow. The best that Ginet can offer us, then, is anecdotal evidence from his 
own experience: accounts of similar occasions when he has felt conflicted between 
two courses of action, and has subsequently chosen opposing courses on these 
similar occasions. As evidence goes, this is lamentably poor. It is poor because, 
while two situations may be very similar in many respects (so, to borrow Ginet’s 
example, in both situations it is a Saturday afternoon, there is football on the 
television, and the agent in question has competing desires either to get on with some 
work or to watch the football), no two situations will ever be identical. And no 
matter how similar any two situations are, the determinist can always assert without 
fear of disproof that it is the small but significant differences between the two 
situations that explain the different outcome in each case. So while Ginet views his 
example as evidence in favour of libertarianism, the determinist is able to offer his 
own perfectly coherent explanation for what is going on—and one, crucially, that 
does not require rejecting the PSR. 
In conclusion, while Mill inevitably fails to prove beyond dispute that all human 
actions are antecedently determined (inevitably, since it is impossible to devise an 
experimental setup to test the uniformity of extremely complex and comparatively 
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23 Others have noted the impossibility of verifying Mill’s (1872: pp. 449-50) claim that “volitions do, 
in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity and […] the same 
certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes.” For example, Steward (2012: pp. 170-1) 
asks: “Why, for instance, am I currently still sitting here writing rather than making the cup of tea I 
have been dimly thinking about for the past hour or calling the bank, which is something I also need 
to do today? Some will no doubt be inclined to say that I must have wanted to sit here writing more 
than I wanted the cup of tea and more than I wanted to phone the bank, and that this is the 
explanation. But if this ‘must have’ can be justified, it can surely only be by appeal to a conception of 
desire-strength according to which it simply follows from the fact that I am still sitting here that this 
was my ‘strongest’ desire.” 
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poorly-understood psychological laws with the same accuracy that we can with 
physical laws), Ginet’s anecdotal evidence in favour of indeterminism of human 
action is wholly unconvincing. Given the presumption in favour of the PSR, and 
Ginet’s failure to offer any convincing reason to abandon this presumption, the lack 
of explanation objection is, I think, successful against Ginet’s libertarianism. While 
Ginet’s responses to both of these criticisms have been unconvincing, that is not to 
say that some other libertarian theory might not be able to provide a satisfactory 
response to them. For this reason, let us turn now to Kane, who believes he can 
answer these same objections satisfactorily.  
 
3.3 Kane’s Libertarianism 
The next libertarian theory of free will to consider is Kane’s, who champions what 
can be called an “event-causal” account of libertarian free will. This is to say that 
Kane argues free actions are caused by events involving agents. What distinguishes 
Kane’s view from those of the many compatibilists who would agree with this basic 
analysis of free actions is that he adds the condition that these events must, at least 
on occasion, be non-deterministically caused. 
Central to Kane’s account is the claim that there are two key requirements for free 
will, both of which Kane believes are in fact met, and neither of which is compatible 
with determinism. The first of these is the familiar requirement of “alternative 
possibilities” (AP). Kane writes: “Free will seems to require that open alternatives or 
alternative possibilities lie before us—a garden of forking paths—and it is “up to us” 
which of these alternatives we choose.”24 Our future can be represented as a “garden 
of forking paths” in the sense that it really is open to us to choose from the many 
possibilities that lie before us—and our choices are not always determined.25 Such an 
image vividly illustrates the difference between libertarian theories on the one hand, 
all of which affirm the existence of AP, and deterministic theories on the other, 
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24 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 14. 
25 This choice of image originates from a short story by Jorge Luis Borges entitled “The Garden of 
Forking Paths.” 
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according to which one’s life would be more accurately represented by an image of a 
path with no branches or forks.26  
This first requirement of AP is, as I have noted, a feature of all libertarian theories, 
and is summed up in Ginet’s insistence that, when acting, it is often the case that two 
or more alternatives are open to one, in the sense that “which of them I do next is 
entirely up to my choice at that moment.”27 The second requirement for free will, by 
contrast, is not a feature of all libertarian theories. Nevertheless, Kane insists that its 
importance for the free will issue is as great, if not greater than, the AP requirement. 
This second requirement is captured by Kane when he declares it imperative that 
“the sources or origins of our actions lie “in us” rather than in something else (such 
as the decrees of fate, the foreordaining acts of God, or antecedent causes and laws 
of nature).”28 This requirement is dubbed by Kane the condition of “ultimate 
responsibility” (UR), and he offers this further encapsulation of what it means to be 
ultimately responsible for an act: “To be ultimately responsible for an action, an 
agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for the 
action’s occurring.”29 
As to the relationship between AP and UR, the two supposed requirements for free 
will, Kane explains that the latter condition of UR does not require us to have been 
able to do otherwise—that is, to have had AP—for each and every act carried out of 
our own free will. However, it does require us to have had AP on at least some 
occasions in the past. Further, Kane contends that the choices we have made when 
faced with these AP are ones that have had a substantial impact in forming our 
present character, and he dubs these choices “self-forming actions” (SFAs). 
Summarising the importance of SFAs for explaining how it is that we can be morally 
responsible for our acts, Kane says: “SFAs are only a subset of those acts in life for 
which we are ultimately responsible and which are done “of our own free will.” But 
if none of the acts in our lifetimes were self-forming in this way, we would not be 
ultimately responsible for anything we did.”30 
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26 For more on ‘forking path’ arguments, see van Inwagen (2009); Fischer (1994); and Ekstrom 
(2000). 
27 Ginet (1990), p. 90. 
28 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 14. 
29 Ibid., p. 14. 
30 Ibid., p. 15. 
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In summary, Kane, in common with Ginet and indeed all libertarians, argues for the 
necessity of AP. But to this Kane adds the further requirement of UR, according to 
which an agent can only be ultimately responsible for an act if they are responsible 
for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for that act. Since the requirement of 
UR could not be met without positing the existence of undetermined SFAs (because 
otherwise our choices would follow from events in the past for which we are patently 
not ultimately responsible), it follows that UR entails AP. In positing and describing 
the relation between AP, UR, and SFAs, Kane believes he has advanced a plausible 
and attractive theory of human action which demonstrates not only that: (a) agents 
are able (on occasion) to do otherwise, but also that; (b) they can do so voluntarily, 
intentionally, and rationally. 
 
3.4 Criticisms of Kane’s Libertarianism 
3.4.1   The Luck Objection 
The same objections that were levelled at Ginet’s libertarian theory will be 
reconsidered in the light of Kane’s own libertarian solution to the free will problem. 
The aim of course is to find out whether the difficulties that Ginet’s theory faces are 
merely due to features of his particular brand of libertarianism, or whether in fact 
there is some intrinsic flaw from which libertarian theories as a whole suffer. 
Let us begin once more by applying the luck objection to Kane’s theory. Before 
examining his response we must first spell out how the luck objection applies to 
Kane’s libertarianism. We need to know: how does Kane’s account of human action 
invite the charge that the actions he describes are unavoidably and unacceptably 
subject to luck? In answer, the luck objection applies to Kane’s undetermined SFAs: 
it is these actions, Kane’s critic will say, that are unavoidably and unacceptably 
subject to luck. The argument is that, since SFAs are supposed to lack sufficient 
cause or motive (which, being undetermined, they must), the resulting action cannot 
be characterised as being anything other than (at least in part) subject to luck. This is 
the same oft-rehearsed argument that we saw was articulated by Hume, A.J. Ayer, 
Galen Strawson, Mele, and others when the same objection was raised to Ginet’s 
libertarianism. 
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Kane, like Ginet, is familiar with this criticism, and his response to it is to argue that 
there is more going on with SFAs than the luck objection credits. Kane’s contention 
is that the occurrence of SFAs is not the product of mere chance (although he 
concedes that there is an element of chance to all SFAs), but rather that it is 
primarily an effort of the will which ensures that one outcome prevails over another. 
Since we are prima facie responsible for our own efforts of will, we must equally be 
responsible for the undetermined SFAs that occur largely as a result of our efforts of 
will. To illustrate the importance of efforts of will in the occurrence of SFAs, Kane 
presents an example which he considers typical of cases in which SFAs are 
performed. This action, Kane is keen to stress, is willed, voluntary, and allows for a 
freedom that compatibilists find themselves deprived of due to their denial of AP. He 
describes the scenario thus: 
[A businesswoman] is on her way to a very important meeting when she observes an assault taking 
place in an alley. An inner struggle ensues between her conscience, to stop and call for help, and her 
career ambitions, which tell her she cannot miss this meeting. She has to make an effort of will to 
overcome the temptation to go on. If she overcomes this temptation, it will be the result of her effort, 
but if she fails, it will be because she did not allow her effort to succeed […] When we, like the 
woman, decide in such circumstances, and the indeterminate efforts we are making become 
determinate choices, we make one set of competing reasons or motives prevail over the others then 
and there by deciding.31 
This response may appear convincing at first glance—Kane is surely right, after all, 
to think that efforts of will are of crucial importance when we are faced with 
conflicting motives. What is more, we are all familiar with facing difficult dilemmas: 
situations in which we find ourselves presented with two opposing courses of action 
and must choose between them as best we can. To come to a decision in these 
circumstances we must perhaps wrestle with our consciences, or maybe consider 
very carefully the options that are laid before us (or both of those things). However, 
notwithstanding the undoubted importance either of efforts of will when faced with a 
conflict of motives, or of the fact that these scenarios of ‘feeling torn’ are familiar to 
us all, a crucial question for Kane remains, namely: what specific role does 
indeterminism play in this process of decision-making for SFAs? Answering this is 
not such an easy task, a fact that is made plain by Pereboom’s comment on Kane’s 
position:  
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31 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
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Consider Anne, the businesswoman, who can either decide to stop and help the assault victim, or can 
refrain from so deciding. The relevant causal conditions antecedent to this decision—agent-involving 
events, or, alternatively, states of the agent—would leave it open whether this decision will occur, and 
she has no further causal role in determining whether it does. I contend that with the causal role of the 
antecedent conditions already given, whether the decision occurs is not then settled by anything about 
the agent—whether it be states or events in which the agent is involved, or the agent herself.32 
It seems that Kane cannot avoid the charge that undetermined SFAs are subject to 
luck, given that the relevant causal conditions prior to an agent’s decision when 
performing SFAs leave the outcome of this decision open. In the case of the 
businesswoman, if the relevant causal conditions prior to her decision leave it open 
whether she will help the assault victim, and if she plays no further causal role in 
determining how this decision is made, then whether she helps appears to be a matter 
of luck. So to the question of what role indeterminism plays in the process of 
decision making for SFAs, the inescapable answer is that all it introduces is an 
element of luck. 
In conclusion, Kane’s libertarian account is every bit as vulnerable to the luck 
objection as Ginet’s. Whether by deliberate tactical manoeuvre or mere artless 
oversight, Kane succeeds in obscuring the issue by stressing that, when it comes to 
SFAs, it is the agent’s will that is of central importance. From considering one’s own 
experience, everyone can agree that situations do sometimes arise in which one must 
make an important decision between two opposing courses of action. Further, it 
seems clear that, especially when a decision must be made between an easier, less 
moral course of action and a harder, more moral one, a strong effort of the will may 
be involved. But nothing about this account of action conflicts with the idea that 
these inner struggles in fact have a determinate outcome. That is, nothing about the 
phenomenology of decision-making in such cases gives us reason to believe that this 
process is not wholly determined.  
Further, Kane does not provide—and cannot by the nature of the case provide—an 
explanation of how the undetermined SFAs could transform what would otherwise 
be a determined and therefore supposedly unfree process into a free one. Once again, 
the evidence is that the libertarian theories so far examined fail to establish a link 
between indeterminism and increased freedom. Importantly, this is not due to a quirk 
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32 Ibid., p. 193. 
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of the particular theories presented, but is rather due to the fact that the one feature 
that all libertarian theories share—an embracing of indeterminism in the sphere of 
human action—is a feature that adds nothing to a determinist metaphysic beyond an 
element of chance.33 
 
3.4.2   The Lack of Explanation Objection 
Perhaps the best that the libertarian could hope for in the wake of the luck objection 
would be to pin their faith on future libertarian theories being able to explain exactly 
how indeterminism can be posited in such a way that it avoids the objection. This is 
certainly van Inwagen’s position, who confesses himself unable to understand “how 
free will works,” but feels justified in affirming libertarianism owing to his strong 
belief that humans possess the free will required for moral responsibility, allied to 
his further conviction that such free will would be impossible in a determined 
world.34 
But what if the libertarian’s metaphysical picture suffers not just the problem of 
being unable to convincingly explain ‘how free will works,’ as the luck objection 
reveals? What if it is not just the link between indeterminism and free will that is in 
question but something more fundamental, namely, the viability of the libertarian’s 
metaphysical picture itself? If the PSR is to be embraced, then this is indeed the 
situation in which libertarians find themselves since the PSR has been shown to 
preclude indeterminism in any sphere of life, including of course the sphere of 
human action. This is the thrust of the ‘lack of explanation’ objection: since nothing 
happens or exists without having a complete explanation (as per the PSR), any theory 
of human action must reflect this fact; but libertarian theories, by virtue of espousing 
indeterminism, deny this. Libertarian theories are therefore untenable. 
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33 To state the objection more generally, we might say: since all libertarian theories must posit AP, 
and since there must necessarily lack a sufficient cause or reason as to which AP actually occur, we 
cannot escape the conclusion that these so-called “freely willed” libertarian actions, to the extent that 
they are undetermined, are subject to luck. 
34 Van Inwagen (1983: pp. 216-7) expresses his position as follows: “I have never pretended to 
understand “how free will works.” If I knew I would tell you, but I don’t know […] I have no liking 
for unresolved mysteries in philosophy. But it is no good trying to pretend that mysteries do not exist 
if they quite plainly do exist. Moreover, I prefer small mysteries to large mysteries.” To van 
Inwagen’s mind, then, it is a smaller mystery to imagine that an agent is able to choose non-
deterministically between outcomes than it is to suppose either that moral responsibility simply does 
not exist, or that moral responsibility exists “even though no one ever has any choice about anything.”  
74!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
With the ‘lack of explanation’ charge restated, let us see whether Kane is able to 
provide a libertarian rebuttal where Ginet could not. A good place to start the 
libertarian defence is with the following question: to what problem is indeterminism 
in the realm of human action deemed to be the solution? One answer to this is that 
indeterminism allows for alternative possibilities (AP). Without AP there is no real 
choice, it is claimed, as our futures must already be mapped out in front of us. Rather 
than our life paths being akin to a “garden of forking paths,” we must instead be 
condemned to treading an unalterable course through our lives. 
As arresting as this visual metaphor admittedly is, and as disquieting as is the notion 
that, if determinism is true, then our fates have been decided long before we were 
around to have any say in the matter, we have already seen that libertarians are 
incapable of securing AP without incurring the unacceptable cost of admitting that 
an individual’s choice of AP must be ascribed to luck.35 If there are forks in the path 
of life then it seems that there must be a corresponding absence of complete 
explanation as to why any particular path was in fact chosen, and hence such choices 
are subject to luck (as opposed to being the outcome of a freely-willed, libertarian 
choice). 
The argument that indeterminism is necessary since it allows for AP is therefore a 
non-starter if the luck objection succeeds, as I have argued it does. But Kane offers a 
further reason for embracing indeterminism, and this rests on his identification of a 
further requirement for free will besides AP, one that also could not be met in a 
determined world. This is the ultimate responsibility (UR) requirement described 
when introducing Kane’s libertarianism. To recap, here is Kane’s account of what 
the UR entails: 
If agents must be responsible to some degree for anything that is a sufficient cause or motive for their 
actions (as UR requires), then an impossible infinite regress of past actions would be required unless 
some actions in the agent’s life history (SFAs) did not have either sufficient causes or motives and 
hence were undetermined.36  
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35 Unacceptable, that is, not just for the critic of libertarianism but also for libertarians themselves, 
since if AP are required for free will then it  cannot be considered a mere matter of luck which AP a 
person should in fact choose.  
36 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 15. 
IS!LIBERTARIANISM!A!COUNTEREXAMPLE!TO!THE!PSR?!!!!!!!75!
!
Kane is concerned not only with our ability to choose between different paths in the 
future (which the AP requirement seeks to capture), but is concerned also to secure 
the result that we are the ultimate sources or originators of our acts (which the UR 
requirement expresses). Since, if determinism were true it could not be the case that 
one were the ultimate source or originator of one’s acts (because one could not be 
said to be the ultimate source of one’s acts if those acts follow inescapably from the 
state of the world at some time before our birth together with the laws of nature), 
indeterminism must be embraced. By this means only can we secure the vital 
condition of UR. 
Kane is well aware of the charges levelled at those libertarians who, like himself, 
wish to make intelligible the UR condition that he describes and endorses. Kane 
quotes Nietzsche, who once wrote disparagingly that the notion that one could be the 
ultimate source of one’s will and actions is “the best self-contradiction that has been 
conceived so far,” by way of illustrating the fact that there are those who consider 
the UR condition to be an incoherent and impossible ideal.37 And in devil’s advocate 
mode, Kane himself poses the question the libertarian must face: “how could acts 
having neither sufficient causes nor motives be free and responsible actions?”38 
Kane is thus aware of and able to openly acknowledge the difficulty in rendering the 
UR condition intelligible; but he nevertheless considers the task possible. His 
defence of UR relies on a successful defence of his account of SFAs, since not only 
are occasions when SFAs occur ones at which (according to Kane) we have AP, but 
they are also a necessary condition for UR. This is because SFAs are the means by 
which the following regress can be stopped, a regress Kane believes would otherwise 
rob us of responsibility: agents must be responsible (according to the UR condition) 
by virtue of past voluntary actions for whatever is a sufficient cause of their actions. 
In order to stop the regress, certain actions in an agent’s life history must be 
undetermined (and so lack sufficient causes). These actions are, of course, SFAs. 
Kane attempts to make his thesis more plausible by explaining that he does not claim 
that all free acts are undetermined, but rather only those acts which help to shape us 
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37 Neitzche (1973), p. 32. 
38 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 23. 
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into the kinds of people that we are, namely “will-setting” or “self-forming actions” 
(SFAs).39 Kane states:  
I believe these undetermined self-forming actions or SFAs occur at those difficult times of life when 
we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become. Perhaps we are torn between 
doing the moral thing or acting from ambition, or between powerful present desires and long-term 
goals, or we are faced with competing tasks for which we have aversions. In all such cases, we are 
faced with competing motivations and have to make an effort to overcome temptation to do 
something else we also strongly want.40 
In such situations, Kane suggests that there might be a “stirring up of chaos” within 
the brain that makes it sensitive to indeterminacies at the neuronal level. The feeling 
of uncertainty and inner tension that we commonly experience when faced with 
conflicting sets of motives, Kane postulates, reflects the indeterminacy going on 
within the cells of our brain. 
Let us now recall the argument against incompatibilism that was adopted and 
reformulated from Ginet: 
(1) Incompatibilism entails that (at least) some free actions are not determined 
by an antecedent state of the world. 
(2) If an action is not determined by an antecedent state of the world, then it has 
(at best) a partial explanation in terms of its antecedents. 
(3) All free actions have complete explanations in terms of their antecedents. 
Therefore incompatibilism is wrong. 
We saw how Ginet denied premise (3) of the argument, and in so doing rejected the 
PSR which the premise invokes. We also saw how Ginet was able to provide little in 
the way of evidence to support this denial of the PSR, citing unconvincing instances 
from his own life to demonstrate both causeless action (such as leg-crossing) and 
also different outcomes following on from the same antecedents (for example, 
choosing to work or instead opting to watch football). Kane also denies premise (3). 
The question is: is his case against the PSR any stronger? 
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39 In contrast to Ginet, of course, who argues that an act of will could only be free if, at that particular 
moment, an agent could have done otherwise than they in fact did.  
40 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 26. 
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I would argue that Kane adds little to strengthen the libertarian’s case against the 
PSR. As with Ginet, Kane looks to personal experience to corroborate his libertarian 
theory. He appeals to introspection when he argues that the inner tension we 
commonly feel at times when we perform SFAs—times when the outcome feels 
indeterminate—reflects the actual indeterminacy going on at the neuronal level. But 
as has already been noted, there is no incompatibility between recognising that we 
can sometimes feel unsure as to the outcome of our deliberations, and believing that 
there is no indeterminacy to this process. As such, citing these situations as evidence 
is inadequate. It also seems ad hoc of Kane to suggest, as he appears to do, that 
SFAs are the sole exception to the otherwise exceptionless rule of cause and effect in 
our universe. Other human acts are presumably determined, as are all acts by other 
species of animal. So why single out human acts in this way? 
None of these considerations against Kane’s and Ginet’s attempts to persuade us that 
some actions lack a complete explanation in terms of their antecedents allow us to 
conclude definitively in favour of the PSR and against libertarianism. As I have 
acknowledged, human action is too complex a phenomenon to yield itself to our 
understanding in the way that (for example) physical laws do: it is simply not 
possible either to prove or disprove the claim that, given identical antecedents both 
within and outside of them, the agent would make the same choice every time. 
Additionally, the libertarian view has undoubted intuitive appeal precisely because it 
does not make us beholden to antecedent causes. As Steward urges, part of the 
appeal of libertarianism lies in its insistence that “it is not because something about 
us makes us act or because something explains why we act, but simply because we 
act that it is up to us what happens to our bodies.”41 Despite these considerations, 
though, there are better reasons for finding in favour of the PSR than there are for 
rejecting it. While neither proof nor disproof can be provided for the claim that 
human actions have sufficient reasons, Kane’s and Ginet’s attempts at providing 
proof are flimsy. Further, while libertarianism certainly has intuitive appeal, I would 
argue that the PSR’s intuitive appeal is greater still. 
We can summarise the ‘lack of explanation objection’ as follows. Kane, in devil’s 
advocate mode, posed the question: “how could acts having neither sufficient causes 
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41 Steward (2012), p. 169.  
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nor motives be free and responsible actions?” While this question does indeed need 
answering (which, I have argued, Kane fails to do satisfactorily), a more searching 
question is simply: “could any act lack sufficient causes or motives?” If we accept 
the PSR, then clearly the answer to this is “no.” Therefore, the next question to ask 
must be: does Kane provide good reasons to believe that the PSR is mistaken? Once 
again, I think Kane fails to offer convincing reasons for believing that some actions 
(namely SFAs) lack sufficient causes or motives. In summary, rather than the PSR 
finding its rebuttal in libertarian theories of will, it is instead libertarian theories of 
free will that find their rebuttal in the PSR. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
I have argued that both Ginet and Kane fail to provide a satisfactory answer to either 
the ‘luck objection’ or the ‘lack of explanation objection.’ I believe we are now in a 
clearer position to see that it is not some feature peculiar to Ginet’s and Kane’s own 
libertarian theories that renders them vulnerable to these objections, but rather that 
all libertarian theories are equally vulnerable.  
The ‘luck objection’ is applicable to all libertarian theories since all posit 
indeterminacy in the realm of human action, and as such all are open to the charge 
that there is no way of explaining this indeterminacy without recourse to the notion 
of luck. Kane in particular seems to be less than clear about why it is necessary to 
posit indeterminacy. It is clear enough that there is a connection between 
indeterminacy and both AP and UR—namely, that indeterminacy is a requirement 
for both. It is clear too that if you have the intuitive sense that the AP and UR 
conditions are required for moral responsibility (which is how Kane characterises his 
own feelings on the matter), you must therefore embrace indeterminacy in order to 
save moral responsibility. So indeterminacy helps in the sense that it allows for 
conditions (AP and UR) that Kane intuitively feels are necessary for moral 
responsibility. But when it comes to explaining the direct connection between 
indeterminacy and moral responsibility, Kane has nothing convincing to offer. In 
fact, at times Kane seems to be saying that it is in spite of, rather than because of, 
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indeterminacy that we are morally responsible agents.42 In which case, one wonders, 
what then is the point of being a libertarian? 
The ‘lack of explanation objection’ is likewise applicable to all libertarian theories. 
The objection is simply that, since the libertarian must affirm the truth of 
indeterminism, and since the PSR commits one to the truth of determinism, the truth 
of the PSR entails the falsity of libertarianism. Relying as it does on the truth of the 
PSR, this ‘lack of explanation objection’ is perhaps a less sure route to undermining 
libertarianism than the ‘luck objection.’ Indeed, Ginet and Kane both see no problem 
in rejecting the PSR, the former citing examples of uncaused action (such as leg-
crossing) and of different choices following on from identical antecedent conditions 
as evidence of its falsity, and the latter appealing to our supposed intuition that, 
when faced with difficult decisions that create inner tension, the outcome is 
indeterminate. 
In both cases, however, I called into question the strength of the evidence against the 
PSR and hence against the ‘lack of explanation objection.’ In particular, Ginet’s 
examples of PSR-violating actions and choices strike me as wholly inadequate since 
the actions and choices he picks out could just as well be considered determined, and 
nothing he says would persuade those not already convinced that some human 
actions are undetermined. Kane also does little to persuade us to reject the PSR, 
beyond appealing to the common experience of feeling as though, when making 
certain difficult decisions, the outcome is not determined. While we may or may not 
agree with Kane that we sometimes sense this absence of determinacy in the 
outcome of our decisions, this remains a poor basis on which to conclude that 
indeterminacy is therefore present. Still, to Kane’s credit he does offer a fuller 
explanation than Ginet of how indeterminacy might enter the picture, arguing that 
indeterminacy at the quantum level could have macro level effects on account of the 
stirring up of chaos within the brain.43 The overall impression, though, is that while 
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42 In the following passage, for example, Kane (in Fischer et al. (2007: p. 27)) suggests that the 
process of solving a mathematical puzzle is analogous to making the correct moral decision since 
both, he claims, are feats accomplished despite the hindrance of indeterminacy: “Whether you are 
going to succeed in solving the problem is uncertain and undetermined because of the distracting 
neural noise. Yet, if you concentrate and solve the problem nonetheless, we have reason to say you 
did it and are responsible for it, even though it was undetermined whether you would succeed. The 
indeterministic noise would have been an obstacle that you overcame by your effort.” 
43 Fischer et al. (2007), pp. 28-31. 
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Kane’s explanation does at least attempt to marry libertarianism with a scientific 
understanding of the world, his appeal to chaos theory and to the results of standard 
quantum theory in order to explain indeterminacy in human action is unacceptably 
ad hoc. In brief, while Kane’s explanation is not demonstrably false, there is little 
reason to consider it true.  
In conclusion, I consider the ‘luck objection’ on its own to provide sufficient reason 
to reject libertarianism in all of its forms. Given that it successfully shows that 
indeterminacy cannot allow for any more freedom or moral responsibility that we 
would otherwise lack in a determined world, I cannot see any reason to adopt the 
libertarian position. However, the ‘luck objection’ does not rule out the possibility of 
indeterminacy in human actions simpliciter, but rather demonstrates that 
indeterminacy can be of no use in defending our human freedom and/or moral 
responsibility against the perceived threat of determinism. The ‘lack of explanation 
objection,’ by contrast, does rule out the possibility of indeterminism and thus, if 
successful, not only leaves one with no reason to adopt a libertarian position but 
positively precludes its adoption. Admittedly, Ginet, Kane, and their fellow 
libertarians are not compelled to agree that the ‘lack of explanation objection’ is 
successful—indeed, their PSR-defying accounts of human action testify to their 
disagreement with this line of argument. But while libertarians can deny the PSR in 
this way without inviting accusations of contradiction or absurdity, there is little 
reason to accept their accounts of human action unless one has prior grounds for 
endorsing libertarianism. With the connection between indeterminism and increased 
freedom and/or moral responsibility severed by the ‘luck objection,’ no prior 
grounds for endorsing libertarianism can be found, and thus it looks as if libertarians 
are requiring us to reject a principle for which we have a presumption in favour 
while getting nothing in return. 
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4 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Case for Hard Determinism 
 
We begin this chapter having established, if not conclusively then at least to our 
satisfaction, that libertarianism is false, and the PSR - and hence also determinism—
is true. As has been shown, the presumed truth of the PSR entails the truth of 
determinism, and neither the arguments against the PSR as presented in Chapter 2 
nor our examination of the case for libertarianism in Chapter 3 can persuade us to 
presume otherwise. 
The central question to address now is: what implications does the truth of 
determinism have for our ascriptions of moral responsibility?1 In particular, we shall 
be asking whether there are good arguments for thinking that the truth of 
determinism precludes the possibility of holding each other morally responsible for 
our acts. Arguments to this effect, if successful, would lead us to adopt an ‘error 
theory’ regarding our ascriptions of moral responsibility: that is, we should be forced 
to conclude that holding people morally responsible for their actions is always a 
mistake, and we can only continue to do so on pain of illogicality. 
At this stage, it might be useful to present a table to illustrate the various 
permutations of opinion about determinism and freedom that it is possible to have, 
whether one holds to their truth (T), their falsity (F), or else remains agnostic (?):2 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I could equally have asked what implications the truth of determinism has for our ascriptions of free 
will to one another—that is, I take it that when we discuss whether or to what extent we possess free 
will, we are talking about the free will required for moral responsibility. So on my understanding (or, 
perhaps, stipulation) free will is always and only present in actions for which we are morally 
responsible, and vice versa. 
2 An identical table to the one presented here can be found in Pereboom (2001: xix), and also in 
Strawson (2010: p. 6). 
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____________________________________________________________________ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)       (9) 
Determinism  T F T F T F ? ? ? 
Freedom  F T T F ? ? F T ? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
As a result of our investigations, we can already rule out positions (2), (4), (6), (7), 
(8), and (9). We are left with a choice of affirming either positions (1), (3), or (5)—
determinism is true, and we can either affirm that we have the free will required for 
moral responsibility, deny this, or else (for whatever reason) remain agnostic about 
the possibility of freedom in the face of determinism. 
There are two arguments to examine in this chapter in favour of position (1), the 
incompatibilist position that we lack the free will required for moral responsibility.3 
Each of these arguments will be presented and then followed by objections to see 
whether their conclusion—essentially, that freedom and determinism are 
incompatible—can be avoided. I have chosen these arguments on the basis that they 
seem to me to be the most compelling arguments for the incompatibilist position. 
Any candidate theory of moral responsibility, therefore, will have to provide a 
convincing response to these arguments if it is to be credible. 
 
4.1 The Consequence Argument 
The first argument to consider is known as the Consequence Argument. It has 
received various presentations at the hands of different philosophers, but the version 
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3 In actual fact the second argument, which is proposed by Galen Strawson, might be more accurately 
classified as an argument for position (7), since Galen Strawson does not affirm the truth of 
determinism but instead argues that, whether or not determinism is true, the free will required for 
moral responsibility that we are generally assumed to possess is an impossibility. Nevertheless, I will 
be taking Galen Strawson’s argument as providing a defence of (1), since unlike Galen Strawson I do 
see compelling reasons to affirm the thesis of determinism, at least as far as human actions are 
concerned. 
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that we shall focus on is expounded by van Inwagen.4 Here is how the argument 
runs: 
(1) No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. 
(2) No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of 
nature entail every fact of the future, including one’s own actions. 
Therefore no one has power over the facts of the future, including one’s own 
actions.5 
The argument is admirably straightforward, both in its premises and its conclusion. 
The basic idea is that powerlessness over both facts about the past and laws of nature 
transfers to powerlessness over one’s own actions, as these actions are the 
inescapable consequences of facts about the past combined with the laws of nature. 
If free action requires the ability to do otherwise than one actually does, and if 
determinism is true, then it seems as though it is never possible to do otherwise than 
what one actually does, and hence that it is never possible to act freely.  
It should be noted that while van Inwagen accepts the conclusion of the argument, he 
is not himself a hard determinist since he does not accept the truth of determinism. 
For him, then, the argument functions as a reductio of the affirmation of 
determinism—since free will is impossible if determinism is true, we can safely 
reject the thesis of determinism. Of course, it is not possible to view the argument in 
this way if, as I have argued is the case, there is good reason to think that 
determinism is true. For those of us that reject the libertarian metaphysics of van 
Inwagen and others, the argument poses a serious threat to the existence of free will. 
There are two lines of response to this argument to consider. The first is from Lewis, 
who seeks to exploit a perceived equivocation in the Consequence Argument in 
order to avoid the conclusion. The second response comes from Slote, who questions 
the legitimacy of moving from the notion of being powerless over facts that are in no 
way alterable by our beliefs, desires, and abilities etc., to the notion that one is 
equally powerless over facts that, conversely, are the result of what Slote calls 
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4 Van Inwagen first presents the Consequence Argument in his (1975) paper “The Incompatibility of 
Free Will and Determinism.” Other presentations of the argument have been offered by the following: 
Ginet (1966); Lamb (1977); and Wiggins (1973). While there are minor variations in emphasis 
between the different presentations, all agree that, if all human actions are in some sense necessary, 
then we lack the free will and/or moral responsibility we commonly attribute to ourselves. 
5 Van Inwagen (1983), p. 222.  
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“appropriate internal factors.”6 After presenting and critiquing these responses, we 
shall conclude by pronouncing on the success (or otherwise) of the Consequence 
Argument. 
 
4.2 Lewis’s Critique 
Defining himself as a compatibilist (“the doctrine that soft determinism may be 
true”), Lewis says that he shall feign to uphold soft determinism (“the doctrine that 
sometimes one freely does what one is predetermined to do”) for the sake of 
argument.7 He then proceeds to outline the following scenario: 
I have just put my hand down on my desk. That, let me claim, was a free but predetermined act. I was 
able to act otherwise, for instance to raise my hand. But there is a true historical proposition H about 
the intrinsic state of the world long ago, and there is a true proposition L specifying the laws of nature 
that govern our world, such that H and L jointly determine [that I put my hand down on the desk].8 
Lewis then asks: what would have had to have been the case if, instead of putting his 
hand on the desk, he had at that moment raised it? The answer is that at least one of 
three things would of necessity been true. Either contradictions would have been true 
together; or the historical proposition H would not have been true; or the law 
proposition L would not have been true. 
Not surprisingly, this admission amounts to a reductio for van Inwagen, as none of 
the three alternatives at first glance seem acceptable. Lewis himself discounts the 
possibility that if he had raised his hand then contradictions would have been true 
together, as well as the possibility that raising his hand would have altered H, the 
historical proposition about the intrinsic state of the world long ago. But he is happy 
to be committed to the consequence that if he had raised his hand as he claims he 
was able to do, then some law would have been broken and L would thus have been 
rendered false. 
A first thought at hearing this might be to wonder whether it is not part of the very 
definition of a law that it cannot be broken, in which case it is a conceptual necessity 
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6 Slote (1982), p. 21. 
7 Lewis (1981), p. 122.  
8 Ibid., p. 122. 
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that the law proposition L must remain true.  Lewis is aware of this, however, and 
does not wish to claim that anything could be both a law and be broken, since on his 
understanding a genuine law must be an absolutely unbroken regularity. Instead, he 
clarifies, his contention is: “If L had not been true, something that is in fact a law, 
and unbroken, would have been broken, and no law.” 9  Notwithstanding this 
clarification, it might reasonably be wondered how it could be the case that we are 
able to perform acts that would entail the falsity of the law proposition L. Lewis 
imagines his philosophical adversary crowing: “You claim to be able to break the 
very laws of nature. And with so little effort! A marvellous power indeed! Can you 
also bend spoons?” 10  However, Lewis goes on to argue that his detractor 
misunderstands the nature of his claim. What his philosophical adversary is actually 
objecting to is something that Lewis terms the ‘Strong Thesis,’ which states: 
ST: I am able to break a law. 
Lewis, though, stresses he is in complete agreement that ST is utterly incredible, and 
as such he does not wish to make a plea for its truth. What Lewis does wish to argue 
the case for is the following ‘Weak Thesis’: 
WT: I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken. 
Lewis proceeds to defend WT by sketching a scenario in which he is able to raise his 
hand “although it is predetermined that I will not.”11 Lewis argues that all that is 
required for him to raise his hand in a situation in which it is predetermined that he 
will not in fact do so, is for some law to be broken. Crucially for Lewis, however, his 
act of hand-raising, were it to happen, would itself neither cause nor be a law-
breaking event. Neither would it be the case that any act of his would either cause or 
be a law-breaking event. Therefore, his alleged ability to raise his hand confers upon 
him no “marvellous ability” to break laws of nature. Instead, all that need be the case 
is that before the act of hand raising a law must have been broken, an event that 
Lewis terms a “divergence miracle.” 
At this point, it would be helpful to pause and consider how Lewis’s embracing of 
WT relates to van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. Lewis is arguing that it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Ibid., p. 123. 
10 Ibid., p. 123. 
11 Ibid., p. 124. 
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possible to perform certain actions (such as raising one’s hand) whose performance 
would render false proposition L (which specifies the laws of nature governing our 
world). As such, the accusation levelled at van Inwagen is that he is guilty of 
equivocation between the following two propositions, either of which could be said 
to be entailed by premise (1) of the Consequence Argument:  
(PROP 1) I am unable to do anything such that my act would be or cause a law-
breaking event. 
(PROP 2) I am unable to do anything such that were I to do it, an actual law of 
nature would be false (and hence not a law). 
Lewis concedes that (PROP 1)—which is effectively the denial of the truth of ST 
stated above – is impossible; but he denies that (PROP 2)—which is the negation of 
WT—is likewise impossible. According to Lewis, the Consequence Argument is 
now either invalid (if we are to understand premise (1) as entailing the true (PROP 
1)) or else it is unsound (if premise (1) is instead meant to entail the false (PROP 2)).  
 
4.2.1   Response to Lewis 
Does Lewis’s attempted rebuttal of the Consequence Argument stand up to scrutiny? 
I would argue not, and that detailed consideration of his defence of compatibilism 
will reveal this fact. A first point to note is that, while Lewis identifies an 
equivocation in van Inwagen’s argument—premise (1) can either be interpreted as 
entailing (PROP 1) or (PROP 2)—van Inwagen would not consider himself guilty of 
equivocation since his premise is intended to affirm the truth of both. That this is so 
is clear from a later article in which van Inwagen clarifies what he means when he 
claims that no one is able to render propositions stating the laws of nature false: 
An agent was able to render a proposition false if and only if he was able to arrange things in a certain 
way, such that his doing so, together with the whole truth about the past, strictly implies the falsity of 
the proposition.12 
This definition makes it plain that van Inwagen would accept neither ST nor WT, 
and so would endorse both (PROP 1) and (PROP 2) since these propositions are the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Van Inwagen (2004), p. 346. 
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negations of those theses. Nevertheless, that van Inwagen is not guilty of 
equivocation is not to say that Lewis is wrong to claim that there is a distinction 
between (PROP 1) and (PROP 2); neither does it show he is wrong to think it 
possible to endorse one without endorsing the other; nor yet does it show that his 
contention that (PROP 1) is true while (PROP 2) is false is mistaken. In fact, we 
certainly can make a distinction between (PROP 1) and (PROP 2), and Lewis is 
perfectly entitled to argue for the truth of the former and the falsity of the latter.  
However, there are good reasons to think that Lewis is unsuccessful in urging the 
falsity of (PROP 2), and thus that his challenge to the Consequence Argument is not 
successful either. First, we can call into question whether it is any more plausible 
that we should possess weak abilities than that we should possess the allegedly much 
more implausible strong abilities. Recall that weak abilities are supposed to be more 
acceptable and less open to ridicule than strong ones on account of the fact that weak 
abilities, unlike their strong counterparts, do not confer upon us the “marvellous 
ability” to break laws of nature. Evidently, this fact is highlighted by Lewis in order 
to underline the point that we should not balk at his endorsement of weak abilities. 
But is what Lewis proposes any easier to accept than if he were to endorse both weak 
and strong abilities? Both weak and strong abilities, it can be argued, are equally 
implausible (or, even less charitably, equally impossible) since both require that a 
law of nature be broken. So it is no defence for Lewis to argue that his 
compatibilism is plausible since he does not accept ST: his acceptation of WT alone 
is enough to commit him to a belief in the possibility of miracles, and hence his 
compatibilism remains suspect.13 
Lewis certainly does not consider the theses WT and ST to be equally plausible, as 
the examples he uses to illustrate the two theses reveal. It will be recalled that, in 
defending WT, Lewis appeals to his ability to raise his hand even though it is 
predetermined that he will not do so. It is Lewis’s supposed possession of this ability 
that demonstrates the truth of WT, which asserts: I am able to do something such 
that, if I did it, a law would be broken. No “marvellous power” is required of him in 
order for this assertion to be true—the raising of one’s hand is, after all, a rather 
mundane act. What is needed (or what is merely needed, Lewis might say), is for his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 In fact, it has been argued that Lewis’s theory commits him to upholding not just WT but also ST 
(see Beebee (2003: p. 272)). I will not press this objection, however. 
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act of hand-raising to be preceded, whether directly or at some time in the distant 
past, by a “divergence miracle” that falsifies a law. By contrast, Lewis implies (and 
presumably believes) that marvellous abilities are required for ST to be true, and this 
belief helps to persuade him that it is not. As an example of an act that would cause a 
law-breaking event, Lewis suggests the following: “Suppose that I were able to 
throw a stone very, very hard. And suppose that if I did, the stone would fly faster 
than light, an event contrary to law. [In such an event] I would be able to do 
something such that, if I did it, my act would cause a law-breaking event.”14 And for 
an example of an act that is itself a law-breaking event, Lewis imagines: “Suppose 
that I were able to throw a stone so hard that in the course of the throw my own hand 
would move faster than light. [In such an event] I would be able to do something 
such that, if I did it, my act would itself be a law-breaking event.”15 
There is nothing wrong with the above examples per se: the case of raising one’s 
hand is an example of a weak ability in action, and the examples in which a stone is 
thrown variously either cause a law-breaking event or is itself a law-breaking event 
are indeed valid examples of strong abilities. The problem is that the examples 
imply, falsely, that strong abilities necessarily require some manifestly miraculous 
power on the part of the agent, a power that it is clearly implausible to suppose that 
we possess. Set against strong abilities thus presented, weak abilities are thereby 
made to seem all the more plausible—a weak ability, after all, appears to be identical 
to many everyday acts such as raising one’s hand. 
But in actual fact the distinction between weak and strong abilities has nothing to do 
with the size of miracle required for their possession. Rather, the distinction is 
simply to do with whether or not the miracle is (or is caused by) an act of mine.16 To 
see that a strong ability need not appear all that miraculous, we can construct our 
own mundane example. In fact, Lewis’s earlier example of hand-raising can be 
appropriated for this purpose: all that needs to be done is to stipulate that the act of 
hand-raising takes place not because of some earlier divergence miracle, but rather 
that the hand-raising is itself the divergence miracle. And so now we have imagined 
two identical-looking hand-raising scenarios: the first involves a weak ability and is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Lewis (1981), p. 124. 
15 Ibid., p. 124. 
16 Beebee (2003: p. 272) makes the same point about Lewis misrepresenting the distinction between 
strong and weak abilities. 
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made possible by the occurrence of an earlier divergence miracle; while the second 
involves the possession of a strong ability and, though the event appears 
unassuming, it is in fact a miracle. The question for Lewis is: why think that the 
former scenario is any more plausible than the latter? After all, both require a 
miracle, and neither is any more or less miraculous than the other. There seems, 
therefore, to be no principled reason for assuming that no divergence miracle could 
ever be a human act. Such an act would be no more miraculous (and therefore no 
less plausible) than an event that does not involve an agent. 
In conclusion, van Inwagen and his fellow incompatibilist need not and should not 
accept either WT or ST. Both require for their truth the occurrence of a miracle and 
the consequent breaking of what would otherwise be a law of nature, and we have 
seen already how the implication that the truth of ST would require a more 
miraculous miracle (so to speak) than the truth of WT is misleading. All that van 
Inwagen needs to say – and what he does in fact say—is that the supposed ability to 
act in such a way that, if one were to perform that act then the proposition L 
expressing the laws of nature would be falsified, is not an ability we ever possess.17 
But it is not just the case that the truth of WT is implausible, or that we have little 
reason to accept it (although these are both true enough). More than that, it surely 
cannot be true if we accept the thesis of determinism on the basis that it is entailed 
by the truth of the PSR. To see this, consider how Beebee elucidates Lewis’s notion 
of a divergence miracle: “[D]ivergence miracles are themselves events, and, by 
definition, the closest world where a divergence miracle f occurs is a world whose 
facts do not diverge from those of the actual world until f itself occurs.”18 This 
passage makes clear that a divergence miracle is an occurrence that marks a 
bifurcation between two previously identical worlds: that is, two worlds sharing 
identical histories diverge on the occasion of a divergence miracle in one or other of 
those worlds. Considering this explanation in the light of our acceptance of the PSR, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Van Inwagen (2004: p. 348) speaks in terms of Lewis and his fellow compatibilist having to 
“measure the price” in response to the Consequence Argument, a phrase that Lewis himself has used 
when writing about philosophical argumentation. In this context, van Inwagen says, the price is that 
the compatibilist “must believe that a free agent in a deterministic world is able to arrange things in 
such a way that one’s so arranging them, together with the whole truth about the past, strictly implies 
the falsity of at least one law of nature,” a situation that he describes as “obviously impossible.” 
18 Beebee (2003), p. 269.  
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it is evident that no such divergence between hitherto identical worlds could take 
place, since there could be no explanation for this occurrence.19 
 
4.3 Slote’s Critique 
We have examined Lewis’s critique of the Consequence Argument and found it 
wanting. Let us now examine a different critique, from Michael Slote, who presents 
an argument to the effect that our powerlessness over the past and the laws of nature 
to which the Consequence Argument makes reference (and which he accepts is the 
case) depends on a selectivity that does not apply to present and future acts. That is, 
we are powerless to alter either the past or laws of nature because current desires and 
abilities are ineffective in bringing about changes to facts about these two things. By 
contrast, current desires and abilities are indisputably causally relevant to present and 
future actions. So in the sense that future actions are at least partly the result of 
current beliefs, desires, abilities and so forth, it is possible (contrary to what the 
Consequence Argument would have us believe) to alter future actions. 
This rough sketch of Slote’s response to the Consequence Argument will now be 
fleshed out before we consider its merits. To begin with, let us present the basic 
argument form that Slote believes underlies all versions of the Consequence 
Argument, and which he will therefore be criticising: 20 
         
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 I have presented here a case for rejecting WT if one accepts determinism on the grounds that it is 
entailed by the PSR. However, I think there is a good case for simply saying that WT is incompatible 
with determinism tout court, and so no further appeal to the truth of the PSR is necessary. This is 
effectively van Inwagen’s position when he argues that it is obviously impossible for an agent to 
arrange things so that this arranging, together with the whole truth about the past, strictly implies the 
falsity of L. If this is correct, then Lewis’s positing the existence of divergence miracles amounts to 
him claiming that determinism is false; and if this is the case, then what relevance does his objection 
have for the Consequence Argument, an argument that assumes the truth of determinism? 
20 Although van Inwagen does not formulate his argument in this fashion, Slote (1982: p. 10) certainly 
thinks that he indirectly appeals to this form of argumentation, which we see entering his 
incompatibilist argument “in pieces, rather than whole.” I think Slote is right that this formulation of 
the Consequence Argument is faithful to van Inwagen’s intentions, and so it provides a legitimate 
basis for Slote’s critique. 
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 Np (where ‘p’ stands for a statement 
that posits the existence of some 
earlier event or circumstance) 
  N (p ⊃ q) (where ‘p ⊃ q’ stands for some 
law of nature) 
 _________ 
                                                                  ∴Nq (where ‘q’ stands for a statement 
that posits some human action) 
 
Slote adds that the necessity indicated by ‘N’ is not to be considered a form of 
logical necessity. Instead, ‘Np’ can be thought to abbreviate ‘p, and no one has, or 
ever had, any choice about whether p.’  
After stating the argument, which Slote terms the “main modal principle,” he next 
seeks to demonstrate that the sort of inference found here from Np and N (p ⊃ q) to 
Nq is questionable. 21  It is questionable because it assumes that the necessity 
expressed in the operator ‘N’ is: (a) agglomerative, and; (b) closed under entailment. 
Speaking generally, agglomeration involves conjoining two propositions to make a 
third, in the belief that if the former two are true then the latter will also be true. In 
this particular context, the assumption of agglomeration amounts to assuming the 
validity of moving from ‘Np’ and ‘N (p ⊃ q)’ to ‘N (p. p ⊃ q)’. Meanwhile, the 
assumption that the operator ‘N’ is closed under entailment sanctions the move from 
‘N (p. p ⊃ q)’ to the conclusion of the argument, which is ‘Nq’.  
Slote’s next aim is to demonstrate how, under certain circumstances, the assumptions 
of agglomeration and of closure under entailment are not warranted. Beginning with 
a fairly uncontroversial example, Slote notes that it is generally accepted that ‘A 
knows that p’ and ‘A knows (p ⊃ q)’ do not entail ‘A knows that q.’ This lack of 
entailment is, of course, because people sometimes fail to make inferences that they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 While Slote rejects this “main modal principle” as embraced in one form or another by those who 
champion the Consequence Argument, he compares it favourably to what he calls the old form of 
deterministic argument against freedom of will, which has roughly the form: p, N (p ⊃ q) ⊢ Nq. This 
old form is clearly fallacious, Slote asserts, as if no necessity attaches to past or pre-existent events 
posited by p, then neither will there be any necessity to the human action posited by q. 
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are entitled to make. If we accept this example, then we accept that closure under 
entailment sometimes fails. 
As Slote acknowledges, however, this example is of limited use since closure under 
entailment fails here due to epistemic weakness on the part of A, whereas the success 
of the entailment relation in the Consequence Argument is not dependent on 
anyone’s ability to draw the correct inference. Still, there are further examples, Slote 
insists, that show we should not take agglomeration and closure under entailment for 
granted, with one other category of examples being those involving obligations. We 
are asked to consider a situation in which a promise has been made to a friend to 
return their book, and a further promise has been made to another friend to meet 
them at a certain time. Slote suggests that, on making these promises, it will be 
obligatory that one returns the book, and obligatory that one meets the friend; but not 
obligatory that one performs the joint act of returning-the-book-and-meeting-one’s-
friend. This example demonstrates that obligations are not agglomerative, argues 
Slote, and they are not agglomerative because they involve relations between 
specific people. Obligations can also fail to be closed under entailment, Slote 
informs us, citing as an example the fact that being under an obligation to meet a 
person at three o’clock tomorrow does not entail being under an obligation to stay 
alive until tomorrow, despite the fact that staying alive is a precondition for meeting. 
The champion of the Consequence Argument might well argue that these examples 
have little to do with the case in hand: while the Consequence Argument is 
concerned with the rules of alethic modal logic, the first example above concerns 
epistemic modalities while the second concerns principles of inference from deontic 
modal logic. But Slote also has an example to hand from the realm of alethic modal 
logic, one which he believes offers a credible counterexample to the assumption that 
examples from this realm must obey agglomerativity and closure under entailment. 
The example is of cases in which events that are themselves not accidental can 
sometimes come together in order to create an event that is accidental. Imagine, we 
are asked, that two friends, Jules and Jim, have each been sent to the same location at 
the same time by their superiors as part of their work (they might, for example, have 
both been sent to a bank by their respective bosses in order to withdraw money). In 
such a case, Slote says, “it would appear to be no accident (not accidental) that Jules 
is at the bank when he is, no accident (not accidental) that Jim is there when he is, 
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but a benign and lovely accident (accidental) that Jim and Jules should both be there 
at that time.”22 
The moral that we are to draw from this example is that the non-accidental is not 
agglomerative: 
Most people who take the trouble to think about it would recognize it to be a main feature of 
(non)accidentality that things that in themselves appear perfectly regular and nonaccidental may 
“come together” to create something that is accidental, and this feature precisely is the non-
agglomerativity of the accidental.23 
Not content with wishing to show that the non-accidental is not agglomerative, Slote 
also claims that the non-accidental appears not to be closed under entailment either. 
We can imagine that it might be no accident for Slote to be in a certain place at a 
certain time (having been sent there by a superior in his line of work), yet it might 
nevertheless be an accident that he remains alive right now (having narrowly escaped 
getting flattened by a truck a few minutes ago). What this shows, Slote thinks, is the 
following: 
If closure thus fails for nonaccidentality, we can perhaps go on to deny that it is governed by our main 
modal principle [i.e. the form of inference on p. 91], on the grounds that [in the above example] where 
it is no accident that I am at a certain place and yet something of an accident that I still exist, it is also 
(on trivial logical grounds) no accident that if I am at that place, then I still exist.24 
Now we are in a position to articulate what it is that Slote thinks is wrong with the 
Consequence Argument. Just as non-accidentality is not agglomerative or closed 
under entailment, so too is the notion of unavoidability appealed to in the 
Consequence Argument not agglomerative or closed under entailment. Further, both 
non-accidentality and unavoidability fail to be agglomerative and closed under 
entailment for the same reason, which is that both notions have a selectivity built 
into them. We have seen how non-accidentality is selective from the above 
examples, in which this feature or property exists only in relation to a plan of a 
specific kind that calls for particular events to occur. How then is the notion of 
unavoidability as employed in the Consequence Argument selective? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Slote (1982), p. 15. 
23 Ibid., p. 15. 
24 Ibid., p. 16. 
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One specific way in which the notion of unavoidability that we find in the 
Consequence Argument is selective, Slote explains, is that when we say that some 
event before our birth (which is where the Consequence Argument usually begins) is 
something we can now do nothing about, we can be interpreted as meaning that the 
event is beyond the causal reach of our desires, beliefs, and abilities acquired during 
our lifetime. Speaking generally, “the factor “selected” by such necessity, is, simply, 
some factor (or set of factors) that brings about the unavoidable thing without 
making use of (an explanatory chain that includes) the desires, etc., the agent has 
around that time.”25 
With these points in mind, Slote now has the ammunition to mount an argument 
against the Consequence Argument. Although past events are beyond an agent’s 
control, as are the laws that lead from them to the agent’s actions, “it will not follow 
that those actions are themselves necessary at some later time when the agent is 
considering whether to perform them.”26 This is because, although the actions are 
determined by and therefore (in principle) predictable in terms of factors prior to the 
agent’s desires, abilities and so forth, those earlier factors bring about an agent’s 
actions only by means of causal chains in which the agent’s desires, abilities and so 
forth are involved. Once agential desires, abilities etc. are engaged in the right ways, 
an agent’s actions can no longer be correctly characterised as unavoidable, and 
therefore the Consequence Argument fails. In summation, Slote writes: 
The selectivity that is plausibly attributed to the necessity involved in recent defences of 
incompatibilism distinguishes between factors within and factors external to agents. For, on our rough 
gloss, what is effected without the “help” of an agent’s (coeval) character, abilities, desires, etc. is 
(then) unavoidable, unalterable, inevitable, but what is brought about via a causal chain that includes 
appropriate internal factors is not.”27 
 
4.3.1   Response to Slote 
Slote believes that an agent is able to render at least some of the consequences of the 
propositions concerning the past and the laws of nature false. His justification for 
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25 Ibid., p. 19. 
26 Ibid., p. 20. 
27 Ibid., p. 21. 
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believing this is that some of these consequences come about (at least in part) due to 
the agent’s character, beliefs, desires, and so forth. 
But what force does this objection have against van Inwagen’s argument? After all, it 
is not as though van Inwagen has let the matter of distinguishing between internal 
and external factors escape unnoticed—indeed, as Slote concedes, van Inwagen 
denies that such a distinction in any way affects the soundness of the Consequence 
Argument.28 Part of the reason Slote believes his objection has force against the 
Consequence Argument is that he thinks his various examples demonstrate the 
existence, previously unconsidered, of cases of alethic necessity that are not 
agglomerative or closed under entailment. Slote writes: 
Previous suggestions that we analyze ability conditionally in order to defend compatibilism from the 
argument of [Consequence Argument proponents] have seemed ad hoc in the absence of alethic 
necessity not subject to our main principle or agglomeration under closure; but when we supply such 
examples and explain how various necessities can flout those principles, the selective necessity that 
we have claimed may be involved in the free-will controversy is made to seem part of a plausible 
pattern, rather than an isolated case.29 
So “conditional analyses” of ability in response to the Consequence Argument were 
ad hoc, Slote believes, in the absence of examples of other sorts of alethic necessity 
that are non-agglomerative and/or not closed under entailment. Now that these 
examples have been provided, however, it is no longer ad hoc to make the case for 
some sort of conditional analysis. 
It is true that Slote provides some ingenious examples to support his case. However, 
I would question whether the examples he offers are really sufficiently similar to the 
Consequence Argument situation to provide much support for what is, when all is 
said and done, quite a straightforward objection (and one, moreover, that van 
Inwagen and other incompatibilists have considered and rejected). For instance, 
although Slote characterises the cases in which he discusses non-accidentality as 
examples of alethic modal logic, this characterisation is questionable. It is 
questionable because the judgment regarding whether some event is or is not an 
accident surely depends on how much we know, and it is this fact that explains why 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See van Inwagen (1975: pp. 196-7) for his discussion of the so-called “conditional analysis” of 
ability, and his claim that the validity of his Consequence Argument in no way depends upon 
demonstrating the inadequacy of this typically compatibilist analysis of ability.  
29 Slote (1982), p. 22. 
96!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
two non-accidental events can combine to create what we judge to be an accidental 
event. To take Slote’s example as recounted earlier, it is a consequence of Jules and 
Jim’s incomplete knowledge of each other’s movements that makes the non-accident 
of Jules being sent to the bank, and the non-accident of Jim being sent to the bank, 
combine to create the benign accident of them both meeting at the bank. If each of 
them knew more about the other’s work and the kinds of errands that the other is 
expected to run, then their meeting would no longer be accidental since their 
increased knowledge of the other’s movements would lead each of them to anticipate 
the encounter. 
There is no such parallel in the case of unavoidability, no comparable way in which 
the notion of the unavoidable can be said to escape the rules of alethic modal logic. 
As such, there is a pertinent difference between the two cases, and this should make 
us question whether the non-agglomerativity and absence of closure under 
entailment in the case of the non-accidental really puts any pressure on the 
Consequence Argument proponent to think that unavoidability might be similarly 
non-agglomerative and not closed under entailment. 
We have reached here a familiar impasse between, on the one hand, compatibilists 
who have the intuition that it is possible to do otherwise in a determined world and, 
on the other hand, incompatibilists who deny this possibility. In the clash of 
intuitions here, I favour the incompatibilist position: it seems to me that the 
soundness of the Consequence Argument is undeniable. Though their arguments 
differ, Slote’s and Lewis’s objections both rely for their persuasiveness on the prior 
adoption of a compatibilist understanding of ability. Lacking this compatibilist 
perspective on the notion of ability, I fail to be persuaded. 
 
4.4 The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility 
Argument                          
We have examined van Inwagen’s argument to the effect that, if determinism is true 
then we lack the free will required for moral responsibility. However, we turn now to 
an argument that makes the stronger claim that, regardless of the truth or falsity of 
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determinism, it is impossible for us to possess the free will required for moral 
responsibility. 30  The argument is due to Galen Strawson, and is titled the 
Impossibility of Moral Responsibility Argument. It runs as follows: 
(1) When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find 
yourself—because of the way you are. 
(2) If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be 
ultimately morally responsible for what you do you must be ultimately 
responsible for the way you are. 
(3) You cannot be ultimately morally responsible for the way you are. 
Therefore you cannot be ultimately morally responsible for what you do.31 
The first premise claims, pretty uncontroversially, that an agent’s action in any given 
situation is the product of the way that they are—that is, it is a product of their 
character. To take a simple example, a person who is temperamentally disposed 
towards anger might find themselves beeping their horn extremely loudly when 
stuck in traffic on a hot summer’s day. By contrast, a person with an altruistic 
disposition might in the same situation find themselves reflecting with sadness on 
the plights of the many other unfortunate souls behind them in the traffic jam whose 
sweltering ordeal will last even longer than their own. According to the first premise, 
then, how we act is a function of the way we are, a function of our character. As I 
have said, it is not a controversial claim, and its truth is not at issue in any of the 
critiques of the argument that we will be considering presently. 
The second premise takes the first premise as an antecedent (the claim that you do 
what you do because of your character), and claims in the consequent that to be 
ultimately morally responsible for your actions you must be ultimately morally 
responsible for your character also. The thought here is as follows: since your actions 
derive from your character, it must be the case that ultimate moral responsibility for 
one’s actions entails ultimate moral responsibility for one’s character. One question 
that this premise raises is just what it means to be ultimately morally responsible for 
something, whether for one’s acts, or character, or for something else entirely. How 
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30 It is not strictly speaking a hard determinist argument, therefore, since the truth of determinism 
features neither as a premise, nor as an assumption underlying any premise, of the argument. Since we 
have prior reasons to accept determinism, however, we can view the argument as providing grounds 
to accept hard determinism if it is successful. 
31 Strawson (2002), p. 443. 
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does mere moral responsibility different from ultimate moral responsibility? 
Strawson’s explanation runs as follows: 
[Ultimate moral responsibility] is responsibility and desert of such a kind that it can exist if and only 
if punishment and reward can be fair or just without having any pragmatic justification, or indeed any 
justification that appeals to the notion of distributive justice.32 
So ultimate moral responsibility as opposed to mere moral responsibility, thinks 
Strawson, can have nothing to do with pragmatic justifications. To take an example, 
while some might argue that at least part of the purpose of holding people morally 
responsible for their acts is to shame them into behaving differently in the future, this 
sort of understanding of moral responsibility is incompatible with the notion of 
ultimate moral responsibility that Strawson presents in the second premise of his 
argument. Similarly, consigning a dangerous criminal to a lengthy stay in prison in 
order to prevent them from committing further heinous crimes may legitimately be 
seen as a way of holding that criminal morally responsible for their behaviour; but 
since the rationale for their sentencing is in this scenario purely pragmatic (i.e. they 
are incarcerated in order to prevent further crimes being committed) this punishment 
cannot be seen as a judgment on whether the criminal is ultimately morally 
responsible for what they have done.  
The third and final premise is the shortest—yet for many libertarians the most 
contentious—of the premises in Strawson’s argument. This premise states that no-
one can be ultimately morally responsible for the way they are—and, since being 
ultimately responsible for one’s character is a precondition for being ultimately 
morally responsible for one’s acts, the conclusion follows that it is impossible for 
anyone to be ultimately morally responsible for anything that they do.  
Why are we not—Indeed, why is it not so much as possible for us to be—ultimately 
morally responsible for the way we are (that is to say, for our character)? The answer 
is that ultimate moral responsibility for your character is impossible as this would 
require the completion of an infinite series of acts of self-formation. To see this, we 
can begin by observing that, in order to be ultimately responsible for your present 
character, it would have to be true that you intentionally brought it about at some 
earlier time that you have the character you currently possess. But of course, in order 
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THE!CASE!FOR!HARD!DETERMINISM!!!!!!!99!
!
for this to be the case, prior to this act of character formation you must have had a 
certain mental nature on account of which you acted to bring it about that you have 
the character that you now do. And this mental nature must have been intentionally 
formed due to some prior nature on account of which you acted, and so on ad 
infinitum.33 
This is not to say that Strawson denies that we commonly feel ourselves to be 
ultimately responsible for our characters—on the contrary, he acknowledges that we 
often unreflectively (and incorrectly) experience ourselves as ultimately responsible, 
in just such a way that would only be warranted if the above process of self-
formation or self-determination could actually be completed.34 Strawson is therefore 
urging us to abandon this unreflective tendency both to assume ultimate 
responsibility for our own character and also to ascribe ultimate responsibility to 
others for theirs. Nietzsche is mentioned approvingly in this connection for having 
declaimed: “No one is accountable for existing at all, or for being constituted as he 
is, or for living in the circumstances and surroundings in which he lives.”35 
Strawson’s argument effectively adds that, as a consequence, no one is ultimately 
accountable for anything whatsoever. Consequently, claims Strawson, there is a 
“fundamental sense in which no punishment or reward is ever ultimately just.”36 
 
4.5 Hurley’s Critique 
On account of the arguments of the previous two chapters, libertarianism has now 
been ruled out of the picture. This makes our task in this section somewhat easier, 
since libertarians are inclined to deny either premise (1) or (3), while compatibilists 
typically direct their attention to demonstrating the falsity of premise (2).37 As such, 
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33 Ibid., pp. 445-7. The irresoluble dilemma for Strawson’s opponent, as Strawson himself articulates, 
is that “[t]here has to be, but there cannot be, a starting point in the series of acts or processes of 
bringing it about that one is a certain way, or has a certain nature, a starting point that constitutes an 
act or process of ultimate self-origination.” 
34 See Strawson (1986), p. 106. 
35 Nietzche (2008), p. 35. 
36 Strawson (2002), pp. 457-8. 
37 Denying both premise (1) and (3) as libertarians do requires affirming the truth of indeterminism, 
which is precisely why we are able to rule these possibilities out. Clarke (2005: p. 16), for instance, 
denies the claim in premise (1) that how you act is a function of the way you are, saying: “The agent 
might act freely […] because it might be up to him whether his being a certain way is followed by his 
acting as he does, and so be up to him whether if he is that way mentally, then he so acts.” Kane, 
100!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
this section will focus on the compatibilist’s objection to premise (2), which finds its 
fullest articulation in a paper by Hurley in which she asks: ‘Is Responsibility 
Essentially Impossible?’38 
Hurley sums up her objection to Strawson’s argument as follows: “According to one 
natural set of intuitions, a person need not be responsible for being what he is in 
order to be responsible for choices that are determined by what he is.” 39 On this 
understating of the conditions for moral responsibility, the buck must stop 
somewhere, and as a matter of fact it stops at our characters. That is to say, even 
though it is true that we are not responsible for our characters in the way Strawson 
demands we must be in order to be responsible for our actions, it is simply wrong to 
insist that responsibility for one’s character is a condition for responsibility for one’s 
actions. To put the point in a way that relates it to Strawson’s argument, Hurley 
thinks we might deny the truth of the conditional expressed in premise (2), and thus 
reject the argument as a whole. It is not the case (runs the objection) that we cannot 
be ultimately morally responsible for what we do despite the fact that we are not—
and indeed never could be—ultimately morally responsible for the way that we are.  
Is Hurley right to think that it is natural to intuit that we can be morally responsible 
for our actions, even given the belief or knowledge that we are not responsible for 
our character? Nozick believes so, offering his opinion to the effect that we can be 
deserving of praise and blame for our actions without necessarily being responsible 
for the character traits and other factors that explain those same actions: 
It is not true, for example, that a person earns Y (a right to keep a painting he’s made, praise for 
writing A Theory of Justice, and so on) only if he’s earned (or otherwise deserves) whatever he used 
(including natural assets) in the process of earning Y. Some of the things he uses he just may have, not 
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meanwhile, denies the assertion in premise (3) that you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way 
you are by citing the Self Forming Actions (SFAs) that we discussed in the previous chapter: these 
allow us to wrest control from determining forces and make us the originators of our own character 
and actions. 
38 Others have articulated much the same objection. For example, Mele (1995: p. 224) worries: “It is 
being claimed, in effect, that the very definition of ‘true responsibility’ entails that possessing such 
responsibility for any choice requires having made an infinitely regressive series of choices.” While I 
shall focus discussion on Hurley’s criticisms of Strawson, she and Mele share a similar basic worry 
with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility, which is that he defines the concept of moral 
responsibility in such a way that its instantiation requires the impossible to occur (namely, for an 
infinitely regressive series of choices to be made). 
39 Hurley (2000), p.30. 
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illegitimately. It needn’t be that the foundations underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the 
way down.40 
This at least shows that Hurley is not alone in having the intuition that premise (2) 
might not be true, and that we might in fact be responsible for our actions without 
always being responsible for all of the elements of our character from which these 
actions find their source. Still, all that has been presented so far, in the form of 
Hurley’s and Nozick’s assertions, is evidence that people sometimes intuitively 
believe the falsity of premise (2). More will be required if we are to demonstrate that 
Hurley’s and Nozick’s intuitions about the falsity of premise (2) are actually correct. 
To this end, we should consider Hurley’s rejection of Strawson’s premise (2) in the 
context of the project of the paper in which it appears. As has been mentioned, 
Hurley’s paper attempts to answer the question of whether true moral responsibility 
is essentially impossible, a question which Strawson of course answers in the 
affirmative. Early on in her paper, Hurley muses: “suppose a theory requires for 
responsible action that people control not just their actions but the causes of their 
actions, and their causes in turn, all the way back.”41 This is just the sort of 
requirement for responsible action which premise (2) of Strawson’s argument 
demands, and which it appears cannot be met. And now, since this condition can be 
seen to be non-empirically impossible to satisfy, the following dilemma arises: 
“Does this show that all [ascriptions of responsibility have been made] in error, that 
no one is ever responsible for anything? Or does it show that the theory is in error, 
that it misdescribes the conditions for responsible acts?”42  
As may be guessed, Hurley plumps for the latter solution to the dilemma, arguing 
that so-called ‘error theories’ regarding moral responsibility are themselves (rather 
ironically, it may be thought) in error. The dilemma posed is one between adopting a 
position of eliminativism regarding moral responsibility (as Strawson does), or else 
favouring a revisionist position (as Hurley does)—revisionist in the sense that, if we 
had previously assumed that moral responsibility must involve a commitment to 
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40 Nozick (2012), p. 225. 
41 Hurley (2000), p. 3. 
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
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what Hurley terms a ‘regression requirement’ (a requirement to which premise (2) is 
committed), then this assumption will need to be revised.4344 
Hurley argues that there are good reasons to favour the revisionist stance over an 
eliminativist one. Perhaps the main reason she cites is that eliminativists such as 
Strawson are required to pull off what she inventively terms an “interpretative 
double whammy”: they must persuade us that it is both analytically impossible for 
any agent to fulfil the regression requirement demanded by premise (2), and also 
necessary that they do so in order to be ultimately morally responsible.45 So, while 
some varieties of eliminativism make the weaker claim that some property P that is 
essential to kind F is as a matter of fact uninstantiated and thus that there are no Fs, 
others make the much stronger claim that it is impossible that property P, which is 
essential to kind F, should be instantiated. Galen Strawson’s position, according to 
which “true self-determination is both necessary and logically impossible,” is an 
example of the latter variety of eliminativism, which Hurley duly dubs ‘impossible-
essence eliminativism.’46 
This rejection of the regression requirement in premise (2) is, in Hurley’s view, a 
natural corollary of her favouring what she terms a “context-driven approach” to the 
issue of moral responsibility. Such an approach stands in contrast to theory-driven 
approaches to moral responsibility in the following respect: while theory-driven 
approaches involve satisfying certain conditions which, collectively, can be regarded 
as defining a theoretical role for moral responsibility, context-driven approaches 
instead focus on how the notion of moral responsibility is applied. Strawson’s 
demand that moral responsibility satisfies the regression requirement condition thus 
marks out his approach as being theoretically driven, while Hurley emphasises the 
importance of focusing on contexts of use. In Hurley’s words, a context-driven 
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43 Hurley (2000: p. 24) defines this ‘regression requirement’ by saying: “to be responsible for 
something you must be responsible for its causes, and it applies recursively.” Although worded 
slightly differently from premise (2), it seems to me that both express the same intuition, and 
therefore both either stand or fall together. 
44 Of course, that Hurley labels her position ‘revisionist’ does not imply that she thinks all will 
consider it a revision. In fact, and as just noted, Hurley makes the case that the intuition that premise 
(2) is false is reasonably commonplace, citing Nozick as one example of what we might call (with no 
disparagement intended) “regression requirement deniers.” The point is simply that, insofar as we 
have a tendency to either tacitly assume or else explicitly acknowledge the truth of the regression 
requirement, Hurley’s position constitutes a revision to our notions of moral responsibility. 
45 Hurley (2001), p. 21. 
46 Strawson (2010), p. 50. 
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account “gives explanatory priority to contexts of positive use, though it can admit 
that some of these are mistaken.” 47 
We can now see why Hurley is unprepared to accede to the truth of Strawson’s 
eliminativism—because, as she says: “the revisionist who invokes a context-driven 
account cannot allow that none of our positive applications of ‘responsibility’ hit 
their mark, since some such must anchor her claim to be talking about 
responsibility.”48 Hurley is claiming that if one is inclined (as she is) to adopt a 
context-driven account, then it cannot be the case that none of one’s attributions of 
responsibility are correct. If all attributions of responsibility turned out to be false, 
Hurley argues, then proponents of context-driven accounts would not even be talking 
about responsibility. And since they patently are talking about responsibility, Hurley 
rules that it is extremely unlikely that eliminativism regarding moral responsibility is 
correct. 
 
4.5.1   Response to Hurley 
Hurley has argued that the notion of an impossible essence is at best suspect and at 
worst meaningless. Her context-driven approach to the issue of moral responsibility 
favours revisionism as opposed to eliminativism and, while she stops short of 
definitively ruling against the latter, her conclusion is that Strawson’s argument is 
uncharitable in the extreme in choosing to interpret ascriptions of moral 
responsibility as involving incoherence. Strawson is unperturbed by this line of 
criticism, however, and he defends his commitment to the claim that our attributions 
of moral responsibility are incoherent. This he does by pointing out that the putative 
incoherence of moral responsibility attributions does not entail a commitment to the 
belief that the concept of moral responsibility is meaningless. On the contrary, 
Strawson wishes to affirm that moral responsibility is meaningful even while he 
denies that it is even possible for any agent ever to be truly morally responsible. He 
writes: 
[I]t is precisely (only) because one has a grasp of the content of the notion of [ultimate moral 
responsibility] that one can see, or can be brought to see, that it is incoherent. It is the same with the 
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47 Hurley (2001), p. 39. 
48 Ibid., p. 38. 
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notion of a round square. Some may say that they don’t really know what the content of this notion is, 
but it is easy to specify. A round square is an equiangular, equilateral, rectilinear, quadrilateral closed 
plane figure every point on the periphery of which is equidistant from a single point within its 
periphery. It is because we know the content of the notion that we know that there cannot be such a 
thing as a round square, and the same is true of the notion of [ultimate moral responsibility]. Many 
say that statements or concepts that are self-contradictory are meaningless, but meaningfulness is a 
necessary condition of contradictoriness.49 
I think that Strawson is right to defend the claim that his arguing that all attributions 
of moral responsibility are incoherent does not entail that the very notion of moral 
responsibility is meaningless. That moral responsibility meets the regression 
requirement is part of the essence of moral responsibility, Strawson wishes to claim, 
and the fact that this requirement can never be met does not render the concept of 
moral responsibility meaningless. Even while remaining agnostic regarding the truth 
of whether there is a regression requirement on moral responsibility (at least for the 
time being), I think it is clear that affirming such a requirement does not render the 
concept of moral responsibility meaningless, just as the notion of a round square is 
both impossible to instantiate and not meaningless. 
Another issue to examine is context-driven accounts of moral responsibility. In 
particular, we can ask whether Hurley is right to adopt such an account, and also 
whether she is right to think that its adoption effectively blocks any claim of 
eliminativism regarding moral responsibility. Dealing firstly with the question of 
Hurley’s rationale for favouring a context-over a theory-driven approach in the case 
of moral responsibility ascriptions, we can note how she observes that the latter are 
“attractive where revisionism seems intuitively correct.”50 For example, she explains, 
it might have been part of our ancestors’ beliefs that stars are the spirits of the great 
kings of the past. As such, if we were to adopt a theory-driven approach to stars 
whereby it is an essential property of these objects that they are the spirits of the 
great kings of the past, we would thereby be committed (implausibly, of course) to 
eliminativism about stars. Context-driven accounts, by contrast, which protect 
applications of a term at the expense of extant theory, would allow for certain 
misattributions of the term ‘star’ (since, for example, we might erroneously apply the 
term to planets until we realise that planets lack certain essential properties of stars) 
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49 Strawson (2002), p. 452. 
50 Hurley (2000), p. 12. 
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but nevertheless ensure that some of our attributions are correct. Just as a context-
driven approach is attractive vis-à-vis stars, so it is for moral responsibility: it 
favours revisionism over eliminativism, which seems intuitively correct in both 
cases. 
I am not convinced of the reasonableness of Hurley’s rationale for endorsing a 
context-driven approach. It sounds rather as though Hurley has made up her mind on 
the issue of eliminativism regarding moral responsibility before even considering 
Strawson’s argument, and that she therefore allows prior intuitions about the 
appropriateness of ascribing moral responsibility to guide her thinking rather than 
engaging with the logic of the argument. Tellingly, nowhere in Hurley’s paper does 
she offer any explanation as to exactly how Strawson’s regression requirement is 
misguided (that is, aside from an appeal to her and Nozick’s intuitions on the issue, 
she offers no argument for rejecting the claim that, to be morally responsible for 
what you do, you must be morally responsible for the way you are). 
In any case, it is not at all clear that adopting a context-driven approach blocks the 
move to eliminativism: I see no reason why one should not allow for the possibility 
that all of what Hurley terms “contexts of positive use” are mistaken.51 That is, 
adopting an approach towards analysing moral responsibility whereby, as Hurley 
recommends, you begin by examining contexts of use for the term and then build a 
theory around these positive attributions, does not seem to rule out the possibility of 
subsequently discovering that all positive applications of the term are wrong. 
Certainly, having an intuition in favour of retaining the concept of moral 
responsibility is sure to influence (or, less neutrally, bias) your judgements regarding 
theory; but having these intuitions and adopting a context-driven account as a result 
will not to any degree help to establish the falsity of eliminativism. 
After considering the arguments in detail, I conclude that Strawson is right to insist 
on the regression requirement expressed in premise (2) of his argument. While 
Hurley contends that one natural set of intuitions leads us to believe that a person 
“need not be responsible for being what he is in order to be responsible for choices 
that are determined by what he is,” a much more natural intuition to my mind is to 
believe the exact opposite: that is, that a person cannot be responsible for choices 
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51 Ibid., p. 39. 
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that are themselves determined by something for which he is not responsible.52 
Further, Hurley’s contention receives no support from her attempts to establish that 
the notion of an impossible essence—which Strawson must characterise moral 
responsibility as being—is in some way suspect or even meaningless. It is neither of 
those things: on the contrary, there can be no difficulty in understanding Strawson’s 
insistence that the regression requirement is both a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility and one that is impossible to satisfy. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has expounded and critiqued what I consider to be the two most 
persuasive arguments for hard determinism. I have argued that even the best and 
most ingenious compatibilist attempts to block these arguments’ conclusions are 
unsuccessful, and that there is therefore a strong case for accepting the hard 
determinist’s contention: no-one has the free will required for moral responsibility. 
Nevertheless, despite my considering them persuasive, it must be acknowledged that 
they fail to win over the numerous philosophers who maintain that determinism and 
the free will required for moral responsibility are compatible. The question then is: is 
there any one issue in particular that lies at the root of this disagreement? I would 
argue that there is, and it is an issue, moreover, that we encountered previously when 
discussing libertarianism: the origination condition. The notion of origination was 
invoked not only in Galen Strawson’s explanation of what it is to be ultimately 
responsible but also in Kane’s elucidation of his libertarian theory of free will, who 
nicely encapsulates it as follows: 
This, of course, is the governing image of free will that we tried to spell out in terms of UR: the 
origins or sources, or archai, of actions should be in the agents themselves and not in something 
outside the agents, if the agents are to be ultimately responsible for what they do and what they are.53 
It can be seen how the origination condition plays a role in both van Inwagen’s and 
Galen Strawson’s respective arguments, since both have at their core the idea that an 
agent’s supposedly freely-willed actions are a consequence of something over which 
the agent has no control. Not being in the agent’s control, the agent is therefore not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Ibid., p.30. 
53 Kane (1996), p. 70. 
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responsible for the action. In van Inwagen’s case, that ‘something’ over which the 
agent has no control is the fact that the state of the world at some prior time together 
with the laws of nature entail one’s own actions (as expressed in premise (2) of his 
argument), whereas for Galen Strawson, it is the character from which an agent’s 
actions flow that he cannot control and hence for which he cannot be held 
responsible (also expressed in premise (2) of his argument). 
So we can see that the condition of origination concerns the sources of our actions, 
and is the requirement that these should come from the agent rather than from some 
external source over which the agent lacks control. While van Inwagen’s and Galen 
Strawson’s arguments both rely on the intuition that the origination condition ought 
to be met, the compatibilist, on the other hand, must deny this. I do not wish to 
suggest that the case against those compatibilists who seek to deny the conclusions 
of van Inwagen’s and Galen Strawson’s hard determinist arguments is conclusive. 
However, I do say that the examples considered in this chapter lend strong support to 
the view that the origination condition is indeed a necessary condition for true moral 
responsibility. 
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5 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mixed Views on Moral Responsibility 
 
Having rejected libertarianism, and having judged that there are strong arguments for 
rejecting compatibilism also, we continue with our task of seeking to identify the 
correct theory of moral responsibility. Libertarianism was rejected on the grounds 
that the truth of the PSR entails determinism, which in turn entails the falsity of 
libertarianism. Compatibilism, meanwhile, was strongly called into question on 
account of the arguments of van Inwagen and Galen Strawson. The common thread 
between these arguments is that they are concerned with one’s actions being beyond 
one’s control, of not originating with the agent. Compatibilists argue in various ways 
that this lack of origination does not impact upon one’s free will or moral 
responsibility. The responses to van Inwagen’s and Strawson’s arguments, however, 
are not able to establish this convincingly. 
Harking back to the beginning of the previous chapter, a table was presented to 
illustrate the various permutations of opinion that one can have regarding 
determinism and freedom. At this stage, we find ourselves inclined towards position 
(1) from that table, which is the hard determinist’s position: determinism is true, and 
this is not compatible with the free will required for moral responsibility. In fact, if 
we are convinced that we can discount libertarianism and compatibilism, then we 
have no choice but to adopt the hard determinist position. 
However, there are many who view hard determinism as such an unappealing 
position to take that it would be better avoided at all costs.1 It is considered an 
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1 For example, van Inwagen (1983: p. 207) argues that the reality of moral responsibility is too self-
evident to deny, and he illustrates his argument with the following humorous example: “I have 
listened to philosophers who deny the existence of moral responsibility. I cannot take them seriously. 
I know a philosopher who has written a paper in which he denies the reality of moral responsibility. 
And yet this same philosopher, when certain of his books were stolen, said, “That was a shoddy thing 
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unappealing position for various reasons. For one thing, it is sometimes argued that 
the belief in one another’s moral responsibility, at least some of the time, is an 
inescapable part of our thinking.2 This belief of course translates into the practices 
that we have in our society, such as blaming those who commit offences and 
sanctioning them by various means, as well as praising and honouring those who are 
considered deserving by virtue of the good deeds that they have performed. 
Embracing hard determinism, therefore, would entail transforming our beliefs 
concerning moral responsibility, and in all likelihood would also entail the alteration 
of our attitudes and practices. Undergoing such a transformation in our beliefs, 
attitudes and practices would be intolerable, impracticable, and perhaps even 
impossible (or so the argument goes). 
And so it is in the spirit of attempting to avoid this hard determinist position that we 
turn now to what can be called ‘mixed views’ on moral responsibility! Mixed views 
derive their name from the fact that they combine elements of compatibilist and 
incompatibilist thought (with libertarianism and hard determinism being the two 
species of incompatibilism). Their appeal lies in the fact that they hold out the 
promise of providing a more satisfying response to the problem of origination than 
we encountered from standard compatibilist responses to van Inwagen’s and Galen 
Strawson’s arguments, while allowing us to avoid the all-out denial of the reality of 
moral responsibility that embracing hard determinism seems to demand. Two mixed 
views will be under the spotlight in this chapter, the first of which is expounded by 
Manuel Vargas and goes by the name of ‘Revisionism,’ while the second is Richard 
Double’s theory of ‘Metaethical Subjectivism.’ An account of each of these theories 
will be given, with the hope being that insights from either or both of them might 
help us when it comes to constructing a positive account of moral responsibility—an 
account that we hope can avoid the pitfalls of standard compatibilist and hard 
determinist theories. 
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to do! But no one can consistently say that a certain act was a shoddy thing to do and say that its 
agent was not morally responsible when he performed it: those who are morally responsible for what 
they do may perhaps deserve our pity; they certainly do not deserve our censure.” 
2 P.F. Strawson’s (1963: p. 9) highly influential article “Freedom and Resentment” provides the 
classic statement of the belief that a theoretical conviction that determinism is true poses no threat to 
our current moral responsibility practices. P.F. Strawson writes: “[W]e cannot, as we are, seriously 
envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of theoretical 
conviction of the truth of determinism.”  
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5.1 Vargas’s Revisionism 
Revisionism with respect to theories and practices surrounding moral responsibility 
comes in many forms. What all of these forms have in common, however, is that 
they involve noting a discrepancy between two different projects, one of which can 
be called diagnostic, and the other prescriptive. So, all revisionist theories will on 
the one hand offer a diagnosis of our common sense opinions regarding moral 
responsibility. This would explain what we (in the main) in fact believe to be true 
regarding responsibility, and most crucially the conditions under which an agent is 
thought to be morally responsible. On the other hand, revisionist theories seek also to 
prescribe, to make the case for what we should believe to be true regarding 
responsibility.3 It is this positing of a discrepancy between what we in fact believe 
and what we ought to believe, that makes any given theory a revisionist theory. 
Vargas identifies himself as a ‘moderate revisionist.’ A wide range of views come 
under the umbrella of moderate revisionism, Vargas informs us, which is perhaps not 
surprising given his broad definition of it, which is as follows: “moderate 
revisionism is the idea that the folk concept of responsibility is inadequate until it 
has been modified in some way.”4 Still, such a definition does distinguish moderate 
revisionism from both weak and strong varieties in that it reveals that moderate 
revisionism is not limited to mere clarifications of linguistic or conceptual 
confusions (in contrast to weak revisionism), yet neither does it advocate the 
straightforward elimination of the concept of responsibility, nor of related attitudes 
and practices (in contrast to strong revisionism). Instead, what it calls for is a 
“pruning,” to use Vargas’s term, of one or more of these elements. While this might 
involve the elimination of aspects of these elements, there is no wholesale 
elimination of the elements themselves. 
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3 Note that, according to Vargas’s (in Fischer et al. (2007), p. 151) account of revisionist theories, the 
sole criterion for judging whether a theory is revisionist is whether it prescribes different beliefs from 
those it diagnoses. If it does, then it is revisionist; if not, then it is not. As for attitudes and practices, 
while Vargas sees these (along with beliefs) as elements of our thought and behaviour that require 
justification on account of the fact that they reveal our attributions of free will and moral 
responsibility, nevertheless, and strictly speaking, the concept of revisionism is defined solely in 
relation to our beliefs—that is, a theory is revisionist if and only if it claims that our beliefs are 
different from what they should be.   
4 Vargas (2005), p. 409. 
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How does Vargas propose that we modify our folk concept of responsibility? He 
suggests we do so by pruning away the libertarian beliefs that he detects in us: 
[W]e see ourselves as having genuine, robust alternative possibilities available to us at various 
moments of decision. We may even see ourselves as agent-causes, a special kind of cause distinct 
from the non-agential parts of the causal order. Moreover, we tend to think of this picture of our own 
agency as underwriting many important aspects of human life, including moral responsibility.5 
Vargas’s diagnosis is that our folk beliefs are libertarian: most people have a 
propensity towards a pre-philosophical belief in robust alternative possibilities, of a 
sort whose veracity would entail the truth of indeterminism in the realm of human 
action. It might further be the case, Vargas adds, that the majority of us are 
predisposed to believe that we are agent-causes, set apart from the causal order. 
These folk metaphysical beliefs provide the grounding for our belief in moral 
responsibility: that is, we believe that we are morally responsible because of our 
metaphysical intuitions.6 This conception of ourselves and of what is required for us 
to be morally responsible is, continues Vargas, “implausible and largely 
unnecessary.”7 To the extent that we hold a libertarian picture of human agency, our 
folk concept of moral responsibility is in error. Despite his insistence that our folk 
concept is in error, when it comes to prescription—that is, his account of what we 
should believe regarding moral responsibility—Vargas argues that we need not 
jettison talk of moral responsibility, praise, and blame. On the contrary, these 
properties really are instantiated, and so the prescriptive part of his revisionism 
assures us that we should expect success in locating them. 
What we have when we put together the descriptive and prescriptive parts of 
Vargas’s theory is a hybrid account, as Vargas himself acknowledges: it is one that is 
incompatibilist in its diagnosis (of what we in fact believe), but compatibilist in its 
prescription (for what we should believe). We are inclined to see things, one might 
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5 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 128. 
6 Vargas is far from alone in believing that most people are predisposed to favouring a libertarian 
position on the issue of free will. For example, Pereboom (2001: xvi) states: “Beginning students 
typically recoil at the compatibilist response to the problem of moral responsibility”; Ekstrom (2002: 
p. 310) notes: “[W]e come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists”; and, lastly 
Kane (1999: p. 219) declares: “In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural 
incompatibilists […] Ordinary persons have to be talked out of this natural incompatibilism by the 
clever arguments of philosophers.”  
7 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 128. Vargas (2011: p. 20) also declares: “If the integrity of our normative 
practices rested on [libertarianism], it would leave us in the morally precarious situation of blaming 
and punishing people on the basis of a fervent hope that we have it.” 
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say, from a libertarian perspective;8 but we are enjoined to recognise that we must be 
compatibilist in our outlook instead. When it comes to this compatibilist 
prescription, a satisfactory moderate revisionism of the type that Vargas envisages 
will need to provide accounts of two distinct concepts: (1) of responsible agency, 
and; (2) of responsibility norms.  
Vargas summarises his own account of (1) as follows: “On the particular account I 
favour, the distinctive mark of the freedom-relevant aspects of responsible agency is 
the agent’s sensitivity to specifically moral considerations and the capacity of that 
agent to appropriately govern his or her conduct in light of those considerations.”9 
Vargas elaborates on this by explaining that considerations are the kinds of things 
that can generate reasons; thus, to be a responsible agent is to be able specifically to 
detect moral considerations, and so to have reasons for acting that are generated by 
these moral considerations. 
This account of the concept of responsible agency is not a novel one. As Vargas 
acknowledges, Fischer and Ravizza put forward a very similar position with their 
reasons-responsive account. What does make Vargas’s position distinctive, however, 
is his account of (2), the concept of responsibility norms. More importantly, at least 
for our purposes, is the fact that Vargas’s account is distinctive in a way that might 
prove useful in the current dialectical situation: that is, it offers the hope of providing 
justification for our “responsibility norms”—essentially, our practices of praising 
and blaming—without needing to deny the insights encapsulated in the arguments of 
van Inwagen and Galen Strawson. Vargas makes possible this compatibilism (for 
want of a better word!) between the arguments for hard determinism, and the 
insistence that we can and should maintain our current responsibility norms, by 
arguing that these norms are the way they are for utilitarian purposes. The following 
passage provides a sketch of how Vargas sees this working:  
When you judge me blameworthy for being insensitive to someone’s feelings, the sting of your 
disapproval forces me to attend to considerations that I might have failed to see or failed to act on in 
the right way. Over time, and given widespread participation in this system of judgments, practices, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Vargas (in Fischer et al. (2007: p. 152)) states that the libertarian perspective from which we are 
inclined to see things includes “minimally, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities.”  
9 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 155. 
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and attitudes we come to help both ourselves and other consideration-sensitive creatures to better 
track what moral considerations there are.10 
Our responsibility norms thus serve an essentially utilitarian function, that function 
being to improve us morally over time. That is not to say that that is all they are; 
neither is it to say that this is how we generally perceive them either—nonetheless, 
Vargas contends that responsibility norms are essentially utilitarian in function.11 
Additionally, Vargas insists that it is precisely because responsibility norms serve 
this utilitarian function that we are justified in acting in accordance with them. It 
seems possible to read Vargas as declaring that utility is in fact the sole justification 
for responsibility norms, since he claims that these norms are only justified 
“inasmuch as they, on the whole and over time, tend to contribute to our better 
perceiving and appropriately responding to moral considerations.”12 However, in 
another passage, Vargas appears to adopt a less strident position in allowing that, 
while we can justify the bulk of our responsibility-characteristic practices and 
attitudes with reference to their utility-maximising qualities, this “does not preclude 
other ways of justifying the responsibility system or parts of it.”13 Vargas does not 
elaborate on this or offer further speculation as to how else we might justify our 
responsibility norms besides suggesting that there may be overlapping justifications 
available. It may turn out to be the case that utility is not the sole justification for our 
responsibility norms, then, although Vargas insists that it is the primary justification. 
Before moving on to a full critique of Vargas’s moderate revisionism, a final 
consideration to note is that he does not believe that his approach binds him to 
accepting all of our current responsibility norms. On the contrary, Vargas counsels 
that it would be unduly optimistic to imagine that our current norms just so happen 
to be the “normatively ideal norms.”14 It is more plausible to think instead that most 
of our responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and beliefs can be justified on 
utilitarian grounds, although there is no guarantee that even this much is so. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Ibid., p. 155. 
11 To apply Vargas’s terminology to his own theory, it seems fair to characterise his position on our 
perception of responsibility norms as revisionist. That is, Vargas thinks that, although we do not 
generally perceive responsibility norms as being essentially utilitarian in function, this is what they in 
fact are. 
12 Fischer et al. (2007), pp. 155-6. 
13 Ibid., p. 156. 
14 Ibid., p. 156. 
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5.2 Debating Vargas’s Diagnosis 
As has been explained, Vargas’s moderate revisionism has two facets: the diagnostic 
and the prescriptive. Concerning the diagnostic facet, Vargas identifies a strain of 
libertarianism in our folk intuitions surrounding moral responsibility, which leads 
him to believe that libertarian freedom seems worthwhile “at least because it is the 
only kind of theory that preserves our ordinary concept of responsibility.”15 
Elsewhere, however, Vargas has acknowledged that this diagnosis could be 
incorrect, such as in the following passage: 
Most current revisionist accounts have been revisionist compatibilisms, motivated by the conviction 
that folk beliefs contain incompatibilist elements. It would be problematic if it turned out that 
ordinary persons did not have incompatibilist commitments.16 
A first criticism is that Vargas is quite right to raise the possibility that ordinary 
persons do not have incompatibilist commitments of the sort that he believes them to 
have: rather, most of us are natural born compatibilists, so this criticism goes, and 
therefore Vargas’s prescription of compatibilism is no revision at all. Evidence in 
favour of the claim that we are in fact folk compatiblists rather than folk libertarians 
comes in the form of a paper by Nahmias et al.17 In order to challenge the claim that 
incompatibilism is intuitive, Nahmias et al. tested the following prediction, which 
folk incompatibilists, Vargas included, should expect to be found accurate: 
(P)  When presented with a deterministic scenario, most people will judge that 
agents in such a scenario do not act of their own free will and are not morally 
responsible for their actions.18 
The prediction (P) was put to the test by surveying people who had not studied the 
free will debate. These people were presented with the following scenario, which 
draws on a Laplacean conception of determinism: 
Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer 
which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Vargas (2004), p. 237. 
16 Vargas (2010), p. 25. 
17 Nahmias et al. (2006). For studies that likewise find that the majority of people are natural 
compatibilists, see also Viney, Waldman and Barchilon (1982); and Woolfolk, Doris and Darley 
(2006). 
18 Nahmias et al. (2006), p. 36. 
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exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the 
way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a 
supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 
A.D., twenty years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and 
the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195. As 
always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 
26th, 2195.19 
Once participants had been presented with this scenario, Nahmias et al. asked: “Do 
you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will?” A 
significant majority (76%) of participants judged that Jeremy does act of his own 
free will.20 In order to assuage worries that people might be more inclined to 
overlook mitigating factors when an agent performs an act which is deemed to be 
immoral, Nahmias et al. asked another set of participants to judge a similarly 
Laplacean scenario, but one in which the action performed was positive rather than 
negative. Instead of robbing a bank, the scenario on this occasion involved Jeremy 
saving a child. A third scenario, meanwhile, presented to a third set of participants, 
involved the neutral act of Jeremy going jogging. The results showed that changing 
the nature of the action had no significant effect on responses: 68% and 79% of 
participants respectively judged that Jeremy acted of his own free will. Additional 
sets of participants were also asked directly for their opinion on Jeremy’s moral 
responsibility: 83% judged that Jeremy is “morally blameworthy for robbing the 
bank,” and 88% judged that “he is morally praiseworthy for saving the child.”21 
Similar deterministic scenarios were also presented to participants. For instance, they 
were asked to imagine one scenario in which the universe was recreated over and 
over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions and with the same laws of 
nature, such that each time the same woman, Jill, decides to steal a necklace at the 
same time. Another scenario made salient the fact that the agents’ actions (twin 
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19 Nahmias et al (2006), p. 36. Note that the word ‘determinism’ is not used in any part of the 
description of this scenario. Nahmias et al. (2006: p. 37) write that the reason for this is that prior 
surveys showed that “most people either did not know what ‘determinism’ meant or they thought it 
meant, basically, the opposite of free will.” Using the term ‘determinism’ would therefore be of no 
use for those who did not know the meaning of the term, while it would be positively prejudicial in 
the case of those who thought it meant the opposite of free will, since incompatibilism would be 
judged by these people to be correct by definition, regardless of what intuitions they might have when 
faced with actual deterministic scenarios. 
20 There is a complete description of this and similar studies, including the methodology used, in 
Nahmias et al. (2005).  
21 Nahmias et al. (2006), p. 37. 
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brothers, in this case) were deterministically caused by factors outside their control, 
namely their genes and upbringing: one twin, Fred, having been adopted by the 
selfish Jackson family has been caused to value money above all else and to think 
that it is acceptable to acquire money in any way you can; the other twin, Barney, 
has been caused through a combination of genetic inheritance and upbringing in the 
kindly Kinderson family, to value honesty above all else and to respect the property 
of others. When each man one day finds a wallet containing $1000 and an ID card, 
only Barney returns the wallet to the owner, while Fred (somewhat predictably) 
trousers the money. 
Participants were asked the same questions of the agents in each of the above 
scenarios, namely: did they act of their own free will, and; were they morally 
responsible for their action? In all cases, the majority of participants judged that the 
agent or agents acted of their own free will and were morally responsible, thereby 
offering strong evidence for the falsity of (P), the incompatibilist prediction that 
most ordinary people would judge that agents in a deterministic scenario lack free 
will and moral responsibility for their actions.22 
The implications for Vargas’s proposal that we should adopt his form of moderate 
revisionism should be clear: if the findings of Nahmias et al. are correct, then it is 
not the case that the majority of ordinary people have an incompatibilist folk theory 
of responsibility. These findings put the diagnostic element of Vargas’s theory in 
jeopardy, and compel him to respond in one of two ways: he must either argue that 
there is some alternative way of understanding the claim that the majority of us are 
folk incompatibilists, one that, crucially, does not commit him to accepting (P); or 
else he must show that there is some flaw in the methodology employed by Nahmias 
et al., a flaw that precludes them from concluding the falsity of (P). 
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22 A table displaying the summary of results from all three scenarios is presented in Nahmias et al. 
(2006: p. 39) and reproduced below: 
 
Subjects’ judgments 
that the agents… 
 
Scenario 1 
(Jeremy) 
Scenario 2 
(Jill) 
Scenario 3 
(Fred & Barney) 
…acted of their own 
free will 
76% (robbing bank) 
68% (saving child) 
79% (going jogging) 
 
66% 
76% (stealing) 
76% (returning) 
…are morally 
responsible for their 
action 
83% (robbing bank) 
88% (saving child) 
77% 60% (stealing) 
64% (returning) 
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In truth, pressure can be applied to both horns of this dilemma. Let us begin by 
looking at how Vargas can tackle the second horn, which requires him to find some 
flaw in Nahmias et al.’s methodology, thereby undermining their claim that (P) is 
false.23 Sarkissian et al. (2010) highlight one methodological flaw in particular. They 
point out that the kind of concrete, affect-laden cases that Nahmias et al. concoct are 
just the kinds of cases that may (according to a wealth of studies in social 
psychology) introduce biases in folk judgments. It remains to be seen, therefore, 
whether “compatibilist intuitions hold up when participants are presented not with a 
case likely to trigger affect, but instead asked more directly whether moral 
responsibility can be possible [sic] in a deterministic universe.”24 
Nichols and Knobe (2007) sought to resolve just this issue in designing the following 
experiment. Two Universes are described to participants, Universe A and Universe 
B. Whereas in Universe A everything is caused by preceding events (i.e. it is a 
determined universe) in Universe B everything apart from human decisions is 
caused by preceding events. Once participants have grasped this difference between 
the two universes, they are randomly assigned to one of two groups: the concrete 
condition or the abstract condition. Those assigned to the concrete condition are 
given the following question: 
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only 
way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his 
house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement 
that burns down the house and kills his family. 
Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children? 
YES NO 
No scenario is presented to those in the abstract condition, who are instead simply 
asked the question: 
In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions? 
YES  NO25 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For critiques of Nahmias et al., see Sarkissian et al. (2010); Feltz, Cokely and Nadelhoffer (2009); 
Roskies and Nichols (2008); Misenheimer (2008); and Nichols and Knobe (2007). 
24 Sarkissian et al. (2010), p. 347. 
25 Nichols and Knobe (2007), p. 670. 
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Nichols and Knobe found that, for the concrete condition, 72% of participants 
responded that Bill was fully morally responsible, a result that appears to support the 
view that the majority of people’s intuitions regarding moral responsibility are 
compatibilist. However, when it came to the abstract condition, 86% of participants 
responded that it is not possible to be fully morally responsible in Universe A, 
lending support to an incompatibilist stance on folk intuitions. These findings give 
credence to the hypothesis that affect plays a key role in generating people’s 
compatibilist intuitions. The thought now is that these results might provide some 
ammunition for Vargas against Nahmias et al., as they offer evidence that the 
majority of us are indeed folk incompatibilists - at least when presented with a 
scenario which is not affect-laden. 
Related to this issue of affect-laden, concrete examples versus more neutral, abstract 
ones, is the issue of where the presented scenario is set. Roskies and Nichols (2008) 
noted that many of the scenarios presented by Nahmias et al. were supposed to occur 
in our own world, whereas the scenarios presented by Nichols and Knobe were 
always set in an alternate universe. Conducting their own experiment, Roskies and 
Nichols randomly assigned participants to two conditions: Actual and Alternate. In 
both conditions, subjects were provided with a sketch of a deterministic world, the 
only difference being that, in the Actual condition, this universe was clearly implied 
to be our own, whereas in the Alternate condition (“Universe A”) the universe was 
explicitly not ours. In each case, eminent scientists were said to have discovered 
beyond any reasonable doubt that all events, including human actions, are 
determined. Participants were then presented with the following statement to match 
their condition, and asked to rate their level of agreement (from 1 [disagree 
completely] to 7 [agree completely]):  
- Alternate: If these scientists are right, then it is impossible for a person in 
Universe A to be fully morally responsible for their actions. 
- Actual: If these scientists are right, then it is impossible for a person to be 
fully morally responsible for their actions. 
The results were striking: the mean response in the Alternate condition was 5.06, 
against a mean response in the Actual condition of 3.58. So, participants were much 
more inclined to give compatibilist responses when they were asked to assume that 
MIXED!VIEWS!ON!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!!!!!!!119!
!
determinism was true of their own world, as opposed to when determinism was 
operating in some other world.26  
Do the findings of Nahmias et al.’s critics suggest that prediction (P) is tenable after 
all? I would argue they do not. What they undoubtedly do show is that intuitions 
regarding free will and moral responsibility vary according to the details of the 
deterministic scenario sketched; but (P) predicts that most people have the folk 
intuition that determinism precludes the possibility of free will and moral 
responsibility, when the fact is that that blanket assertion is not true. Further, it 
should be remembered that Vargas is in any case concerned to capture our folk 
intuitions regarding this world, and thus we should expect him to be more interested 
in the findings from Nahmias’s et al.’s concrete, affect-laden examples than the more 
abstract, affectless ones of Nichols and Knobe, or Roskies and Nichols. There is no 
dodging the conclusion, then, that (P) is false. 
While the first horn of the dilemma can be ruled out, the second horn remains to be 
considered. This second horn sees Vargas conceding that (P) is false, while at the 
same denying that the diagnostic element of his moderate revisionism commits him 
to believing that (P). Endorsing the following alternative prediction to (P) could 
enable Vargas to achieve that aim: 
(P*)  When presented with scenarios in which human actions are either 
deterministic or indeterministic, most people will judge: (a) that our universe 
is most like the indeterministic scenario, and; (b) that it is possible for a 
person to be fully morally responsible in our universe. 
Prediction (P*), as can be seen, is in fact an amalgam of two separate predictions.27 
The first of these is that most people will judge that human actions are not 
determined in our universe, while the second makes the prediction that most people 
will judge that full moral responsibility is a feature of our universe. If it turns out that 
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26 Roskies and Nichols (2008), pp. 373-4. 
27 A third prediction could usefully be added, which is that people judge that indeterminism is 
compatible with full moral responsibility. This would rule out the possibility that people might 
endorse both (a) and (b), and yet not be conscious that these two judgments conflict with a further 
belief in the incompatibility of indeterminism and full moral responsibility. Unfortunately, this 
prediction remains untested, so I note this just to flag up the possibility of people holding conflicting 
beliefs. I am happy to proceed, however, on the assumption that the great majority of people hold no 
such conflicting beliefs. 
!
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not only are these predictions correct, but that the vast majority of people endorse 
both (a) and (b), then it follows that most people think that the libertarian picture of 
free will is the correct one, at least when it comes to our own world. In endorsing 
(P*), Vargas sidesteps commitment to (P) and its discredited claim that most people 
have the intuition that determinism precludes full moral responsibility. Of course, 
once Vargas has abandoned (P) he can perhaps no longer claim to be a folk 
incompatibilist; but he can still maintain that the majority of us have demonstrably 
libertarian leanings, a claim that (P*) is intended to capture (and so we might label 
him a ‘folk libertarian’). 
As far as the evidence for (P*) goes, Vargas is on stronger ground. Recalling Nichols 
and Knobe’s experiment in which two Universes, Universe A and Universe B (a 
deterministic and an indeterministic universe, respectively), were described to 
participants who were then asked: ‘Which of these universes do you think is most 
like ours?’ According to Nichols and Knobe, nearly all participants (over 90%) 
considered Universe B (which was described as being determined in all aspects with 
the exception of human decisions, which, participants were told, were not completely 
caused by the past and thus did not have to happen the way they do) to be the 
universe most similar to our own.28 It seems, then, that prediction (a) finds clear 
evidential backing in Nichols and Knobe’s experiment. 
As for prediction (b) set out in (P*), it is not clear whether participants in Nichols 
and Knobe’s experiment were asked whether full moral responsibility is possible in 
the undetermined Universe B, since no data has been provided. In any case, the 
prediction that a majority of people believe that full moral responsibility is possible 
in our own universe is scarcely one that requires supporting evidence—the claim 
that, under certain conditions, an agent is fully morally responsible for their 
behaviour has the status of a truism. If this contention is correct, then we can infer 
not only that the vast majority of people think that full moral responsibility is 
compatible with existence in a Universe B-type world, but that we and our world 
provide evidence of that compatibility.29  
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28 Nichols and Knobe (2007), p. 669. 
29 Indirect evidence that most people consider it possible to be fully morally responsible in our 
universe comes from the Roskies and Nichols (2008) experiment cited above. Since the majority of 
participants in their experiment believed full moral responsibility would be possible even if scientists 
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Before moving on from the prescriptive to the descriptive element of Vargas’s 
moderate revisionism, there are two fundamental points to be gleaned from the 
discussion so far. The first is that most of us do indeed believe that we have both 
libertarian free will and full moral responsibility. In other words, the evidence from 
Nichols and Knobe validates prediction (P*). A second point, however, is that this 
evidence for what can be termed ‘folk libertarianism’ of the sort expressed by (P*) 
does not amount to evidence for folk incompatibilism as expressed by (P). In fact, 
there is every reason to think that (P)—the claim that the majority of people are 
categorical incompatibilists—is false, since, when presented with a this-world 
scenario in which determinism has been found to be true, the majority will choose to 
maintain their belief in full moral responsibility at the expense of their belief in 
libertarian free will.30 This is an interesting result, and one that suggests, say Roskies 
and Nichols, that the intuition that we are morally responsible is what they call a 
“non-negotiable intuition.”3132 Since it remains a possibility that scientists might find 
empirical evidence for global determinism, it cannot therefore be claimed (contrary 
to what (P) predicts) that the majority of the folk are strict incompatibilists: if 
determinism turned out to be true, the vast majority would sooner concede the truth 
of compatibilism than abandon belief in moral responsibility. 
In summary, then, we can say that the experimental results provide confirmation of 
(P*). Additionally, the above results suggest that the great majority of people would 
abandon their belief in indeterminism more readily than they would forsake belief in 
moral responsibility. The folk position on free will and moral responsibility thus 
appears to be curiously congruent with the one presented by van Inwagen, who has 
described his own libertarianism as involving a hierarchy of beliefs in which the 
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were to discover that our world is determined, it can be reasonably inferred that a still higher 
proportion would believe in the possibility of moral responsibility if it were conclusively proved that 
determinism is false. 
30 See both Roskies and Nichols (2008) and Nahmias et al. (2006). 
31 Roskies and Nichols (2008), p. 12. 
32 Another way of explaining folk intuitions regarding determinism and moral responsibility would be 
to say that the majority of people accept a “non-robust conditional,” a term due to Frank Jackson from 
his (1991) monograph, Conditionals. A non-robust conditional is one that a person accepts, but would 
reject if there were sufficient evidence for the truth of the antecedent. In this instance, the antecedent 
is that determinism is true, while the consequent is that full moral responsibility is impossible. So, 
most people are willing to accept a conditional which states that the truth of determinism would entail 
the impossibility of full moral responsibility (and judgments on scenarios relating to other worlds bear 
this out, as the majority of people display incompatibilist intuitions in such cases); but once asked to 
suppose that the antecedent (i.e. determinism) is true of our world, most people are inclined to reject 
the conditional rather than accept its consequent (i.e. the impossibility of full moral responsibility). 
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reality of moral responsibility is held to be utterly foundational and incontrovertible, 
while the belief in indeterminism is strongly held yet tractable.33 The final word on 
the issue of our folk intuitions is that Vargas is entitled to claim that the majority of 
people are folk libertarians, on the proviso that he understands that claim to be an 
endorsement of (P*) as opposed to (P). As for further intuition-testing experiments, 
it would be interesting to discover just to what extent the folk think it likely that we 
have libertarian free will. The results indicate that belief in indeterminism is 
negotiable in a way that the belief in full moral responsibility seems not to be for so 
many—so what sort of probability, it may be asked, would the folk assign to the 
thesis that determinism is true?34 
 
5.3 Debating Vargas’s Prescription 
The descriptive element of Vargas’s theory appears to be secure - so long, that is, as 
he is willing to be understood as endorsing (P*) instead of (P). The prescriptive 
element is still more crucial, however, as this outlines what kind of theory Vargas 
thinks we should be adopting. It is clear that Vargas wishes to prescribe a 
compatibilist solution to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. But this 
now raises the vexed question of how Vargas understands his own assertion that, on 
his theory, people can be deserving of praise and blame. The thought is that, if 
Vargas wishes to provide a consequentialist justification for maintaining our current 
responsibility norms (or at least for maintaining similar norms to those to which we 
currently adhere), then he is in effect conceding that the notion of ultimate desert—
the kind of responsibility with which Galen Strawson, among others, is concerned—
should be abandoned. Pereboom sets out to disentangle the two different senses of 
moral responsibility as follows: 
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33 Van Inwagen (1983), pp. 219-21. 
34 The question about our folk intuitions regarding the likelihood of determinism is unaddressed by 
the studies examined here, in all of which it was simply stipulated in the various this- and other-
worldly scenarios that either indeterminism or determinism was true. If more were known about how 
plausible people generally consider the possibility of determinism to be, we would have a truer sense 
of the extent to which people are inclined towards folk compatibilism. It might turn out, for example, 
that most people believe there is a vanishingly small probability that human decisions in this world 
are determined—in which case the results of Roskies and Nichols’ scenarios, in which they stipulated 
that determinism was true of our world, would offer far less support for folk compatibilism than might 
at first glance be presumed. 
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I am very much open to the view that the question: “Are we sometimes morally responsible for our 
actions?” as posed in ordinary language, needs to be disambiguated. If it is specified that moral 
responsibility in the “legitimately called to moral improvement” sense is meant, then the answer is 
“yes.” This answer would quite obviously not be inconsistent with hard incompatibilism, nor to 
incompatibilism more generally, as these notions function in the debate. For what is at issue is 
whether moral responsibility in the “basic desert” sense is compatible with determinism (and with the 
relevant sorts of indeterminism).35 
Recall how Vargas asserts that holding one another morally responsible for our good 
and evil deeds is (at least partly) justified by the fact that doing so will “tend to 
contribute to our better perceiving and appropriately responding to moral 
considerations.”36 Pereboom agrees that we all are morally responsible in this 
sense—in the sense that we can be “legitimately called to moral improvement”; but 
he suggests that this leaves open the question of whether we can be morally 
responsible in the “basic desert” sense, a question which he himself answers in the 
negative. So where does Vargas stand on the question of whether we can be 
ultimately responsible in the way that Pereboom denies is possible? 
Vargas replies that this second notion of moral responsibility—i.e. moral 
responsibility in the “basic desert” sense—is “exactly the sense of moral 
responsibility with which we should be concerned,” and with which he too is 
concerned.37 While some degree of conceptual revision away from our libertarian 
commitments regarding this notion of moral responsibility may be required, he 
concedes, it is not his intention (in contrast with Pereboom) to eliminate the notion 
of basic desert altogether. People are deserving of praise and blame when they are 
responsible agents who have violated the norms of the responsibility system, claims 
Vargas, and since there are many instances of responsible agents violating the norms 
of the responsibility system there are correspondingly many instances of agents 
being responsible in the basic desert sense. 
Vargas’s statement of his own intent is clear: he does not wish to dispense with the 
notion that we are sometimes morally responsible in the basic desert sense. On this 
point he is at odds with hard determinists such as Pereboom (who sees the 
sourcehood condition as a requirement if we are to maintain the notion of basic 
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35 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 200. 
36 Ibid., p. 156. 
37 Ibid., p. 210. 
124!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
desert), but in agreement with compatibilists such as Fischer and Ravizza (who deny 
that the sourcehood condition must be met). While Vargas himself declares that he 
does not wish to dispense with the notion of basic desert, the question remains: does 
Vargas’s theory of revisionism entitle him to retain this notion?  
It is understandable that, in his discussions with Vargas, Pereboom should seek to 
clarify the distinction between two different notions of moral responsibility—as a 
legitimate call to self-improvement on the one hand, and in a basic desert sense on 
the other. After all, Vargas’s emphasis on the centrality of utilitarian considerations 
might reasonably lead a person to believe that his concern lies solely with the notion 
of moral responsibility as a legitimate call to self-improvement, and not at all with 
the notion of basic desert. It is puzzling that this is not the case, too, since Vargas 
evidently sees himself as offering up a justificatory story that is distinctively 
different from his compatibilist contemporaries. Abandoning the notion of basic 
desert would certainly be a way for Vargas to mark his theory out as being set apart 
from these more conventional compatibilists, and would burnish his credentials as a 
fearless revisionist in the face of what might be characterised as the unthinking 
orthodoxy. 
Perhaps, however, dispensing with basic desert is one revision too far for Vargas, 
and so, like Fischer and Ravizza, he affirms instead that “people can deserve praise 
and blame when they are responsible agents who have violated the norms of the 
responsibility system.”38 As for the origination condition, if the belief persists that 
this must be met in order for praise and blame to be deserved, then this must be 
revised away just as the alternative possibilities requirement and agent causal beliefs 
were subject to revision.39 
Unfortunately, Vargas adduces no reasons for believing that his brand of revisionism 
entitles him to the notion of basic desert. His compatibilist prescription places him in 
the exact same predicament that faces all compatibilists, and no fresh solution is 
proffered. Of course, for those who side with compatibilists in thinking that the 
origination condition can be dispensed with, Vargas’s revisionism does indeed 
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38 Ibid., p. 211. 
39 Vargas (in Fischer et al. (2007), p. 215) writes: “On the variety of revisionism I favor, we should 
revise our commonsense construal of the alternative possibilities requirement, any agent causation 
elements in our thinking, and, if we have them, any incompatibilist conception of a sourcehood 
requirement.” 
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present a viable alternative. However, in the present dialectical situation, 
conventional compatibilist responses are considered unsatisfactory since they fail to 
account for the intuition that the absence of origination precludes the possibility of 
what we have been referring to variously as ‘basic desert’ and ‘ultimate moral 
responsibility’ (in Pereboom’s and Galen Strawson’s terminology, respectively). 
Vargas offers no novel solution to the problem on this point, and so, despite the 
ingenuity of his theory, it fails to offer a wholesale solution to our predicament. 
Therefore, despite Vargas’s insistence to the contrary, I find myself in agreement 
with Pereboom’s appraisal that: “[I]f we revised our notion of free will to a 
compatibilist one, we would also need to revise our notion of moral responsibility so 
that the “basic desert” sense is eliminated.”40 Since the prescriptive element of 
Vargas’s theory is essentially compatibilist, he is unavoidably committed to the 
elimination of the notion of basic desert, irrespective of the fact that he refuses to 
concede that this is the case. 
Before moving on to examine our second ‘mixed view’, it should be said that while 
Vargas’s theory does not provide us with the complete solution we would like, it 
does offer us the intriguing possibility of exploring whether a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility norms might help resolve our 
compatibilism/incompatibilism dilemma. In other words, while Vargas himself does 
not wish to revise our concept of moral responsibility in such a way that the notion 
of basic desert is eliminated, there is no reason for us not do so – and at the same 
time, there is no reason for us not to retain a purely consequentialist justification of 
our moral responsibility norms. In this way, we would be drawing inspiration from 
Vargas by retaining what is distinctive and different about his approach to moral 
responsibility norms, and indeed taking his revisionary spirit still further by (further) 
redefining what it means to be morally responsible. This possibility will be explored 
later.  
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40 Fischer et al. (2007), p. 199. 
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5.4 Double’s Free Will Subjectivism 
The mark of a ‘mixed view’ is that it favours neither the standard compatibilist nor 
the standard incompatibilist positions on free will, instead combining elements of 
both in an attempt to offer a fresh and illuminating new perspective. Our next ‘mixed 
view’ has perhaps an even greater claim to impartiality between the arguments of 
compatibilists and incompatibilists than Vargas’s, since, while Vargas finds in 
compatibilism’s favour by affirming the truth of the claim that free will (of the sort 
required for moral responsibility) is compatible with determinism, the view now 
under consideration shows no such partiality. Instead, it simply denies that the claim 
that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism possesses any truth value 
whatsoever. As such, neither compatibilists nor incompatibilists are right to think 
that free will and determinism are compatible. (Or perhaps both are right, if we 
prefer to think charitably about it.)41 
The present view belongs to Richard Double, and he terms it “Free Will 
Subjectivism.” As Double explains, free will subjectivism is the position of denying 
that “judgments concerning moral freedom provided by the lower-level free will 
theorists can be objectively true.”42 The lower-level free will theorists Double refers 
to here all hold to one of the four following positions: traditional compatibilism; 
traditional incompatibilism; the no-free-will-either-way theory; and the free-will-
either-way theory. Double’s designation of these theories as ‘lower-level’ is not 
made with any pejorative intent—they are lower-level merely in the sense that they 
are concerned with how to approach questions of moral freedom. By contrast, ‘meta-
level’ theories are essentially concerned with the question of whether we should be 
subjectivists or objectivists concerning our lower-level judgments. On this question, 
Double insists we must be subjectivists about our free will judgments. 
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41 I am not merely being flippant (although I am being a bit flippant) in suggesting that Double’s 
theory might allow us to vacillate between thinking that compatibilists and incompatibilists might 
both be right, and thinking that they might both be wrong: Double himself seems inclined to think this 
way too. For example, when talking about conflicting lower-level theories, Double (2004) claims that 
both can be “equally true” (p. 415); yet he also denies that lower-level theories can ever be 
“objectively true” (p. 413). The key to this apparent paradox, I think, is to realise that conflicting 
lower-level theories can both be true, but only subjectively, while no lower-level theories—whether 
conflicting or not—can be objectively true. 
42 Double (2004), p. 413. 
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As Double makes clear, this distinction—one between lower-level and meta-level 
theories—echoes a parallel distinction in the field of ethics. Here too we see a debate 
at the meta-level over whether moral judgments can be objectively true: on one side 
of the debate, meta-ethical objectivists insist that moral judgments possess objective 
truth value, while meta-ethical subjectivists deny this.43 Both objectivists and 
subjectivists engage in lower-level, normative ethical debates, attesting to the fact 
that subjectivists are capable of arguing just as vociferously for their normative 
ethical theory as objectivists.44  
The terms “objectivism” and “subjectivism” get used in a great variety of ways, of 
course, so it would be wise to clarify just how Double intends them to be understood. 
In Double’s own words, these terms are primarily intended to “refer to metaphysical 
theses about the ‘location’ or ontological dependence of entities.”45 To elucidate, 
Double asks us to consider the case of peas. We can say of peas that they exist 
objectively, or in their own right, whereas the taste of peas exists subjectively in 
persons who like or dislike their flavour. So, by analogy, just as it would be wrong to 
claim as an objective fact that peas are disgusting, it would be wrong to claim as an 
objective fact that an agent is morally responsible in any given situation. As a free-
will subjectivist, Double thus believes that there can be no objective fact of the 
matter about which of the four lower-level theories of free will is true: instead, 
judgments affirming or denying moral freedom are “dependent on the feelings and 
attitudes of the persons who think about such things.”46 
Given that Double believes there is no objective fact of the matter about which 
lower-level theory is true, what implications does this have for his views on moral 
responsibility? In particular, does Double’s belief that judgements of moral 
responsibility lack true value lead him to disavow any right to an opinion on such 
judgements? No, he does not abandon all opinions in the light of his commitment to 
free will subjectivism, but rather feels at liberty to pick and choose among the lower-
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43 Double is himself a meta-ethical subjectivist, and although he does not explore the issue, it seems 
hard to imagine that anyone might be an objectivist in one domain and subjectivist in the other. If this 
is right, then it is all the more strange that the possibility of free will subjectivism has to date 
remained so little explored, as there are no shortage of philosophers happy to proclaim themselves 
subjectivists in the realm of meta-ethics. 
44 See Hume (1965), Mackie (1977), and Smart (1973) for examples of metaethical subjectivists who 
express strong opinions on normative ethics. 
45 Double (2004), p. 412. 
46 Ibid., p. 413. 
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level theories as his feelings and attitudes dictate: “Accepting free will subjectivism 
leads me to a fairly mixed acceptance of the lower-level theories” writes Double, 
“inasmuch as all of the theories seem attractive to me in many cases.”47 The key 
point to note, of course, is that he chooses among the lower-level theories on the 
basis of his feelings and attitudes, and not on the basis that there can ever be an 
objectively correct response when it comes to judgments of an agent’s free will and 
moral responsibility. 
What advantages are there in free will subjectivism? Double argues that his theory is 
liberating, in that it allows us greater resources when addressing questions of moral 
responsibility, reward, and punishment. We can opt for any lower-level theory we 
want, which means that, unlike the free will objectivist, we need never abandon our 
most strongly-held moral intuitions even when these are in lower-level conflict. On 
this point, Double’s free will subjectivism provides an interesting contrast to 
Vargas’s revisionism: Double considers it an advantage of his theory that he need 
not revise any of his moral intuitions for the sake of what he sees as a misplaced 
belief in the importance of theoretical consistency. In fact, Double goes so far as to 
claim that it is “morally better to keep our philosophical moral judgments as close as 
possible to our moral intuitions, because our best-considered moral feelings and 
attitudes constitute morality.”48 So, far from adopting Vargas’s position of endorsing 
revisions in our beliefs concerning moral responsibility, Double takes the opposing 
line that revision is best avoided if at all possible.49  
A moral advantage of free will subjectivism, according to Double, is that adopting 
free will subjectivism might make a person less disposed to blaming and punishing. 
Double quotes Waller in this connection: “when it is understood that there is no deep 
objectivity in our notions of just desert, that will leave us much less inclined to 
punish, and more inclined to look for causes that can be corrected.”50 Nonetheless, 
Double insists that “as subjectivists we can still apply moral responsibility when we 
want it to apply,” much in the same way that the normative ethicist can endorse a 
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47 Ibid., p. 413. 
48 Ibid., p. 416. 
49 It is perhaps a little ironic, therefore, that proponents of the four lower-level theories would need to 
revise their beliefs regarding free will and moral responsibility very substantially were they to be 
persuaded that Double (2004: p. 413), the self-confessed “lone meta-level subjectivist,” is right to 
spurn objectivism regarding moral responsibility judgments. 
50 In correspondence with Double (2004), p. 413. 
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deontological, consequentialist or virtue ethicist theory while remaining a meta-
ethical subjectivist.51 
Another perceived advantage of free will subjectivism—and one that is related to the 
fact that it allows us to avoid revising our strongly-held intuitions—is that holding to 
it represents a prudent strategy. Even if it turns out that free will subjectivism is 
wrong and that there is after all an objective fact of the matter concerning which 
lower-level theory is true, the adoption of meta-level subjectivism allows us to hedge 
our bets, as it were, and so avoid the risk of choosing the wrong lower-level theory. 
Of course, if it turns out that meta-level subjectivism is wrong, some of the moral 
intuitions to which we hold as spread-betting meta-ethical subjectivists will of 
necessity be wrong; but this is no reason to favour meta-ethical objectivism, as 
Double argues: 
[E]ven if we stipulate that meta-level objectivism is true, we still would be no closer than we are now 
to knowing which lower-level theory is the true one. If we cannot know which objectivist theory is 
correct (and the history of the free will debate suggests this is not likely to change), then we cannot 
know which moral intuitions to surrender.52 
In other words, even if free will subjectivism is wrong and some particular lower-
level theory does represent the objective truth, there is only a 25% chance that we 
will choose to endorse the correct lower-level theory out of the four on offer 
(assuming of course that each is equally likely to be correct). Better, then, that we 
remain free will subjectivists, safe in the knowledge that at least some of our 
intuitions regarding moral responsibility will be objectively correct should it turn out 
that free will subjectivism is false. 
A final question regarding free will subjectivism: what does Double’s theory have to 
say about the crucial issue of origination? First, Double acknowledges the truth of 
Honderich’s observation that “if we have life-hopes for ourselves as undetermined 
“originators” of our choices, these hopes will be rationally unavailable to us if we 
accept determinism at the macro-level.”53 Double thus accepts that determinism rules 
out origination, and also acknowledges that it is part of (many of) our life-hopes that 
we should be undetermined originators of our choices. However, he goes on to 
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51 Double (2004), p. 413. 
52 Ibid., p. 416. 
53 Ibid., p. 418. 
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suggest that a strength of free will subjectivism is that it allows us, when we “elect to 
wear our lower-level compatibilist spectacles,” to divorce judgments of moral 
responsibility from feelings about life-hopes regarding origination.54 Even-handed to 
a fault, Double concludes that he can see why someone would want to make the 
connection between moral responsibility and the need for origination; and he can 
also see why one would not. And according to the dictates of free will subjectivism, 
there is no compulsion for anyone either to affirm the necessity of origination for 
moral responsibility, nor, conversely, to deny it. Since there can be no objective fact 
on the matter of origination, one is at liberty to do either, or neither, or both, without 
fear of contradiction.   
 
5.5 Why Free Will Subjectivism is Inadequate 
To cut to the chase, I believe that Double is wrong to hold to the doctrine of free will 
subjectivism. Moreover, he is wrong to hold to free will subjectivism because the 
theory is incorrect. While it might seem obvious that we should reject Double’s 
theory if it is deemed incorrect, it should be remembered that Double argues his 
theory should be adopted even if it is suspected of being false. This line of argument 
I shall dub his ‘prudential justification’ for free will subjectivism. Therefore, when I 
reject the theory on the grounds of judging that it is likely to be false, I am declaring 
that the ‘prudential justification’ for being a free will subjectivist is not strong 
enough to counterbalance consideration of what I consider the likely falsity of the 
theory. In this section, I will explain why I think that free will objectivism is true, a 
task that will involve responding to Double’s points in favour of his own theory as 
set out in the previous section. Nevertheless, in spite of my rejection of free will 
subjectivism, I shall argue that Double’s ‘prudential justification’ provides us with a 
valuable lesson about the importance of having the humility to hedge one’s bets 
when the situation requires. 
We have seen how Double declared it an advantage of his theory that it allows us to 
avoid revising any of our beliefs. Instead, we are free to maintain whatever beliefs 
we wish about moral responsibility without fear of being forced to give them up on 
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54 Ibid., p. 418. 
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account of any theory. This claim—that we are free to make any judgment 
whatsoever about any situation of possible moral culpability—really does grant us an 
incredible degree of freedom in our thinking on moral responsibility; but of course it 
also leads to an obvious criticism, which is that free will subjectivism ultimately 
grants us too much freedom. With no objective truth to anchor us, both theoretical 
and practical problems emerge. On the issue of practical concerns Double assures us 
that, as subjectivists, we can “still apply moral responsibility when we want it to 
apply.”55 Nonetheless, despite this assurance, the sceptical question naturally arises: 
on what authority can it be applied if it is widely accepted that no judgment of moral 
responsibility can be objectively correct? Furthermore, what happens when others do 
not want moral responsibility to apply? Of course, it must be said that we encounter 
cases of conflicting beliefs over the proper assignment of moral responsibility all the 
time. The difference between these commonly encountered cases and those that 
would arise if belief in free will subjectivism were the norm, however, is that the 
former are held against a backdrop of shared belief in the existence of objective facts 
of the matter on the issue. Without a shared belief in objective truths concerning 
moral responsibility judgments, it is hard to see how we could even attempt to 
resolve conflicts of opinion on questions of moral responsibility.  
Who has the authority to impose their subjective judgments, and how conflicts in 
judgments are to be resolved are important concerns; but they are also essentially 
practical concerns, in that to raise them is to raise doubts about the desirability of a 
widespread belief in free will subjectivism. Such practical concerns lead naturally, 
however, to deeper questions about the very intelligibility of free will subjectivism. 
The main worry, I would argue, runs as follows: if free will subjectivism is true, then 
it would not be legitimate to offer reasons in support of one’s subjectively-held 
judgments of moral culpability. Of course, in common with all people, philosophers 
and non-philosophers alike, Double cannot refrain from offering reasons and 
justifications for his moral judgments, and these, in consequence, belie his insistence 
in the truth of free will subjectivism. 
Why, if free will subjectivism were true, would it not be legitimate to offer reasons 
in support of one’s subjectively held judgments of moral culpability? Because, 
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according to free will subjectivism, judgments affirming moral freedom and 
responsibility are supposed to have their source in one’s feelings and attitudes, and 
these feelings and attitudes need not—and indeed cannot—be justified by reference 
to any reasons. That is, if judgments of moral responsibility are at root merely 
subjective feelings and attitudes, then these feelings and attitudes not only require no 
explanation, but they must not be amenable to explanation, since if they were it 
would imply that they had some objective basis that others could be compelled to 
recognise. Not surprisingly, of course, Double makes frequent reference to his 
reasons for holding certain supposedly subjective moral judgments, and, more 
problematically still, he sees no problem with having reasons for holding conflicting 
opinions at one and the same time.56 The basic thought against Double here is this: to 
offer reasons for your opinions regarding moral responsibility is to tacitly accept that 
it is open to the objective evaluation of others, on the basis of those reasons adduced 
for holding them, to determine whether or not these opinions are justified. 
I contend that Double’s appeals to reasons for his holding certain moral 
responsibility judgments betrays an unconscious objectivism in his thinking, in spite 
of his stated allegiance to free will subjectivism. We can also note Double’s 
tendency to stray into objectivism when criticising lower-level, competing theories. 
According to the logic of his free will subjectivism, I would argue that Double is 
considerably constrained in what he is at liberty to say in response to other theories. 
As I have already claimed, he cannot offer reasons for why his judgments of moral 
responsibility are superior to someone else’s, since his judgments are supposed to be 
mere feelings and attitudes. By the same token, he certainly cannot claim that his 
theory is right and another one wrong, since this is even more transparently the 
language of objectivism. In fact, he must refrain from offering any kind of critique 
that presupposes or otherwise implies that there is some objective standard to which 
his philosophical adversary should be receptive. Yet this is precisely what he does 
when arguing against Pereboom. In response to Pereboom’s assertion that a 
quarantine-rehabilitation rationale for incarcerating criminals is justified on the basis 
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56 Double (2004: p. 415) says, for example, that Martin Luther was praiseworthy “for his reason-
sensitive stand against the Church,” yet also not praiseworthy “inasmuch as his actions were caused 
by heredity, by environment, and, if libertarianism is the case, partly by chance”; he also suggests that 
subjectivists should deny that Stalin is morally responsible for the Purges at the lower level (since 
according to hard determinism and no-free-will-either-way-theory, no one is morally free); while at 
the same time holding that Stalin (rather than Trotsky) is morally responsible at the lower level “when 
we wish to single out the correct person for assigning moral responsibility.”  
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of his no-free-will-either-way theory, Double imagines a scenario in which, 
according to this quarantine-rehabilitation rationale, we should incarcerate criminal 
B for a crime in fact committed by A, due to B’s comparative malleability and the 
likelihood of him falling into a life of crime unless checked. Commenting on this 
scenario, Double protests that it “seems unfair” to quarantine B.57  
While I can sympathise with Double’s sentiment here (incarceration for a crime one 
has not committed is, after all, manifestly unjust), I question whether he is entitled to 
disapprove in such terms—or, at least, I question whether his disapproval, coming as 
it does from a free will subjectivist, carries any weight. Since Double is a 
subjectivist, I struggle to understand what he means to convey in asserting that the 
no-free-will-either-way has “unfair” consequences, such as the incarceration of 
innocents. Specifically, I worry that, in declaring the incarceration of an innocent 
“unfair,” he is appealing to some objective fact of the matter, which is something he 
is not entitled to do, of course. The dilemma as I see it, then, is as follows: Double is 
either appealing to an objective notion of fairness to which he is unentitled; or else 
he is appealing to a subjective notion of fairness, and thus Pereboom—whose own 
notion of fairness cannot then be deemed false nor its value be gainsaid—need pay 
no heed whatsoever to Double’s criticisms.  
I have argued that Double’s appeal to reasons in support of his own ascriptions of 
moral responsibility, and his choice of language when critiquing lower-level 
theories, both unwittingly betoken a belief in an objective standard as regards moral 
responsibility judgments. While it is possible that Double could explain why this is 
not the case, these considerations certainly threaten to impugn his theory of free will 
subjectivism. But perhaps the most compelling consideration of all in favour of 
rejecting Double’s theory is that it fails to do justice to our intuitions—an ironic fact, 
given that he argues free will subjectivism allows us to cleave to whatever moral 
responsibility intuitions we might already have. In fact, the one big intuition we are 
obliged to surrender is the belief that our moral judgments have a truth value. To 
illustrate this with reference to the issue of origination, we have seen how Double 
understands why someone would want to make the connection between moral 
responsibility and the need for origination, and he can also understand why one 
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would not. And ultimately it is a mere a matter of opinion, as far as Double is 
concerned, whether and on what occasions one decides to affirm the necessity of 
origination for moral responsibility. This so fails to capture my own intuition—that, 
on the contrary, when we debate issues such as the necessity or otherwise of 
origination, we are surely arguing over objective facts rather than mere opinions—
that I can only conclude that Double’s theory must be rejected out of hand. The 
inducement that one is allowed to maintain all of one’s lower-level intuitions in 
becoming a free will subjectivist are, to my mind, far outweighed by the heavy price 
that must be paid in the form of the necessary abandonment of belief in objective 
truths regarding moral responsibility. 
To finish discussion of free will subjectivism, let me say a few more words about 
Double’s ‘prudential justification’ for the theory, the gist of which is that it is 
prudent to be a free will subjectivist even if the theory should turn out to be false, 
since we are likely to endorse the wrong lower-level theory anyway. While feeling 
very much at liberty to declare that free will subjectivism is false beyond reasonable 
doubts, the question remains: is there nonetheless a case for being a free will 
subjectivist in the light of the ‘prudential justification’? 
Again, the answer is ‘no,’ quite simply because the overwhelming likelihood of the 
falsity of free will subjectivism provides all the warrant needed for rejecting it. That 
rejection comes with a caveat, however, which is that we have cause for 
circumspection regarding our ability to correctly discern the objective facts of the 
matter when it comes to moral responsibility. This becomes evident when one 
reflects on the reality that there remain large and seemingly intractable 
disagreements between lower-level theorists, and thus to opt for the wholesale 
endorsement of any one of these theories is to risk backing the wrong horse, so to 
speak. While this concern does not amount to a reason for adopting subjectivism, it 
may well provide the motivation to favour sticking to one’s intuitions as opposed to 
forcing one’s intuitions to conform to whichever lower-level theory is thought to 
have the best credentials. In matters of prudence, then, if not on any other matter, 
Double’s free will subjectivism has something to teach us. 
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6 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Smilansky’s Mixed View 
 
With Vargas and Double’s theories having been surveyed, this chapter brings us to 
consideration of our final mixed view. This is articulated by Smilansky, who 
believes that, in a world in which libertarian free will does not exist, compatibilism 
and incompatibilism nonetheless each fail to capture adequately what he considers to 
be our well-founded intuitions on free will and moral responsibility. To remedy this 
perceived failure in the theories of compatiblism and incompatibilism, Smilansky 
offers two distinctive proposals. The first is that we should embrace what he terms 
the ‘fundamental dualism.’ In a nutshell, this sees Smilansky arguing that, while 
neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism is adequate on its own, aspects of both 
are indispensable, and we must therefore abandon what he refers to as the 
‘assumption of monism,’ according to which either compatibilism or 
incompatibilism must be affirmed wholesale while the other must be rejected in its 
entirety. Smilansky’s second proposal is that we embrace ‘illusionism’ with regards 
to free will. According to Smilansky, humanity as a whole “is fortunately deceived 
on the free will issue, and this seems to be a condition of civilized morality and 
personal value.”1 It is not that we should be inducing illusory beliefs, says 
Smilansky, and still less that we might be able to live with beliefs that we fully 
realise are illusory: rather, the contention is that illusory beliefs are already in place 
in many of us, and that (generally speaking) these play a positive role. 
Each of these proposals will be unpacked in greater detail in the course of this 
chapter, and their merits and deficiencies will be weighed. Once Smilansky’s theory 
has been presented and evaluated, I shall reflect on what it has to offer us in terms of 
helping to create a credible theory of moral responsibility. 
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1 Smilansky (2002), p. 500. 
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6.1 Smilansky’s Fundamental Dualism 
While Smilansky’s theory is comprised of two distinctive proposals which he seeks 
to persuade us to adopt, it is perhaps the first of these—fundamental dualism—that 
most clearly provides the warrant for labelling his theory a mixed view. The proposal 
of a fundamental dualism is offered as an alternative to what Smilansky characterises 
as the prevailing orthodoxy, the assumption of monism, according to which one must 
affirm compatibilism or hard determinism.2 In fact, Smilansky demurs, “there is no 
conceptual basis for thinking that the Assumption of Monism is necessary.”3 This 
denial of the necessity of the assumption of monism does not amount to an 
affirmation of the logical consistency of compatibilism and hard determinism—on 
the contrary, Smilansky acknowledges their logical inconsistency. Rather, it points to 
the possibility of holding a “mixed, intermediate position that is not fully consistent 
with either.”4 
Before we go on to see what such a mixed, intermediate position might look like, a 
few words should be said on why Smilansky considers both compatibilism and hard 
determinism insufficient. Beginning with compatibilism, it is evident that Smilansky 
is moved by considerations of origination, control, and luck—the same issues that 
motivate the previously discussed arguments of van Inwagen and Galen Strawson—
to declare that ultimate responsibility is impossible. Consider the following passage: 
If people lack libertarian free will, their identity and actions flow from circumstances beyond their 
control. To a certain extent, people can change their character, but that which does or does not change 
remains itself a result of something. There is always a situation in which the self-creating person 
could not have created herself but was just what she was, as it were, “given.” Being the sort of person 
one is and having the desires and beliefs one has, are ultimately something one cannot control, which 
cannot be one’s fault; it is one’s luck. And one’s life, and everything one does, is an unfolding of 
this.5 
From what Smilansky says here, it seems he is persuaded of the validity of the 
arguments for hard determinism discussed in Chapter 4; in fact, however, his 
rejection of compatibilism does not lead him to unqualified acceptance of hard 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 As for libertarianism, Smilansky rejects this on the grounds that indeterminism cannot contribute 
anything to moral responsibility. 
3 Smilansky (2002), p. 491. 
4 Ibid., p. 491. 
5 Ibid., pp. 492-3. 
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determinism.6 Just as compatibilism is deemed insufficient, so too is hard 
determinism, on account of the fact that we must retain certain important 
compatibilist distinctions if we are to do justice to morally required forms of life. 
Smilansky believes that such distinctions as compatibilists are wont to make often 
have crucial, non-consequentialist, ethical significance. To support his contention 
that compatibilist distinctions are sometimes unjustifiably overlooked by hard 
determinists, Smilansky offers the following reflection: 
[T]he kleptomaniac and the alcoholic differ from the common thief and common drinker in the 
deficiency of their capacity for local reflective control over their actions. Here everyone should agree. 
But the point worth adding is that such differences are often morally significant.7 
Smilansky is arguing that there are sometimes morally salient differences between 
two cases (such as between a kleptomaniac and a common thief) which the 
compatibilist is able to recognise but which the hard determinist would ignore. In 
such cases, the intuition is that it is simply not fair to regard both agents as equally 
lacking in moral responsibility. Furthermore, we as agents do not want to live in a 
society in which its members are morally excused for their bad deeds where no 
mitigating circumstances exist: 
We want to be members of a Community of Responsibility where our choices will determine the 
moral attitude we receive, with the accompanying possibility of being morally excused when our 
actions are not within our reflective control […] We have to enable people to live as responsible 
beings in the Community of Responsibility, to live lives based largely on their choices, to note and 
give them credit for their good actions, and to take account of situations in which they lacked the 
abilities, capacities, and opportunities to choose freely and are therefore not responsible in the 
compatibilist sense.8 
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6 In fact, Smilansky is not even committed to the acceptance of determinism, let alone hard 
determinism. That is, whereas I have argued that we must accept the truth of determinism on the basis 
of the PSR, Smilanksy considers it an open question whether determinism is true. However, if 
determinism proves to be true, then Smilansky would, I think, assent to the conclusion of van 
Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. And if determinism proves to be false, then Galen Strawson’s 
Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility would in any case suffice to convince 
Smilansky that ultimate responsibility is unattainable. Given his ambivalence regarding the truth of 
determinism, Smilansky might be more accurately characterised here as displaying sympathy for the 
doctrine of ‘impossibilism’—and, insofar as I accept Galen Strawson’s arguments, I share his 
impossibilist sympathies. Nevertheless, I shall continue to frame the debate as one between hard 
determinism and compatibilism, for two reasons: first, because this is how Smilansky himself frames 
it; and second, because I have already put forward the case that determinism is true. 
7 Smilanksy (2002), pp. 493-4. 
8 Ibid., p. 495. 
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A partial condemnation of both compatibilism and hard determinism thus follows. 
On the one hand, Smilansky rebukes compatibilists on the grounds that any factor 
for which a person is appreciated, praised, or even loved is ultimately a matter of 
luck. “That compatibilists are indifferent to such ultimate arbitrariness, shallowness, 
and injustice,” says Smilansky, “is morally outrageous.”9 On the other hand, he also 
fulminates against hard determinists for their failure to recognise the difference 
between cases such as that of the common thief and the kleptomaniac, and for being 
blind to the moral inadequacy of social institutions that would fail to take account of 
this difference. “That hard determinists are indifferent to such distinctions and 
ethical imperatives,” Smilansky once more declares, “is morally outrageous.”10 
Smilansky’s arguments for the partial validity of compatibilism and hard 
determinism (or, to put the same point in more negative terms, the partial inadequacy 
of both) sets the stage for his first proposal, which is the case for a fundamental 
dualism on the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism. There are 
aspects of each position—compatibilist and hard determinist—that the other cannot 
plausibly deny, and therefore any “monistic” position will be inadequate. In other 
words, we cannot completely disregard the hard determinist insight (as the 
compatibilist would have us do) that even vicious and compatibilistically free 
criminals are in some sense victims of circumstance. Neither can it be ignored that 
favourable compatibilist assessments of persons are necessarily shallow, since any 
such assessments ultimately depend on factors not under the person’s control. 
Equally, however, there can be no disregarding the compatibilist insight that there 
are legitimate moral distinctions to be made between, say, the alcoholic and the 
common drinker, or the kleptomaniac and the common thief. The kleptomaniac, for 
instance, is simply not in a condition for membership in the kind of ‘community of 
responsibility’ to which most people, including the common thief, can—and should 
want to—belong. 
How should we understand Smilansky’s notion of a community of responsibility? 
The first thing to say is that such a community must be built on compatibilist 
distinctions, since the hard determinist perspective simply denies the reality of 
responsibility. Being built on compatibilist distinctions, a community of 
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10 Ibid., p. 496. 
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responsibility would in one sense be unjust, says Smilansky, by virtue of the fact that 
it involves holding one another responsible even though our actions are not on the 
ultimate level up to us. In another sense, however, the community of responsibility is 
just, as it allows us to maintain the kinds of distinctions—between kleptomaniacs 
and common thieves, for instance—we already commonly make when deciding 
whether an agent’s action was ‘up to’ them. To fail to create a community of 
responsibility, argues Smilansky, would be to fail to show proper respect for persons, 
because showing proper respect for persons requires the establishment of some kind 
of non-arbitrary moral order. Since no satisfactory moral order can be established 
merely on the basis of hard determinism (so Smilansky claims) we must therefore 
work with compatibilist notions of fault and moral responsibility. We can and should 
acknowledge that working in this way has a moral price in terms of unfairness and 
injustice when viewed from the hard determinist perspective, concedes Smilansky, 
but this does not negate the fact that there is a frequent need to think along 
compatibilist lines in order to maintain a community of responsibility. 
In brief, the core insight of Smilansky’s fundamental dualism is that, instead of 
embracing the mistaken assumption of monism (according to which either 
compatibilism or incompatibilism is wholly correct) we “need to try out ways of 
combining them.”11 Although Smilansky offers suggestions as to how they might be 
combined he allows that his particular suggestions need not be followed zealously, 
since his main aim is merely to illustrate the possibility of working within a dualistic 
framework. Whether Smilansky’s idea of embracing fundamental dualism has merit 
will be considered following an exposition of his second proposal: ‘illusionism.’ 
 
6.2 Smilansky’s Illusionism 
Smilansky’s illusionism is comprised of two claims: the first of these is that the 
majority of people have illusory beliefs regarding free will; the second is that this 
situation is largely for the best. We will examine each of these claims in turn. 
According to Smilansky, we—or at least the majority of us—have illusory beliefs 
regarding free will. So what does the notion of “illusion” mean to Smilansky, why 
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11 Ibid., p. 497. 
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do we need it, and exactly what illusory beliefs does he identify? In clarification of 
the first question, Smilansky tells us that the sense of illusion he is interested in 
combines the falsity of a belief with “some motivated role in forming and 
maintaining that belief—as in standard cases of wishful thinking or self-
deception.”12 There is no need to determine the current level of illusion concerning 
free will, argues Smilansky, although he is in no doubt that it has a large role to play 
in the free will debate.  
Why does Smilansky believe certain illusions regarding free will are necessary? The 
necessity of illusion arises, we are told, from two features of the free will problem: 
first, it arises indirectly as a result of the fundamental dualism—that is, it arises from 
the partial and varying validity of compatibilism and hard determinism. Smilansky 
terms the circumstances giving rise to illusion here the ‘dissonance problem.’ 
Second, the need for illusion flows directly and more deeply from the absence of 
libertarian free will, which would otherwise provide grounding for some of our 
beliefs on moral responsibility. This is labelled the ‘insufficiency problem.’ We shall 
examine each of these in turn. 
If both sides of the fundamental dualism are acknowledged, warns Smilansky, then 
there is a risk that either compatibilism or hard determinism will be rejected in its 
entirety. This, in essence, is the dissonance problem. Smilanksy suggests various 
motivations that might lead someone to abandon one or other perspective: they may 
be troubled by the very existence of the dilemma, or else troubled by the fear of 
inconsistency or irrationality. Alternatively, perhaps one or other of the ultimate and 
compatibilist insights might encourage the rejection of one half of the fundamental 
dualism—for example, says Smilansky, “the idea that no ultimate-level distinction 
can be made might cause some people to neglect ultimate criteria, while causing 
others to discount all criteria.”13 
Whichever side of the fundamental dualism is abandoned on account of the 
dissonance problem, argues Smilansky, the result will be problematic. If the 
compatibilist perspective is rejected, then we can expect this to give rise to particular 
harms. The first of these harms is the Present Danger of the Future Retrospective 
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12 Ibid., p. 500. 
13 Smilansky (2000), p. 159. 
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Excuse, which Smilansky summarises as follows: “people ought not to be fully 
aware of the ultimate inevitability of what they have done, for this will affect the 
way in which they hold themselves responsible.”14 That is to say, if people are aware 
of the hard determinist insight that their actions are not ultimately under their 
control, the knowledge that this excuse for past behaviours will be open to them in 
the future is likely to encourage bad behaviour in the present. Another potential harm 
Smilansky cites from rejecting compatibilism is the Danger of Worthlessness. If it is 
believed that everything that happens is merely the unfolding of the given, then the 
worth of what one achieves as an individual might seem to be diminished. A final 
harm associated with rejecting compatibilism as a result of the dissonance problem is 
the Danger of Retrospective Dissociation. From the hard determinist perspective, an 
individual can easily appear as a mere vehicle, whose decisions, feelings, thoughts, 
and so forth are simply phenomena. Since having genuine feelings of responsibility 
are crucial to being responsible selves, argues Smilansky, we cannot remain 
sanguine about the dangers of adopting a stance of retrospective dissociation. 
A rejection of the ultimate perspective does not pose the same risk in terms of 
potential harms that rejection of the compatibilist perspective poses. However, 
ultimate perspective rejection is equally unacceptable to Smilansky, for two reasons. 
For one thing, the ultimate perspective contains valid insights and as such cannot be 
wholly dispensed with any more than can the compatibilist persepctive. 
Additionally, ultimate-level conclusions are derived from a concern with such 
features as the source of—and control over—actions, issues which exercise 
compatibilists every bit as much as hard determinists. It is therefore not possible for 
compatibilists to discount hard determinists’ concerns with these issues without, in 
so doing, diluting the power of their own theory.15 
Whereas the dissonance problem arises indirectly from the absence of libertarian free 
will (via the partial validity of both hard determinism and compatibilism), the 
insufficiency problem arises directly from it. In particular, it arises “from the fact 
that much of our personal reactive life and closely related values, conceptions, and 
practices have deep connections with the idea of libertarian free will.”16 The danger, 
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14 Ibid., p. 153. 
15 See Smilansky (2000), pp. 149-61 for a lengthier disquisition on the Dissonance Problem. 
16 Smilansky (2000), p. 162. 
142!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
according to Smilansky, is that if the reality of the absence of libertarian free will 
were made clear, then these values, conceptions, and practices would be abandoned 
despite being partially justified on compatibilist grounds. We therefore need the 
illusion of libertarian free will to provide a safeguard against the danger of moral 
nihilism that arises from exclusively embracing the ultimate perspective. So, as 
Smilansky argues: “if libertarian assumptions carry on their back [compatibilist] 
distinctions, which would not be adhered to sufficiently without them, an illusion 
which defends these libertarian assumptions seems to be just what we need.”17 
It is clear, then, that the three dangers discussed above in relation to the rejection of 
compatibilism due to the dissonance problem—the Present Danger of the Future 
Retrospective Excuse, the Danger of Worthlessness, and the Danger of Retrospective 
Dissociation—are equally applicable in the case of the insufficiency problem: all 
three are examples of what can happen when one adopts the ultimate perspective to 
the exclusion of any other, which is just what Smilanksy fears might happen should 
people become aware of the lack of libertarian free will. As Smilansky is keen to 
assure us, he is not arguing that there is no justification for our moral distinctions 
once it has been discovered that libertarian free will is false—on the contrary, 
compatibilism provides at least a partial justification for our moral responsibility 
practices. The problem is that Smilansky doubts whether most people would find 
compatibilist distinctions sufficiently compelling to prevent them from defaulting to 
a hard determinist denial of free will and moral responsibility. Given these facts, it is 
necessary for the “fragile compatibilist-level plants […] to be defended from the 
chill of the ultimate perspective in the hothouse of illusion.”18 
In summary, illusion is necessary, and results from both the dissonance problem and 
the insufficiency problem. Regarding the dissonance problem, if the absence of 
libertarian free will is realised, then there is the danger that one or other side of the 
fundamental dualism (either compatibilism or hard determinism) will be abandoned 
wholesale. If compatibilist distinctions are abandoned, this might lead to a moral 
nihilism threatening (among other things) our ability to hold ourselves morally 
responsible, to feel a sense of self-worth in our achievements, and to feel proper 
remorse for moral failings. If, on the other hand, the dissonance problem leads to the 
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18 Ibid., p. 173. 
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rejection of the ultimate perspective of hard determinism, no such deleterious 
practical consequences will follow; but this outcome is nonetheless to be regretted on 
account of hard determinism’s partial validity, as well as the weakening effect such a 
rejection would have on compatibilism itself given shared compatibilist/hard 
determinist concerns with questions of sourcehood and control. Smilansky is 
pessimistic about the hopes of successfully reconciling the two perspectives of the 
fundamental dualism: “Whichever balance between the elements occurs, complex 
patterns of confusion and unwarranted dismissal of one or both perspectives are very 
likely to emerge.”19 
As for the insufficiency problem, the difficulty here is that the absence of libertarian 
free will renders us unable to justify the many beliefs, values and practices related to 
moral responsibility that depend on the truth of libertarian free will. Our capacity to 
adopt an ethical view of one another, to feel worthy of deep respect, perhaps even 
our ability to view one another as autonomous individuals, are all potentially under 
threat from an awareness of the absence of libertarian free will.  While it is true that 
compatibilist distinctions offer us partial justification for maintaining many of our 
beliefs, values and practices, many will consider this too weak a foundation on 
which to base their beliefs on moral responsibility. Such people are therefore likely 
to adopt to their detriment an exclusively hard determinist perspective. Additionally, 
even if one accepts compatibilist distinctions, they remain a poor substitute for belief 
in libertarian free will and the concomitant assurance of the truth of origination and 
ultimate responsibility.  
For the reasons discussed, Smilansky commends to us his illusionism, which calls 
for “a large measure of motivated obscurity regarding the objections to libertarian 
free will.”20 Since Smilansky considers that these illusory beliefs are already largely 
in place, his illusionism can be seen as much as anything as a call to philosophers to 
keep silent about the absence of libertarian free will for the sake of the common 
good. 
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19 Ibid., p. 288. 
20 Smilansky (2002), p. 501. 
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6.3 Assessing Smilansky’s Mixed View 
Should we accept Smilansky’s proposals for a fundamental dualism and for 
illusionism? I would argue that neither can be adopted in quite the form that 
Smilansky presents them. In fact, insofar as illusionism calls for motivated obscurity 
regarding objections to libertarian free will, I contend it should not be adopted at all. 
As for fundamental dualism, the suggestion that we need to combine compatibilist 
and incompatibilist ways of thinking shows more promise, and as such I hope to 
make the case that some sort of fundamental dualism should be adopted. 
 
6.3.1   Assessing Illusionism 
Let us first discuss the merits of illusionism, however, and in particular Smilansky’s 
claims that illusion with regards to the non-reality of libertarian free will is 
widespread, plays a largely positive role in our lives, and ought to be supported on 
account of its usefulness. Beginning with the claim that illusion is widespread, we 
can note the similarity of Smilansky’s and Vargas’s positions on this point. While 
Vargas never describes belief in libertarian free will as illusory, he would certainly 
agree with Smilansky’s conviction that such belief is both the norm, and is false.21 It 
was argued in Chapter 3 that libertarianism is false. The question of whether belief in 
libertarianism is the norm was discussed in relation to Vargas’s revisionism, 
receiving a qualified ‘yes’—qualified principally by the observation that belief in 
moral responsibility seemed to be stronger than belief in indeterminism. In view of 
these facts, I have no objection to what we might (following Vargas) term the 
‘diagnostic’ aspect of Smilansky’s illusionism: libertarianism is indeed the 
predominant view in our society. Furthermore, it is false. As far as these diagnostic 
criteria are concerned, then, Smilansky’s illusionism passes muster. 
When it comes to the ‘prescriptive’ element of Smilansky’s theory, though, things 
are trickier and more contentious. At the heart of the matter, however, is a simple 
question: is Smilansky right to think that, on balance, it is preferable to seek to 
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21 Where Vargas is at variance with Smilansky is in the latter’s claim that there is often a motivated 
element to our mistaken adherence to libertarianism: i.e. that self-deception is at play. Whether this 
claim—that adherence to libertarianism is largely motivated by the urge to self-deceive—is borne out 
by the evidence will be questioned shortly. 
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conceal from the majority the truth regarding our lack of libertarian free will? 
Smilansky presents two reasons for thinking that the absence of libertarian free will 
is a secret best kept hidden, and these together form his case for a “motivated 
obscurity” on the subject. The first reason cited is that illusion plays a positive role 
in its capacity as (in Smilansky’s poetic phrase) “the handmaiden of reality” in 
disguising the absence of libertarian free will.22 In more prosaic terms, the claim is 
that compatibilist distinctions, although possessing their own non-illusory reality, 
nonetheless require libertarian illusion for their support. To the extent that illusion 
helps to support these compatibilist realities, we can view this not as mere falsehood 
but rather as a condition for the emergence of a valid morally necessary reality. So, 
features of moral life such as the acceptance of personal responsibility, adherence to 
the values and practices of the compatibilistically-grounded community of 
responsibility, and a sense of pride in having done the right thing in a difficult 
situation, are all made possible by a belief (albeit false) in the reality of libertarian 
free will. As to why a belief in libertarian free will should be a condition for 
supporting compatibilist realities, Smilansky answers (as we have seen) that a 
realisation of the absence of libertarian free will would likely lead many to abandon 
valid compatibilist distinctions, and would encourage them to embrace the moral 
nihilism of hard determinism instead. 
Another reason given in favour of a motivated obscurity with regards to the falsity of 
libertarian free will is that illusion can have a value in and of itself. In fact, 
Smilansky goes so far as to say that illusion “not only helps to create and sustain 
independent reality, but is in itself a sort of ‘reality,’ simply by virtue of its 
existence.”23 That is, the fact that a belief is false does not negate the fact that the 
belief is experienced as true by the believer. Moreover, the effects of such illusory 
beliefs can sometimes be positive, and Smilansky asserts that belief in libertarian 
free will is one such example of an illusory belief capable of giving rise to positive 
effects. 
Despite Smilansky’s pro-illusion arguments, I remain unconvinced. According to his 
first reason, in the absence of the illusory belief in libertarian free will, many of us 
would abandon perfectly valid compatibilist distinctions in favour of the ultimate 
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22 Smilansky (2000), p. 170. 
23 Ibid., p. 170. 
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perspective of the hard determinist. Illusion (in the form of belief in libertarian free 
will) is thus supposed to be a condition for supporting reality (the partial validity of 
compatibilist distinctions). However, I question the assertion that, on becoming 
aware of the absence of libertarian free will, many people would abandon valid 
compatibilist distinctions in favour of the supposed moral nihilism of hard 
determinism. To claim, as Smilansky is effectively doing, that most non-
philosophically trained people require belief in libertarianism as a crutch, without 
which they would be unable to appreciate the (partial) validity of compatibilist 
distinctions, is to fail to credit such people with the natural intelligence they surely 
have. Smilansky’s illusionism is excessively paternalistic in this regard, in that the 
general mystification and self-deception he perceives and endorses in the majority is 
deemed unnecessary for the minority. In short, since Smilansky is able to bear the 
knowledge that libertarian free will is a chimera, why should anyone else find it such 
a problem? What’s good for the goose, as they say, is good for the gander. 
Moreover, Smilansky’s fear that moral nihilism awaits those that are stripped of their 
illusions regarding libertarian free will is hard to reconcile with the evidence 
considered in the previous chapter on folk concepts of free will. Nichols and 
Knobe’s study, for instance, suggests that belief in moral responsibility is much 
more resilient than Smilansky realises. In particular, the finding that, if the world 
were found to operate according to deterministic laws, the majority of people would 
still judge an agent in such a world to be morally responsible, provides evidence that 
Smilansky’s fears of moral nihilism are unfounded.24 In fact, the power of belief in 
moral responsibility can be evinced simply by reflecting on the extent to which such 
belief is susceptible to elimination on theoretical grounds. Put simply, far from 
thinking that theoretical arguments for abandoning libertarianism are likely to lead 
people to abandon belief in moral responsibility, we should instead be concerned 
with the much more plausible worry of people continuing to praise, blame, punish, 
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24 Nichols and Knobe (2007: p. 670) found that, when presented with a scenario in which an agent 
behaves immorally, 72% of participants judged that the agent was fully morally responsible for their 
behaviour even once it was stipulated that they lived in a determined world. 
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and reward in situations in which these practices have been found to have no 
theoretical warrant.25 
Smilansky’s final reason in favour of illusionism, which is that illusion can have 
value in and of itself, cuts little ice. It is doubtless the case that false beliefs and self-
deception are sometimes valuable features of our psychological make-up, a fact 
evidenced by studies such as that by Alloy and Abramson, who found that 
supposedly ‘normal’ subjects in fact had inflated, and less realistic, perceptions of 
their importance, reputation, locus of control and abilities than did depressed 
subjects.26 However, while most of us would surely agree that depression is too large 
a price to pay for the benefit of having a more realistic perception of one’s character 
and abilities, the likely consequences of knowing the truth regarding libertarian free 
will are, I submit, significantly less onerous, to the extent that they fail to support the 
case for motivated obscurity. As for the observation that the falsity of a belief does 
not negate the fact that it is experienced as true by the believer, my response is: so 
what? The assertion is true, but I fail to see how it lends support to the claim that 
these false beliefs should merit protection from the harsh reality. 
To conclude, I contend that the supposed threat posed by the unmasking of the 
illusion of libertarian free will is in fact no threat at all. While I accept that an 
understanding of the absence of libertarian free will is likely to be a cause for regret, 
one must balance that against the inherent value of knowing the truth, even when one 
would prefer that reality were otherwise. Admittedly, that it is always preferable for 
false beliefs to be challenged and revealed might be too strong a claim—if a more 
realistic outlook could only be achieved at the cost of serious depression, for 
example, then this would plausibly too high a price to pay. Another factor to 
consider is hinted at in the dictum that “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing”: a 
complete lack of understanding is sometimes preferable to partial understanding, and 
this might provide grounds for motivated obscurity in some instances. However, in 
this particular instance—namely, regarding the commonly-held and erroneous belief 
in libertarian free will—it is hard to see that these grounds apply. Rather, 
Smilansky’s dire prognostications for societal wellbeing should the truth of the lack 
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25 I see support for my assertion here in P.F. Strawson’s (1962) insight that our propensity to praise, 
blame, reward, and punish is so deep-rooted that it is questionable whether theoretical considerations 
could make any appreciable difference to such habits of moral appraisal.  
26 Alloy and Abramson (1979). 
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of foundation to belief in libertarian free will become widely known are, at the least, 
greatly overstated. Further, if Smilansky, being privy to this knowledge, finds that he 
is yet able to bear it without either falling into abject despondency or succumbing to 
nihilism, then why not expect the same of the man on the Clapham omnibus? 
 
6.3.2   Assessing Fundamental Dualism 
Leaving Smilansky’s illusionism aside now and turning to his proposal for a 
fundamental dualism, I wish to argue that while this proposal must be adopted in 
some form, this need not—and in fact should not—be in the form in which 
Smilansky himself presents it. Fundamental dualism, it will be remembered, amounts 
to a repudiation of the assumption of monism, according to which one must accept 
either compatibilism and incompatibilism wholesale while rejecting the other in its 
entirety. I agree with Smilansky that the assumption of monism is not tenable, since 
neither incompatibilism nor compatibilism should be rejected in their entirety. 
However, I disagree with Smilanksy’s particular approach to combining 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, and after critiquing Smilansky’s approach I 
shall present the case for a fundamental dualism of the kind that I think we should 
adopt.  
The first aspect of Smilansky’s fundamental dualism to discuss is his approach to 
incompatibilism. Where Smilansky is somewhat equivocal I wish to be less so, by 
affirming that: if the hard determinist contention that it is not possible to be 
ultimately morally responsible is correct—and the arguments of van Inwagen and 
Strawson are sufficiently persuasive to conclude that it is—then punishment can 
never be truly deserved. It is not clear whether Smilansky would assent to the claim 
in this conditional: on the one hand, he seems to assent to the antecedent, which 
expresses the conclusion to the hard determinist arguments we encountered in 
Chapter 4; but on the other hand, he seems to believe that punishment is sometimes 
deserved on compatibilist grounds (for example, the common thief deserves 
punishment where the kleptomaniac does not). Smilansky’s acknowledgement that 
origination is both a requirement for real moral responsibility and does not exist 
should force him to affirm that punishment is never truly deserved—yet he 
confounds our expectations of logical consistency by declaring that whether desert 
SMILANSKY’S!MIXED!VIEW!!!!!!!149!
!
applies varies according to the situation. To illustrate, Smilansky sketches the case of 
the lazy waiter, whose inattentiveness towards customers and general lack of 
effort—despite the fact that he’s perfectly capable of acting differently—are 
punished by the poor tips he receives as a result. In this scenario, Smilansky says, the 
waiter “does not deserve the full tip.”27 We are urged to believe the compatibilist 
perspective is more salient in this scenario (though it is not clear why), and since the 
lazy waiter is compatibilistically free to moderate his behaviour in order to make 
more effort and thereby earn better tips, he deserves to reap the consequences of not 
doing so.  
Quite simply, I see no reason for thinking that the hard determinist perspective does 
not apply with equal force to this case as indeed it does to all cases. Moreover, once 
it is applied, the same conclusion will be reached: the agent’s behaviour is caused by 
factors ultimately beyond their control, and hence they cannot ultimately be held 
morally responsible. So, in the case of the lazy waiter, we can legitimately ask: why 
is he the sort of person who lacks any inclination to make an effort? Ultimately, we 
will find that our answer traces back to factors beyond the lazy waiter’s control, and 
for this reason he, like all agents in all scenarios, is neither ultimately responsible for 
his behaviour, nor deserving of its consequences. 
 
6.4 Consequentialism and Moral Responsibility 
After laying out my disagreement here, it may seem as though there is little scope for 
sympathy with compatibilist distinctions. However, it is less the compatibilist 
distinctions themselves that I wish to query, but rather their justification. Put simply, 
whereas Smilansky argues that compatibilist distinctions have crucial non-
consequentialist ethical significance, I consider that—given that origination is a 
requirement for moral responsibility—the ethical significance of compatibilist 
distinctions must perforce be consequentialist in nature. We saw in the previous 
chapter how Vargas seemed to toy with the idea of embracing a consequentialist 
justification of responsibility norms before eventually rejecting this approach in 
favour of a (failed) defence of ultimate desert from a compatibilist perspective. I 
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27 Smilansky (2002), p. 494. 
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submit that, once it has been accepted that hard determinist concerns over origination 
are not misplaced, consequentialism remains the only justification for our 
responsibility norms on the table. Therefore, not only should we avail ourselves of it, 
we in fact have no option but to do so if we want to avoid the moral nihilism of 
abandoning all moral responsibility norms. 
Why does a consequentialist understanding and justification of our moral 
responsibility norms remain the only viable option at this juncture? The reason is 
that the arguments of van Inwagen and Galen Strawson have found no convincing 
rebuttal in the mixed views surveyed thus far. In the present case, Smilansky’s 
attempt to persuade us that hard determinism’s validity is merely partial and varying 
is unconvincing, since no real reasons are presented for thinking that its validity may 
vary according to the case at hand. In fact, in contrast to Smilansky’s position, it 
seems clear that if one accepts that hard determinist arguments invoking the 
necessity of origination are successful, then one must accept that they are successful 
in all instances. Rather than offering direct arguments as to why the hard determinist 
insight is merely partial and varied, Smilansky has sought to appeal to our intuitions 
through the use of examples such as the case of the lazy waiter mentioned above. 
These certainly do prompt one into thinking both that compatibilist distinctions are 
important and that they should be maintained; but they in no way detract from either 
the force of the hard determinist insight, or from its universally applicable nature.  
What is more, our intuitions in response to this and other cases Smilansky discusses 
can easily be accommodated by a consequentialist approach to moral responsibility 
norms. Let us take the case of the lazy waiter and see what a consequentialist 
compatibilism would prescribe here. Since the lazy waiter is clearly capable of doing 
a better job—capable, that is, in the compatibilist sense of being able to do a better 
job should he so choose—he is a fitting target of consequentialist punishment, which 
might very well take the form of receiving a reduction in tips from dissatisfied 
customers. Despite the fact that he is not ultimately responsible for the lazy 
behaviour that brings on him the punishment of reduced earnings, the waiter’s 
punishment is nonetheless justified in that it is likely to effect a positive change in 
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what is reasonably considered to be unacceptable behaviour.28 Taking the case of the 
lazy waiter as our exemplum, then, the process of coming to a consequentialist 
judgment of an agent’s moral responsibility seems to involve the asking of the 
following two questions: (1) Is the agent’s behaviour in some way morally 
unacceptable? (2) Is the agent capable (in the compatibilist sense) of correcting their 
behaviour? If the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes,’ then the conditions are 
met for administering punishment—in the form of censure or concrete sanction—
commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. 
It should now be clear that the kind of fundamental dualism I am proposing is of 
quite a different nature to Smilansky’s. Whereas Smilansky conceives of a 
fundamental dualism in which the compatibilist and incompatibilist approaches each 
have what he calls a “partial and varying validity,” and whose applicability varies 
according to the nature of the case in question, I am arguing that both compatibilism 
and incompatibilism are wholly and unvaryingly applicable within their own 
separate spheres.29 Incompatibilism teaches us that no agent is ever ultimately 
deserving of the blame or punishment they receive (and, on the flip side, neither does 
anyone ultimately deserve praise or reward). The rationale for believing this is that 
true desert requires origination, and origination is a condition that cannot be met—
and no amount of compatibilist freedom will ever change that fact. However, while 
compatibilist freedom does not allow for desert, it can provide support for our moral 
responsibility practices. We can say that our moral responsibility practices are 
justified on consequentialist grounds, and that therefore, insofar as compatibilist 
distinctions have beneficial consequences, we should continue to apply them. 
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28 Although I do not here offer an account of how to determine what behaviour counts as 
unacceptable, note that any such account need not necessarily be along consequentialist lines. In other 
words, I am defending a position of consequentialism solely with regards to the justification of 
holding people morally responsible. Whether an act is good or bad, moral or immoral, acceptable or 
unacceptable, is a separate question, and I am happy to let deontologists and consequentialists fight it 
out between themselves as to whose approach is correct in such an instance. My contention is simply 
that: (1) whether one takes a deontological or consequentialist approach to the issue, the lazy waiter’s 
behaviour here would be widely be regarded as bad, immoral, or unacceptable, and; (2) his behaviour 
being bad, immoral, or unacceptable is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to justify his 
being blamed and/or punished. 
29 Smilansky (2000), p. 286. 
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6.4.1 Smart’s Consequentialism 
Consequentialist approaches to justifying moral responsibility norms receive little 
consideration in the current philosophical literature, and still less support. Perhaps 
they are perceived as requiring too radical a rethinking of the conditions under which 
we can hold one another morally responsible—in particular, justifying moral 
responsibility practices in the absence of even so much as the possibility of desert 
may be considered problematic. Nonetheless, consequentialist approaches have been 
championed previously, perhaps most notably by Smart, and it is to his position that 
we shall now turn in order both to further elucidate the consequentialist approach, 
and to help answer the charge that moral responsibility requires desert. 
In answer to the question of what it is to ascribe responsibility, Smart, like 
Smilansky, presents us with various examples. One of these examples concerns a 
schoolboy, Tommy, who has failed to do his homework. There are two possible 
explanations for this failure, Smart tells us: stupidity or laziness. If the former 
explanation is correct then there is no place for punishment, while if the latter is 
correct then punishment may be justified, as Smart explains: 
If Tommy is sufficiently stupid, then it does not matter whether he is exposed to temptation or not 
exposed to temptation, threatened or not threatened, cajoled or not cajoled. When his negligence is 
found out, he is not made less likely to repeat it by threats, promises, or punishments. On the other 
hand, the lazy boy can be influenced in such ways. Whether he does his homework or not is perhaps 
solely the out-come of environment, but one part of the environment is the threatening schoolmaster.30 
The point is that “threats and promises, punishment and rewards, the ascription of 
responsibility and the non-ascription of responsibility” have a clear pragmatic 
justification regardless of questions of determinism, desert, and origination, and for 
this reason the lazy Tommy is a fitting target for punishment while the stupid 
Tommy is not.31 
Smart argues that the example of the stupid/lazy schoolboy Tommy shows that we 
must distinguish two ways in which we use the word ‘praise’: it can either denote the 
opposite of blame (which is what lazy Tommy should receive), or else it can mean 
the opposite of dispraise (which is what stupid Tommy should receive). So, when 
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30 Smart (1961), p. 302. 
31 Ibid., p. 302. 
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used to mean the opposite of dispraise, praise amounts to a positive grading or 
evaluation, and can apply to moral qualities and actions as well as to physical or 
mental characteristics such as strength, beauty, intelligence, and so forth (while 
dispraise, of course, amounts to a negative grading or evaluation). Praise of this sort 
has a primary function and a secondary function, says Smart. Its primary function is 
to describe what people are like in order to inform others. Speaking perhaps from 
experience, Smart here offers an example: “To say that one candidate for a 
lecturership writes clear prose whereas another cannot put a decent sentence together 
is to help the committee to decide who should be given the lecturership.”32 Naturally 
enough, then, we come to like being praised and hate to be dispraised, and 
consequently praise and dispraise come to have an important secondary function: to 
praise an action is to encourage people to do actions of that class, while dispraise 
serves to discourage doing such actions. 
When the term ‘praise’ is used to mean the opposite of blame it shares the same 
meaning as it did when contrasted with dispraise, but with one proviso: to praise a 
person for an action in this sense is not only to grade it but to imply that the person is 
responsible for it in the compatibilist sense of being able to do otherwise. Hence, we 
see that it is appropriate to blame Tommy if his failure to do his homework can be 
attributed to laziness rather than stupidity. Praising and blaming, urges Smart, should 
be every bit as dispassionate as praising and dispraising. Although the former 
involves an ascription of responsibility, this is “perfectly compatible with the 
recognition that the lazy Tommy is what he is simply as a result of heredity plus 
environment (and perhaps pure chance).”33 Therefore, to the extent that people do 
not praise and blame in a dispassionate and clear-headed way, having as they do the 
notion that the appropriateness of praise and blame is bound up with their 
metaphysical (and incoherent) idea of freedom, Smart’s proposal represents a 
revisionist account of moral responsibility.34 
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32 Ibid., p. 304. 
33 Smart (1961), p. 305. 
34 Smart is not proposing a revision to when we should hold one another morally responsible (at least, 
not directly), but rather to the concept of moral responsibility. Whereas in most theories of moral 
responsibility—and indeed in most people’s minds—desert is considered a necessary condition for 
being morally responsible, Smart’s consequentialist theory severs this link between desert and moral 
responsibility. 
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While there is of course much more to say about what shape a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility practices should take, Smart’s account does 
give us a rough outline from which to work. More fundamentally, however, I 
maintain that it is right to think our moral responsibility practices are justified on 
consequentialist grounds, and that this is therefore how we must respond to 
Smilansky’s call for a fundamental dualism in which both compatibilist and 
incompatibilist insights are recognised. That this is the right justification can in the 
first instance be deduced by reflection on the inadmissibility of the alternatives: we 
are compelled to rule out the possibility of the kind of non-consequentialist 
justification of compatibilist distinctions that Smilansky favours, since the hard 
determinist assertion that it is not possible to be ultimately morally responsible has 
met no successful challenge; equally, we must rule out the possibility of doing as the 
hard determinist would have us do and rejecting all our moral responsibility 
practices, since not only would this be likely to have harmful effects for society if it 
were achievable, but it is in any case beyond our capabilities to do this given our 
deep-rooted propensity for praising and blaming. With these two options ruled out, 
consequentialism becomes the only alternative.  
Additionally, there is the positive case for consequentialism, which perhaps provides 
a more satisfying reason for embracing it than does the mere negative appraisal of 
the alternatives. This positive case will form a large part of the next and final 
chapter. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Smilansky’s mixed view has provided us with the material to reflect on how we 
might square the circle of acknowledging the hard determinist’s protestations as to 
the impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility, while still offering a reasonable 
and reasoned justification of our moral responsibility practices.  
Two proposals comprise Smilansky’s mixed view: illusionism and fundamental 
dualism. We saw that illusionism was largely accurate in terms of what it 
diagnosed—namely, a widespread belief in libertarianism. In this regard, 
Smilansky’s illusionism is in accord with Vargas’s revisionism. Additionally, 
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Smilansky’s is right to think that libertarianism is false, and that therefore the 
majority of people justify their moral responsibility norms by reference to a faulty 
metaphysical picture. A final point regarding the diagnostic aspect of Smilansky’s 
illusionism is his claim that there is commonly a motivated element to belief in this 
false picture of libertarianism, the motivation being to evade the troubling reality that 
the kind of free will the libertarian believes in is a chimera. This is the least secure 
element of Smilanksy’s diagnosis, as an alternative explanation for the widespread 
adherence to the false belief in libertarianism is available, which is that people are 
simply mistaken on account of not reflecting sufficiently on the question. As for why 
people should so commonly be mistaken in the same direction—commonly 
mistaken, that is, in holding to a belief in folk libertarianism—the reason is our 
phenomenological experience of agency: in the absence of constraint or coercion, 
and not having epistemic access to the future, it is natural to think that the ‘garden of 
forking paths’ model provides the right metaphysical picture of one’s situation. It is 
only once libertarian agency comes under closer scrutiny that this picture can be seen 
to be misleading. Nevertheless, Smilansky’s suggestion that self-deception is at work 
cannot be written off, since one can readily perceive a motivation for believing in the 
faulty metaphysics of libertarianism, which is as follows: if libertarianism really did 
correctly describe our world then the vexing problem of how to justify our moral 
responsibility practices would dissolve, because the origination condition would (in 
certain instances) be met and ultimate responsibility could therefore be ascribed. We 
thus allowed Smilansky the benefit of the doubt on this matter and declared his 
diagnosis accurate, self-deception and all, for the sake of argument. 
In terms of prescription, however, no such leniency of judgment was extended. 
Smilansky’s argument was that those who are aware of the falsity of libertarian free 
will must actively seek to obscure this fact from those that are not. The central 
justification for this “motivated obscurity” regarding the falsity of libertarian free 
will is that illusion is a condition for supporting the reality of the partial validity of 
compatibilist distinctions. Without this support from illusion, Smilansky argued, 
people would be likely to abandon valid compatibilist distinctions and embrace the 
moral nihilism of hard determinism, heedless of the woeful societal consequences 
such an embrace would entail. Despite Smilansky’s dire warnings concerning the 
perils of speaking up about the non-existence of libertarian free will, we judged that 
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his worries were essentially baseless. In fact, it is reasonable to believe instead that 
our moral responsibility practices are so deeply ingrained that no theoretical 
consideration would be able to completely dislodge them, no matter how compelling 
the arguments.35 In view of this, we should be more concerned about being unable to 
abandon unwarranted habits of praising and blaming than about being unable to 
maintain warranted ones. 
The second proposal, Smilansky’s fundamental dualism, was judged more 
successful. In terms of the basic question, at least, we can agree to answering ‘yes’ to 
the following: should we abandon the assumption of monism? This, it will be 
remembered, is the assumption that either compatibilism or incompatibilism is 
correct in its entirety, and the other is wholly wrong. While we can agree with 
Smilansky that this is not the case, we must part company with him regarding how to 
combine compatiblism and incompatibilism, and regarding the underlying 
justification for this combining. Specifically, we must take issue with two features of 
Smilansky’s fundamental dualism. First, there is Smilansky’s failure to acknowledge 
the implications of the hard determinist’s successful argument for the impossibility 
of desert given the demonstrable impossibility of origination. The main implication 
is that ultimate responsibility, or true desert, is impossible in any situation, and none 
of Smilansky’s attempts to appeal to our compatibilist intuitions are capable of 
altering that one iota. Second, and following on from the first point, Smilansky 
presents a non-consequentialist justification for the compatibilist distinctions that we 
are apt to make, such as in the case of the lazy waiter. Naturally, due to the 
impossibility of true desert, a non-consequentialist justification of these compatibilist 
distinctions is not available. Instead, we must avail ourselves of a consequentialist 
justification of these distinctions if we wish to defend them adequately, and Smart’s 
view provides a good starting point for this. In the end, then, we find ourselves with 
a fundamental dualism in which incompatibilist arguments persuade us that desert is 
impossible, while compatibilist distinctions provide the basis for a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility practices. It would be a mistake to dispense 
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35 While I believe it is reasonable to believe that no argument would be able to persuade us to 
abandon our moral responsibility practices, I concede that whether this is the case is an empirical 
question, and one that could only be definitively answered by running an experiment in which a new 
incompatibilist education was trialled among a sample of participants.   
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entirely with either compatibilism or incompatibilism, since the insights of each are 
applicable in their own sphere. 
The form of a workable mixed view of moral responsibility is coming into view 
now, thanks to our careful scrutiny of the pre-existing mixed views of Vargas, 
Double, and Smilansky. In the next and final chapter we will continue to present the 
case for a consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices, after 
which we will go on to consider what has been learned from the mixed views 
encountered so far. Finally, we will reflect more generally on what we have learned 
on this journey from metaphysics to morals—from the lofty first principles of the 
PSR to the nitty gritty of how we should assign moral responsibility. 
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7 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A New Mixed View 
 
The final chapter is upon us, and the outline of a plausible theory of free will and 
moral responsibility is starting to take shape. This theory is one that owes a debt to 
the insights of both compatibilists and hard determinists, and yet it cannot be said to 
belong wholly to either camp. It owes to compatibilists the conviction that, under 
certain conditions, moral responsibility can be justifiably ascribed to individuals, 
which is to say that we need not attempt to abandon our practices of praising, 
blaming, punishing and rewarding as the hard determinist wishes to persuade us to 
do. On the other hand, it owes to hard determinists the acknowledgement that the 
condition of ultimate desert is one that can never be met, and thus, that while our 
practices of praising, blaming, punishing and rewarding are sometimes justified, this 
is not to say that they can ever be truly deserved. It must be owned that this positing 
of a distinction between what is justified on the one hand and what is deserved on 
the other—whereby the former obtains under certain conditions while the latter 
never obtains—is something that requires further defence and explanation. This will 
be the first task to embark upon in this chapter, as we consider objections and 
responses to the kind of consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility 
norms that I propose we adopt. 
Following this, we will reflect on the ways in which the various different elements of 
the mixed views surveyed are useful to us in constructing this consequentialist 
justification of moral responsibility. We can embrace some of the insights embodied 
in the theories of Vargas, Double, and Smilansky without needing to adopt any one 
of these theories wholesale. The object is to take the best of what we have 
examined—to affirm what is right about revisionism, fundamental dualism, 
illusionism, and metaethical subjectivism—and to reject the rest. 
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Our final task will be to return to where we began, to the PSR, in order to reflect on 
its limits in the light of our discussion of desert, justice, and moral responsibility. 
Even those of us who embrace the PSR to the extent that Spinoza and Leibniz do 
must concede that it is not applicable in all spheres. It appears that reason has its 
bounds, after all. 
It should be said that the suggestions of this final chapter are speculative and 
exploratory in nature. Rather than bringing an end to the debate, then, the 
consequentialist theory outlined is intended merely as a starting point for further 
discussion. 
 
7.1 Defending a Consequentialist Justification of our 
Moral Responsibility Norms 
The previous chapter offered a brief account of what a consequentialist justification 
of moral responsibility norms might look like, taking as its inspiration Smart’s 
renowned account. In the first half of this chapter, I wish to build on this account in 
order to iron out any concerns about whether a coherent case can really be made for 
such a theory. This will be done by setting out and responding to a couple of 
commonly-voiced criticisms of consequentialist justifications of our moral 
responsibility norms, since these threaten to derail the consequentialist project before 
it can get started. These responses should help to allay worries about the viability of 
a consequentialist justification, as well as adding flesh to the bones of our mixed 
view. 
 
7.1.1   Scanlon’s Criticism 
The first criticism is from Scanlon, who offers a critique of what he calls the 
Influenceability theory, which is his moniker for Smart’s consequentialism. 
According to Scanlon, the Influenceability theorist’s purpose or rationale in 
administering moral praise and blame is to influence people’s behaviour for the 
better. Consequently, there is “no point in praising or blaming agents who are not (or 
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were not) susceptible to being influenced by moral suasion,” since it is the ability to 
influence alone that should guide our praising and blaming practices.1 
After providing an account of the Influenceability theorist’s rationale for their moral 
responsibility ascriptions, Scanlon identifies a potential problem. Some 
Influenceability theorists might argue that commonsense notions of responsibility 
should be abandoned to be replaced by their own utilitarian notion—and that is all 
well and good, supposing one is willing and able to make the difficult case for 
revising the concept of responsibility in this way. What cannot be argued, however, 
is that the Influenceability theory provides “a satisfactory account of the notions of 
moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness as we now understand them.”2 Scanlon 
continues: “The usefulness of administering praise or blame depends on too many 
factors other than the nature of the act in question for there ever to be a good fit 
between the idea of influenceability and the idea of responsibility which we now 
employ.”3 So, what on the face of it appears to be a dilemma for the Influenceability 
theorist—whether to argue that we revise our concept of responsibility so that it 
accords with their utilitarian outlook, or else to make the case for the Influenceability 
theory providing a satisfactory account of our current notions of praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness—is in fact more of a Hobson’s choice situation according to 
Scanlon, since the latter of these two options is ruled out.  
I take no issue with Scanlon’s analysis of the problems for the Influenceability 
theory as described. I agree that, if we were to ascribe praise and blame solely on the 
basis of whether the target of our ascriptions is susceptible to the influence of moral 
suasion, then we would have to abandon any hope of maintaining the notion of moral 
responsibility we currently employ. Further, I do not wish to recommend radical 
revision to our notion of moral responsibility in order to make it fit with the demands 
of the Influenceability theory that Scanlon outlines. Instead, I wish to argue for a 
consequentialist theory that, in contrast to the Influenceability theory, does not 
require that we act with the conscious aim of maximising utility. In fact, I submit 
that there is no need to attempt to apply consequentialist thinking at all when making 
ascriptions of moral responsibility. It is unnecessary—and, indeed, fallacious—to 
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1 Scanlon (1995), p. 47. 
2 Ibid., p. 48. 
3 Ibid., p. 48. 
A!NEW!MIXED!VIEW!!!!!!!161!
!
conflate the belief that our moral responsibility practices are justified on utilitarian 
grounds with the belief that we should actively seek to maximise utility when 
carrying out these moral responsibility practices. The former is what the 
consequentialist theory that I prescribe asserts, while the latter is no part of it.4 
It might now be asked: when should we seek to hold people morally responsible, if 
not when we imagine that doing so will maximise utility? The consequentialist 
theory I envisage answers that we should hold people morally responsible when and 
only when two conditions are met: (1) when the agent in question has done 
something morally wrong, and; (2) when the agent is capable of reforming their 
behaviour (and hopefully also their attitude) as a result of being held morally 
responsible.5 This answer leaves much to be discussed, of course. For each of these 
conditions we can ask whether the agent, in performing some particular action, meets 
it (we might have different ideas about what is morally wrong, for example, or we 
might have different beliefs about the individual’s capacity to reflect morally). What 
can be agreed upon, however, is that these two conditions are commonly met. I 
contend that when they are met, we are entitled to hold the person in question 
morally responsible. 
The above are the conditions under which I believe we should hold one another 
morally responsible. I am further claiming that we customarily do hold people 
morally responsible under just these conditions. Both of these assertions are of 
course open to debate, but as a rough outline of how to correctly ascribe moral 
responsibility it is, I would argue, plausible. Similar criteria for morally responsible 
agency are presented by various compatibilists such as Fischer and Ravizza, and 
Haji.6 What these views have in common with my own is a belief that, for blame and 
punishment to be justified, it must be the case that some moral transgression has 
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4 Arneson also makes this point. In the context of discussing Smart’s views on praise and blame, 
Arneson (2003: p. 240) writes: “For [a consequentialist theory such as Smart’s] to work, the agent at 
the time of praising and blaming probably cannot have in mind the thought that she is behaving 
strategically to induce good consequences. [T]he conditions that warrant accountability need not be in 
the mind of someone engaged in an accountability practice.” In short, a utilitarian justification of 
moral responsibility practices need not demand that agents consciously act with utility in mind, nor 
even suppose that doing so would be possible. 
5 While conditions (1) and (2) can be refined and altered to some extent, they at least give an 
indication of the kind of theory I wish to defend. Condition (1) indicates that moral responsibility can 
only be imputed to an agent whose actions violate moral norms, while condition (2) captures the idea 
that an agent must have sufficient capacity to reflect on their actions if sanctioning or rewarding are to 
be legitimate. 
6 Fischer and Ravizza (1998); Haji (1998). 
162!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
taken place, and that the individual committing this transgression has the reflective 
capacity to respond appropriately to whatever sanction they are given. 
My own view is at variance with those of the above-mentioned compatibilists, 
however, in their respective justifications. Non-consequentialist compatibilists 
typically argue that agents who meet the above conditions are deserving of blame 
and punishment, and that this deservingness is what justifies us in meting out our 
chosen sanction. Against this, I would argue that van Inwagen’s and Galen 
Strawson’s arguments force us to conclude that no one ever truly deserves blame, 
and so clearly the ascription of desert cannot justify blame and punishment. Instead, 
my position is that we are justified in our practices of blaming and punishing when 
the two conditions are met, because doing so will ensure the best outcome.7 To 
repeat: the claim is emphatically not that we engage in our moral responsibility 
practices with the explicit intention of achieving the best outcome—our reactive 
attitudes are far more instinctive and less amenable to shrewd calculation than that. 
Instead, the claim is that we are liable to blame and punish when the above two 
conditions are met, and that what justifies us in blaming and punishing under these 
conditions (whether we know it or not) is the beneficial consequences that are likely 
to follow from so doing. 
To conclude, Scanlon contends that there is a clear divergence between our intuitions 
regarding when and how to hold each other morally responsible, and what the 
Influenceability theory recommends. While I accept this contention, and while I 
furthermore agree that radical revision to our concept of moral responsibility so as to 
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7 I acknowledge that the assertion that ascribing moral responsibility in accordance with conditions 
(1) and (2) will ensure the best outcome is open to debate. Still, while this assertion is unproven, I 
submit it on the grounds that it is at least plausible (as I will argue), and on the understanding that the 
conditions are open to revision in the face of evidence that such revision would result in conditions 
that reap better consequences. In defence of the utility of condition (1), it is plausible to think that 
failing to prohibit blame and punishment for those who have not done anything morally wrong would 
have negative consequences, as our sense of justice demands that blame and punishment only be 
administered in cases of wrongdoing. For instance, although it might be imagined that making an 
example of the innocent could on occasion be justified on consequentialist grounds—for example, 
fitting up and hanging an innocent man for some crime as a precautionary warning against others 
committing the offence for which he is falsely accused—permitting such flagrant injustices would, if 
discovered, lead to a breakdown of trust in our moral responsibility system and thus do nothing to 
promote utility. As for condition (2), the case for thinking that this kind of reasons-responsive 
condition will help promote utility is that only those sufficiently capable of reflecting on their actions 
are able to learn from being held responsible. As such, if an agent is not capable of reforming their 
behaviour, we should not expect sanctioning them to produce any benefits—holding someone morally 
responsible is only of benefit if they are mentally constituted in the right way, and that is what (2) is 
intended to capture. 
A!NEW!MIXED!VIEW!!!!!!!163!
!
make it fit with the Influenceability theory as sketched would be undesirable, I reject 
Scanlon’s implicit assumption that a consequentialist approach to justifying our 
moral responsibility practices must involve what we might call ‘conscious 
consequentialism’: that is, that our moral responsibility ascriptions must be formed 
while keeping the consequences of these ascriptions in mind. By contrast, the 
consequentialist theory that I propose does not require us to consider what outcome 
our praising and blaming will bring. Instead, we should continue to do what I 
suggest we always have done, which is to apportion praise and blame commensurate 
with the goodness or badness of the act in question, taking into account the agent’s 
ability to respond appropriately to any sanction. Thankfully, this behaviour comes 
naturally to us, since, as P.F. Strawson notes, no amount of theorising or 
metaphysical speculation could conceivably dislodge our reactive attitudes. 
 
7.1.2   Bennett’s Criticism 
A further criticism of consequentialist justifications of our moral responsibility 
practices comes from Bennett. His concern is that, while the beneficial consequences 
that follow from praising and blaming might by happenstance coincide with 
accountability, consequentialist justifications of moral responsibility norms can 
never get to the essence of what it is to be accountable. In particular, what 
consequentialist justifications fail to do justice to, claims Bennett, is the fact that 
blame-related responses “all involve something like hostility towards the subject.”8 
By contrast, proponents of a consequentialist justification of moral responsibility 
norms can, as Bennett sees it, remain in a “perfectly sunlit frame of mind” while 
feigning ill feeling for merely therapeutic purposes.9 While consequentialist theories 
thus deny that accountability demands reactive feelings, argues Bennett, these 
theories positively encourage the development of what P.F. Strawson refers to as the 
‘objective attitude.’10 Adopting the objective attitude towards oneself and others 
involves inquiring into how we are structured and how we function – and by means 
of this inquiry we help to dispel hostile reactive feelings towards the offender as we 
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8 Bennett (1980), p. 20. 
9 Ibid., p. 20. 
10 Bennett (1980: p. 21) includes among the reactive attitudes the following: blame, reproach, 
vilification, resentment, admiration, gratitude, and praise. They are emotional responses, either 
positive or negative, to a fellow human being, and are bound up with our moral beliefs. 
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come to view them as simply ‘a case.’ In failing to recognise that our reactive 
attitudes are an essential element of accountability, while at the same time 
encouraging this objectivity of attitude that does much to dispel these reactive 
attitudes, Bennett concludes that consequentialist justifications of our moral 
responsibility practices cannot “[do anything] like justice to the real nature of our 
praise- and blame-related responses.”11  
Bennett’s criticism is less easily dealt with than Scanlon’s since it contains a kernel 
of truth, which is that consequentialist justifications of moral responsibility norms 
fail to do justice to real-life ascriptions of praise and blame. The specific charge is 
that reactive attitudes such as hostility are essential to any blame-related response, 
yet proponents of a consequentialist justification of moral responsibility treat them as 
inessential. The task, therefore, is to defend consequentialist justifications against the 
accusation that, in treating wrongdoers as cases to be managed, they fail to recognise 
that true blame requires us to express reactive attitudes.  
The first point to make in response to Bennett’s criticism must be to concede that a 
consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices cannot capture 
everything about our ordinary notion of blame. However, Bennett is wrong about 
precisely what it is that this consequentialist justification fails to capture, since, as I 
will argue, it is not the case that the consequentialist is unable or unpermitted to view 
the reactive attitudes as essential to blame. Instead, what the consequentialist theory 
can rightly be said not to capture about our ordinary notions of blame is the idea that 
the person on the receiving end deserves their treatment. Still, this need not be fatal 
to the consequentialist justification since we need not concede that the correct 
account of what justifies us in our moral responsibility practices must be one that 
perfectly captures the nature of our current praise- and blame-related responses and 
beliefs. On the contrary, we can deny that these praise- and blame-related responses 
and beliefs are in all cases warranted. To the extent that we have a tacit belief that 
the origination condition is met (and, I would argue, this is the case for the vast 
majority of us), we will also believe that ultimate desert is possible. This belief is 
erroneous, so it is of no discredit to the consequentialist justification being proposed 
that it does not allow for responses that imply that we can be deserving of the praise 
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11 Ibid., p. 20. 
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and blame we receive. Our initial response to Bennett, then, is that he is wrong to 
assume that the correct justification of our moral responsibility practices must 
capture all our intuitions about the nature and purpose of accountability. Whereas 
our current moral responsibility practices are predicated on the notion that it is 
possible to be deserving of the praise and blame that we receive, the consequentialist 
justification of moral responsibility norms under discussion here would rightly revise 
this notion of desert.  
Following on from this call for revision to our beliefs about desert, a further possible 
response to Bennett might be to call for revision to our beliefs about the essentiality 
of reactive attitudes as well. In other words, we could assent to Bennett’s view that 
reactive attitudes are an essential feature of our current blaming practices, and agree 
further that no (mere) consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility norms 
could allow for this fact; yet we could at the same time hold that our current blaming 
practices should be revised to recognise the fact that reactive attitudes are not 
essential. However, this is not the line I wish to take, since I think that 
consequentialism regarding our moral responsibility norms can be defended against 
Bennett’s charge that they treat reactive attitudes as inessential. Recall that, on 
Bennett’s view, consequentialists must express reactive attitudes for merely 
therapeutic purposes—ill-feeling, hostility, disapprobation and so forth are feigned 
by the consequentialist in a cynical attempt to discourage wrongdoing, while 
attitudes such as gratitude and admiration are employed equally cynically in 
response to virtuous behaviour. While the consequentialist may or may not 
genuinely feel these reactive attitudes, their only duty is to express them so as to 
encourage virtue and discourage vice. 
We have been here before with Scanlon, as Bennett likewise assumes that those who 
favour a consequentialist justification of moral responsibility practices must 
therefore also favour thinking along consequentialist lines when engaging in these 
practices. The case has already been made that the consequentialist is under no such 
obligation to perform utilitarian calculations when engaged in moral responsibility 
practices. The key question is whether the good consequences of our moral 
responsibility practices justify them, not whether good consequences provide the 
motivation or rationale for acting. The upshot of positing this distinction between the 
justification of our moral responsibility practices on the one hand and our motivation 
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or rationale for acting according to moral responsibility norms on the other, is that 
Bennett’s charge that consequentialists will inevitably find themselves obliged to 
engage in simulated acts of hostility and other such reactive emotions no longer 
sticks. There need be no calculated element to the consequentialist’s ascribing of 
praise and blame. As has been argued, the criteria for determining whether an agent 
is a fitting target of (negative) moral responsibility ascriptions are, in the first 
instance, that they have done something wrong, and, in the second instance, that they 
are capable of responding appropriately to blame and/or punishment. These criteria, 
then, both should and typically do provide us with the motivation and rationale to 
praise, blame, reward, and punish. Further, I submit that we are justified in acting in 
accordance with them because of the beneficial consequences of doing so. In the 
light of these facts, Bennett’s concern, that those who advocate a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility norms will be obliged to engage in confected 
emotional responses for the sake of the beneficial consequences of doing so, no 
longer looks credible. 
The charge that, by being obliged to keep their consequentialist goals in mind, the 
consequentialist is thus forced to act in emotionally dishonest ways has been 
considered and rejected, on the grounds that there is simply no need to keep any 
consequentialist goals in mind when acting. Still, Bennett would probably wish to 
urge that the revision called for by the consequentialist theory here presented—
namely, the revision of our belief in the possibility of desert—renders reactive 
attitudes inessential anyway. After all, it might be asked, how can we sincerely hold 
any of the reactive attitudes that are such crucial components of our interpersonal 
lives if we deny that anyone truly deserves praise or blame? 
In response, I think there is a good case for thinking that reactive attitudes can and 
should retain their essential role in human relations even once a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility norms and practices has been accepted. One 
can imagine, for example, feeling disgust at a person whose behaviour is morally 
objectionable—someone, let us say, who callously refuses to help a vulnerable old 
age pensioner to cross the road even though this common act of kindness would cost 
them nothing. It is natural and proper, I would suggest, to believe that this person is 
not the ultimate source of their own actions and thus not ultimately deserving of 
blame or punishment, while at the same time feeling—and perhaps also expressing—
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disgust at their lack of basic humanity. To take a more positive example, there is no 
inconsistency of attitude in feeling gratitude towards your friend who has taken 
considerable time and effort to bake you a delicious birthday cake, while at the same 
time being aware that they are not ultimately deserving of yours or anyone else’s 
gratitude for their generous character and actions. In fact, it would be absurd to 
withhold one’s gratitude from the friend on the grounds that origination and hence 
true desert are not possible: the absence of true desert in no way detracts from the 
fact that her baking you a birthday cake was a very thoughtful and kind act—the 
very least you could do is to show some gratitude! 
The point of these examples is to illustrate the fact that there is no inconsistency in 
believing that is natural and proper to express the appropriate reactive attitude 
towards a person who is behaving either virtuously or viciously, while at the same 
time accepting that ultimate desert (whether in the form of praise and reward, or 
blame and punishment) is not possible.12 Nevertheless, while the holding of reactive 
attitudes should remain an essential part of our interpersonal lives in spite of the 
denial of the possibility of ultimate desert, it must be accepted that this denial could 
have fairly radical implications for how we view our moral responsibility practices. 
While we will still feel disgust and dismay at the criminal’s wanton disregard for her 
victim, I suggest that, in the final analysis, we can no longer view her as truly 
blameworthy once we become fully aware of the implications of the impossibility of 
origination. Equally, the altruism of a dear friend, not having its source in her, cannot 
be considered grounds for deeming her praiseworthy, although we can delight in and 
feel grateful for her virtues. Their behaviour is, respectively, contemptible and 
delightful, and it is right that we should censure the former and praise the latter; but 
neither, ultimately, can be said to deserve either censure or praise.  
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12 Pereboom, in response to P.F. Strawson (who was of course responsible for coining the phrase 
‘reactive attitude’), makes a similar point to the one expressed here, which is that P.F. Strawson is 
wrong to suppose the hard determinist must forego all reactive attitudes. Where P.F. Strawson argued 
that the hard determinist is not even entitled to express love on account of the constraints of their 
theory, Perebom (2001: p. 202) counters: “[M]oral character and action are lovable whether or not 
they merit praise. Love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on 
many of the aims and desires of the other as one’s own, and a desire to be together with the other. 
Hard incompatibilism threatens none of this.” This is right, I think, and gets to the heart of what is 
wrong with both P.F. Strawson’s and Bennett’s charge against hard determinists and those who insist 
on the impossibility of desert, namely: not all expressions of reactive attitudes depend on a belief in 
the possibility of agents being deserving of praise and blame. 
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7.1.3 Questions and Clarifications 
With these criticisms answered, it just remains of this section to provide answers to 
the following three questions, in order to get a better idea of what a plausible theory 
offering a consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices will ask 
of us: (a) What is it like, psychologically, to live with an understanding of the 
impossibility of true desert? (b) Is it desirable to attain this kind of understanding? 
(c) Is it possible to attain it? 
Our answer to question (a) will influence our answer to (b), since the desirability of 
living with an understanding of our lack of deservingness will be influenced by—or 
perhaps even simply a function of—the experience of having this understanding. A 
plausible concern is that the knowledge that no-one deserves the blame they receive 
would make it impossible to persist in the belief that blame and punishment are 
sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds. Those with such knowledge would 
therefore feel compelled to relinquish all blaming and punishing behaviours, and this 
would lead to the destruction of our moral responsibility norms. Although this is a 
credible line of thought, I cannot agree that an understanding of the absence of true 
desert would compel a person to abandon all practices of praising, blaming, 
rewarding, and punishing. As outlined above, I think we can make sense, for 
example, of blaming and punishing the cruel-hearted man who refuses to help the 
pensioner across the road, even though we are aware that he himself has done 
nothing to deserve the cruel character that gives rise to such behaviour. Our moral 
convictions—that is, our beliefs about what is praiseworthy and blameworthy—
should remain intact and untouched by the knowledge of the absence of desert, since 
I argue that these convictions are guided by conditions (1) and (2) (and knowledge of 
the absence of desert does not in any way prevent agents continuing to meet these 
criteria). What I do accept is that the knowledge that true desert is impossible could 
alter one’s understanding of what one is doing when holding another person morally 
responsible—namely, not seeing that person as ultimately deserving of praise, 
blame, reward, or punishment.  
Those who see knowledge of the impossibility of true desert as a threat to our moral 
responsibility norms will likely answer (b) in the negative: they would argue that it is 
not desirable to attain this knowledge, on the grounds that the importance of 
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maintaining our responsibility norms outweigh the benefits of having this 
knowledge. For those who wish to argue along these lines, a solution might be to 
embrace illusionism with respect to the reality of the lack of origination and 
consequent lack of desert. A true understanding of these abstruse and esoteric 
matters is not worth the price of severe disruption to our system of moral norms, 
they might say, especially since this system is not in need of repair. Just as 
Smilansky recommended illusionism with regard to our belief in libertarianism in 
general, so too is there an argument for maintaining illusion with regard to the issue 
of origination, which is after all a crucial element within many libertarian theories. 
All of this is fine as far as it goes. However, if one denies the supposition that the 
knowledge of the impossibility of true desert will lead to the rejection of our moral 
responsibility practices, then there is no call for illusionism. My answer to (a) leads 
me to believe that there is indeed no need for illusionism, and no reason not to think 
that we should provide an affirmative answer to (b): attaining an understanding of 
the impossibility of true desert is a desirable state of affairs. 
Having provided brief answers to questions (a) and (b), my response to question (c) 
threatens to render these answers redundant. This is because I doubt that any deep 
and abiding understanding of the impossibility of true desert is in any case 
attainable. Taking my cue from P.F. Strawson, I would argue that our habitual ways 
of thinking about moral responsibility and of responding to one another are so deeply 
ingrained that they are bound to militate against any profound change in outlook. 
P.F. Strawson was right to say that, when we ask whether and how we should alter 
our moral responsibility practices in the light of the truth of determinism, we are in 
fact imagining that we have “what we cannot have, viz. a choice in this matter.”13 
This is not to say that I agree with his further judgement that metaphysical matters 
(such as the truth of determinism and the possibility or otherwise of origination) are 
of no importance when it comes to making judgements on ethical issues surrounding 
free will and moral responsibility—quite the opposite, in fact. P.F. Strawson’s 
insight was one of psychology, not metaphysics, and it leads me to suspect that we 
must answer question two in the negative: it is unlikely that we could ever really 
internalise the truth of the impossibility of desert and then respond to others 
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13 P.F. Strawson (1982), p. 78.                    
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accordingly.14 Given my scepticism as to whether it would be possible to live with a 
deep and abiding understanding of the impossibility of true desert, what it would be 
like to live this way and whether it would be desirable to do so are questions that 
consequently assume less importance. 
Before we go on to discuss how the various mixed views previously examined relate 
to the present consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices, 
there is one more issue to consider. This issue is one of terminology, and in 
particular the clarifying of the use of certain terms within the debate over free will 
and moral responsibility. A good place to start on this topic is by noting that Galen 
Strawson’s argument, which was presented and appraised in Chapter 4, is in his 
words an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.15 This argument 
was judged to be sound; and yet we find ourselves in the present chapter defending a 
theory that offers a consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility 
practices. The question this raises is: how can we consistently endorse Galen 
Strawson’s position that moral responsibility is impossible, while we are at the same 
time advocating a theory that purports to provide a justification for practices that 
spring from this same notion of moral responsibility? 
The key to this conundrum lies in recognising that the notion of moral responsibility 
to which Galen Strawson appeals, and the one to which a consequentialist 
justification of our moral responsibility practices appeals, are not the same, and that 
there is therefore no contradiction in denying the possibility of the former while 
affirming the reality of the latter. Galen Strawson’s notion of moral responsibility is 
one that implies that the agent who is held morally responsible must be deserving of 
the treatment they receive at the hands of others, whether that be praise, blame, 
reward, or punishment. The argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility 
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14 At least part of my reason for thinking that an intellectually-held belief in the impossibility of 
origination and desert is unlikely to make much difference to one’s everyday judgements of others is 
that this is what some of the studies examined in Chapter 5 suggest. For example, recall Nichols and 
Knobe’s finding that, while 86% of participants assigned to the abstract condition thought that an 
agent in a determined universe could never be morally responsible, 72% of those assigned to the 
concrete condition thought the opposite. Likewise, Roskies and Nichols found that many participants 
thought that determinism would preclude moral responsibility in some alternate universe, but would 
not in our own. These studies show that we are much more likely to have compatibilist intuitions 
when presented with concrete, this-world scenarios, and they also suggest that real-world judgements 
of moral responsibility are liable to persist regardless of what metaphysical views we hold of our 
world.  
15 That this is so is nowhere clearer than in Galen Strawson’s (1994) paper, entitled: “The 
Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” 
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states (quite correctly) that the impossibility of origination entails that no-one can 
truly deserve either praise and reward or blame and punishment, and, given that the 
present notion of moral responsibility requires desert, we can infer that it is 
impossible for anyone ever to be morally responsible. The notion that a legitimate 
judgement of moral responsibility requires that the agent deserves whatever 
treatment such a judgement entails seems to me to be in line with what Vargas would 
call our ‘folk concept’ of moral responsibility. In other words, desert is commonly 
regarded as a precondition for moral responsibility, such that, in the absence of 
desert, it would no longer be considered possible to legitimately ascribe moral 
responsibility.  
The kind of consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices under 
discussion here, however, does not require desert. On the contrary, the present 
consequentialist justification acknowledges the impossibility of desert, and makes 
the case that we have grounds for maintaining our moral responsibility practices 
regardless. Of course, making this case involves defending a fairly fundamental 
revision to our notion of moral responsibility, a revision that calls for the severance 
of the link between moral responsibility ascriptions and desert. Still, my hope is that 
what has been written about consequentialist justifications of moral responsibility 
norms thus far demonstrates the possibility of providing not just a plausible account 
of how we should think about moral responsibility, but one that does not depend on a 
condition (namely, true desert) that cannot be met.  
To conclude, unspecified terms are a potential source of confusion when discussing 
issues of free will and moral responsibility. In this instance, disambiguation between 
two different usages of the term ‘morally responsible’ has helped to clarify how 
ostensibly conflicting beliefs can in fact be simultaneously affirmed. On the one 
hand, I agree with Galen Strawson that it is not possible for any agent to be morally 
responsible, so long as moral responsibility is understood to require deservingness 
(which most people, I would argue, believe it does require). On the other hand, I 
propose that we operate according to a notion of moral responsibility that does not 
see desert as a precondition for legitimate moral responsibility ascriptions. The 
consequentialist justification that has been sketched so far demonstrates that the 
rending of desert and moral responsibility is possible: given the impossibility of true 
desert and the importance of our moral responsibility practices to our daily lives, it is 
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also necessary. In the following section, we will further discuss what kind of revision 
to our concept of moral responsibility (and perhaps also of our practices) a 
consequentialist justification calls for, and we will also consider how other aspects of 
mixed views—illusionism, fundamental dualism, metaethical subjectivism—are of 
use in establishing a consequentialist justification of moral responsibility norms. 
 
7.2 The Debt to Other Mixed Views 
We have already touched on how certain aspects of mixed views relate to the 
consequentialist justification of moral responsibility norms being propounded here. 
In this section, we will go through the various features of the mixed views surveyed 
in the previous two chapters to see what use they are to us in shaping our 
consequentialist theory. 
 
7.2.1   Revisionism 
As I have argued already, it is generally accepted that we can be ultimately deserving 
of praise and blame when in fact the arguments of van Inwagen and Galen Strawson 
should force us to conclude that this is mere illusion. In consequence, any clear 
understanding of what it is to justly hold a person morally responsible must involve 
the recognition that ultimate desert is impossible, and that moral responsibility must 
instead be justified on consequentialist grounds. Embracing this consequentialist 
justification of our ascriptions of moral responsibility therefore involves revision to 
our concept of moral responsibility: we deceive ourselves if we see ascriptions of 
moral responsibility as implying desert, because no-one ever ultimately deserves any 
of the praise, blame, reward, or punishment that they are liable to receive. The 
concepts of moral responsibility and of desert are thus no longer wedded to one 
another: moral responsibility ascriptions are seen to derive their justification from 
their beneficial consequences, while any ascription of desert must simply be 
mistaken. 
As we have already seen, revising our understanding of the concept of moral 
responsibility in this way is potentially confusing. On the one hand, we must deny 
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the application of our ordinary, ‘folk’ notion of moral responsibility, yet on the other 
hand, we must affirm the reality of a revised notion of moral responsibility that does 
not require desert. So, whether we should affirm or deny the possibility of moral 
responsibility really depends on whether the term is understood in its ordinary, ‘folk’ 
sense, or else in the revised sense being suggested here. Unless it is clear in what 
sense the term is being used, confusion is apt to arise. 
What are the similarities and differences between Vargas’s revisionism and my own? 
The most important features our theories have in common is that we both agree that 
the current folk concept of free will (of the kind required for moral responsibility) is 
libertarian, and we both seek to revise this concept by suggesting compatibilist 
conditions under which our moral responsibility practices are justified. Where they 
differ quite significantly, however, is on the question of desert: whereas Vargas 
believes that praise and blame are not only justified under the right compatibilist 
conditions, but that praise and blame can also be truly deserved under these same 
conditions. My belief in the soundness of Galen Strawson’s and van Inwagen’s 
arguments prevents me from assenting with Vargas on this question of desert, and I 
differ from him further in my belief that consequentialism must be embraced in order 
to justify our moral responsibility practices. In a sense, then, my own revisionism is 
more radical than that proposed by Vargas: where we both agree that libertarian folk 
concept of free will should be revised in favour of a compatibilist understanding, I 
maintain further that our concept of moral responsibility needs revision to reflect the 
fact that true desert is impossible, and that our system of moral responsibility norms 
thus requires a consequentialist justification. 
While the adoption of a consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility 
norms requires us to change our concept of moral responsibility, it is less clear what 
impact, if any, its adoption would have on our moral responsibility practices: 
conditions (1) and (2) are essentially compatibilist, and it is a reasonable assertion 
that conditions much like these govern our current moral responsibility practices; on 
the other hand - and in opposition to standard compatibilist theories—these two 
conditions only cover when ascriptions of blame are justified and not when 
ascriptions of blame are deserved, and this absence of desert might still be thought to 
affect practices. For instance, there is a case for thinking that an awareness of the 
impossibility of desert would alter the way in which one ascribes moral 
174!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!RESPONSIBILITY!
!
responsibility to others: for instance, perhaps a deep understanding of the 
contingency of the causes of the murderer’s vicious character would reduce one’s 
inclination to hold him morally responsible. Still, the thought that this revision of our 
concept of moral responsibility would have any significant effect on our moral 
responsibility practices depends on the assumption that we are actually capable of 
internalising the fact that desert is impossible and then acting accordingly. Even if 
one accepts the arguments for consequentialism, I have expressed my doubts about 
whether any intellectually-held belief in the impossibility of origination and desert 
could ever translate into a deep and abiding understanding that would guide one’s 
behaviour towards others.16 As such, my suspicion is that even if the revised concept 
of moral responsibility proposed here were widely accepted, it would be unlikely to 
have any great impact on our moral responsibility practices.17 
These comments on the effects of adopting a consequentialist justification of our 
moral responsibility norms are unavoidably speculative, of course, since the effects 
of the theory could only be known if it were widely embraced. It is possible, 
therefore, that embracing a consequentialist justification would profoundly affect our 
moral responsibility practices, in which case we should ask whether the practical 
consequences of adopting such a justification are desirable. If the answer to this is 
‘no,’ then there might be a case for appropriating elements of Smilansky’s 
illusionism. This is what we shall consider next. 
 
7.2.2   Illusionism 
I argued in the previous chapter that Smilansky’s illusionism is unnecessary, largely 
on the grounds that widespread knowledge of the falsity of libertarian free will is 
unlikely to have the serious negative repercussions that Smilansky envisages. 
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16 These doubts stem from consideration of the findings of various studies in Chapter 5 (e.g. by 
Nichols and Knobe, Roskies and Nichols); P.F. Strawson’s persuasive case for thinking that 
metaphysical beliefs are incapable of altering our moral responsibility practices; and my own first-
hand experience of continuing to praise and blame both myself and others despite my conviction that 
van Inwagen’s and Galen Strawson’s arguments are successful.  
17 Even if it were to transpire that we are capable of fully internalising the fact that ultimate desert is 
impossible, I think we would still be inclined to retain our current moral responsibility practices in 
much the same form that they are now. It seems to me that our current moral responsibility practices 
are largely effective in encouraging virtuous behaviour, and so, even if we no longer believe in the 
reality of desert, there is still good reason to persist with these practices.  
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However, taking Smilansky’s illusionism as inspiration, it is possible to make a case 
for maintaining a motivated obscurity with regards to the impossibility of ultimate 
desert. While Smilansky advocates illusionism with respect to libertarian free will in 
order to stave off a perceived threat of moral nihilism, the argument in the case of 
illusionism with respect to the lack of ultimate desert is that this would help ensure 
that our moral responsibility practices are effectual in achieving their 
consequentialist purpose. So, if knowledge of the impossibility of ultimate desert 
should prevent people from engaging in moral responsibility practices that have 
beneficial consequences, this might provide grounds for promoting illusionism with 
respect to the impossibility of ultimate desert. 
There is some tension between the revisionism sketched above and the illusionism 
described here: the revisionist urges us to obtain a greater degree of insight into the 
concept of moral responsibility by revising this concept in such a way that we 
expunge the false belief that ultimate desert is a reality; the illusionist, meanwhile, 
points to the dangers of gaining greater insight into the concept of moral 
responsibility, and seeks instead to persuade us that our mistaken belief in ultimate 
desert is in fact an untruth whose convenience warrants its retention. 
The motivation for the kind of illusionism under discussion is that, without the 
background belief in ultimate desert, attempts to hold people morally responsible 
will be deprived of the force they need for ensuring effective outcomes. There are 
two sides to this: on the side of what we might call the ‘blamer,’ the allegation is that 
their knowledge that the person being blamed cannot truly deserve their treatment is 
bound to mitigate the force of the blame being administered; while on the side of the 
‘blamee,’ it is claimed that their knowledge of the same will plausibly make them 
less inclined towards any attempt to mend their ways.18 Illusionism with regard to 
belief in ultimate desert might therefore be seen as a useful fiction, without which we 
would struggle to uphold our moral responsibility practices. 
There are two basic points to make in response to this call for illusionism with regard 
to the impossibility of ultimate desert, both of which have been touched on already 
but which are nonetheless worth restating. The first is that the kind of motivated self-
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18 Although I use the labels ‘blamer’ and ‘blamee’ in making the point, note that the same thought 
applies equally to cases of praising, rewarding, and punishing. 
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deception being promulgated here is unlikely to be necessary, on account of the fact 
that there is little chance of us coming to any lasting appreciation of our mutual lack 
of ultimate deservingness for the good and bad things we have done—in short, the 
illusion is already so powerful that it does not need bolstering with motivated self-
deception. Since our belief in ultimate desert is so deep-rooted that we will likely 
continue to view ourselves and others as though this illusion is real, there is simply 
no call for concern over what the consequences for our moral responsibility practices 
might be if we were stripped of this illusion.19 
The second point is that, if it is in fact possible to thoroughly purge ourselves of the 
illusion of ultimate desert, there is a good case for thinking that doing so would be 
desirable. One would doubtless expect the nature of praising and blaming to change 
as we, as members of society, come to internalise the realisation that ultimate desert 
does not exist. This change is to be desired, however, in that we will view each other 
with a clearer eye, untainted by false notions of desert. Crucially, the absence of 
ultimate desert need not in any way diminish our distaste for immoral and 
reprehensible behaviour, which is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated by those with 
misgivings about consequentialist justifications of moral responsibility norms. 
Equally crucially, there is no reason to think that the targets of our moral 
responsibility ascriptions would change radically if the illusion of desert were 
eradicated. On the contrary, insofar as our present moral responsibility practices 
have beneficial consequences—and, in my estimation, they almost invariably do—
the realisation of the impossibility of desert would have no significant effect on when 
we hold one another morally responsible. Rather, it is the quality of our praise and 
blame that we could expect to see altered, as we come to recognise that Dennett’s 
rhetorical question: “who more deserves to be despised than someone utterly 
despicable?” merits a more nuanced response than he himself imagines.20 
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19 See fn. 14 and fn. 16 for reasons why I doubt we are capable of transcending the illusion of ultimate 
desert. 
20 Dennett (1984), p. 167. 
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7.2.3   Fundamental Dualism 
Smilansky is right to believe that compatibilists and hard determinists each have 
important insights into the free will debate. However, as I argued in Chapter 6, we 
must reject Smilansky’s own understanding of what a fundamental dualism should 
look like, as his account conflicts with the kind of consequentialist justification of 
moral responsibility norms being sketched here. In particular, what cannot be 
accepted is Smilansky’s claim that “very often both [compatibilist and hard 
determinist] perspectives are important simultaneously and imply contrary 
judgements,” the implication being that, when making judgements of moral 
responsibility, we need to be balancing compatibilist distinctions for grounding 
moral responsibility and hard determinist avowals that no such distinctions exist.21 In 
certain cases, Smilansky claims, compatibilist considerations will seem more 
pertinent (for example, in the case of the lazy waiter, discussed in the previous 
chapter), while in other cases, hard determinist ones will come to the fore—and it is 
a matter of judgement to strike the right balance between the two. 
While this account of what fundamental dualism should look like views 
compatibilism and hard determinism as each being partially adequate within the 
same sphere, the fundamental dualism that I propose we embrace sees each as 
wholly adequate and applicable within their own, separate spheres. When it comes to 
making judgements of moral responsibility, it is compatibilist distinctions alone that 
provide our guide, and it is the beneficial consequences of making these distinctions 
that justifies us in making them. This approach contrasts with Smilansky’s on both 
of these counts: on the first count, this approach advises that there is no need to 
balance the conflicting views of compatibilists and hard determinists when seeking 
to ascribe moral responsibility—instead, we work solely on the basis of compatibilist 
conditions (1) and (2); on the second count, Smilansky’s assertion that compatibilist 
distinctions have “crucial (nonconsequentialist) ethical significance” is denied, since, 
given the acknowledged success of hard determinist arguments against the 
possibility of desert, the only grounds on which these distinctions can be justified are 
consequentialist ones.22  
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21 Smilansky (2000), p. 286. 
22 Smilansky (2002), p. 493. 
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Compatibilist distinctions are thus seen to provide our sole guide in the sphere of 
making moral responsibility judgements, meaning there is no need to weigh the 
opposing perspective of hard determinism in the balance each time we ascribe moral 
responsibility to one another. However, the hard determinist perspective is applicable 
within its own sphere, which is our understanding of desert. What a proper 
recognition of the hard determinist arguments grants us is the realisation that 
ultimate desert is impossible: that is to say, that all blame and punishment – and 
indeed all praise and reward—is undeserved.23 If we are willing to accept the 
intuition that origination is a requirement for desert (as I believe we should), then 
this is the inescapable conclusion of van Inwagen’s and Galen Strawson’s 
arguments—and so we see that desert is not a requirement for moral responsibility 
practices that are guided by compatibilist distinctions, and justified by their 
beneficial consequences. 
A couple of advantages to this reconstitution of Smilansky’s fundamental dualism 
suggest themselves. For one thing, the fundamental dualism being proposed here 
does away with the need to deny the universal applicability of the hard determinist 
insight, and instead embraces the reality that no agent ever deserves the praise, 
blame, reward, or punishment they receive. We saw how Smilansky sought 
unsuccessfully to deny this point by means of his sketch of the lazy waiter. 
Unconvincing denials of this sort are not necessary with our present account of 
fundamental dualism. A second point is that our reworked fundamental dualism 
avoids us having to embrace what could either be referred to politely as paradox, or 
else, rather less diplomatically, dismissed as contradiction. Smilansky sees 
compatibilism and hard determinism as applicable within the same sphere, with the 
ultimate perspective of hard determinism always threatening to render compatibilist 
distinctions irrelevant. By placing hard determinism and compatibilism within their 
own, separate spheres, we are thus no longer obliged to make attempts to reconcile 
these two irreconcilable positions. 
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23 In being ultimately undeserved, it is also in a sense unfair that some are praised and rewarded while 
others are blamed and punished—the lottery of life determines that some enjoy the former while 
others must suffer the latter, and that this is so is not fair. However, praise and blame and their 
correlates are justified on account of their beneficial consequences, and so it is fair to praise and 
blame when this justification warrants it. Perhaps we can say that life itself is unfair, and our system 
of moral responsibility, through which we strive to achieve the best consequences, represents the least 
bad of various bad options. 
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7.2.4   Metaethical Subjectivism 
Metaethical subjectivism, as propounded by Double, was judged to be wrong. In 
particular, Double is wrong to suggest that there are no objective truths concerning 
free will and moral responsibility.  
Nevertheless, it was found that Double’s ‘prudential justification’ for metaethical 
subjectivism does offer some interesting lessons for those of us engaged in 
theorising about moral responsibility. This prudential justification, it will be recalled, 
stated that it would be preferable for us to hedge our bets by not adopting any 
particular lower-level theory on the grounds the risk of picking the wrong one is too 
great. Double argues that by retaining and acting on our current, conflicting moral 
intuitions about free will and moral responsibility we thereby guarantee our 
intuitions are wrong only some of the time, whereas if we adopt some particular 
lower-level theory we run the risk of being wrong all the time.24 
Double’s insight is that there are risks in attempting to make our intuitions conform 
to theory. Although he overstates his case significantly by implying that choosing 
which lower-level theory to endorse is a matter of mere guesswork, it is true that we 
cannot be certain that our choice of lower-level theory is correct. It is an advantage 
of the consequentialist justification of moral responsibility being defended, then, that 
it attempts to make sense of both hard determinist and compatibilist intuitions: it 
provides a framework for understanding hard determinist intuitions about the 
impossibility of true desert, as well as compatibilist intuitions about the necessity of 
holding each other morally responsible under certain conditions. Further, this 
consequentialist justification does not call for radical changes in our moral 
responsibility practices, even if the theory itself is quite radical. 
In summary, Double’s prudential justification for his metaethical subjectivism is of 
value not in persuading us of the necessity of adopting his theory, but rather in 
reminding us to consider the risks of abandoning our pre-theoretical intuitions for the 
sake of some particular lower-level theory. If, as I hope, the consequentialist 
justification presented is correct then this reminder is simply unnecessary; and if it is 
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24 Double’s strategy does not diminish the average likelihood of our intuitions being wrong, of 
course—it merely averts the danger of them being utterly wayward on account of having chosen the 
wrong lower-level theory.  
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incorrect, then at least it should preserve our intuitions well enough to allay concerns 
that its implementation might lead to injustices. 
 
7.3 The PSR and Its Limits 
We have now sketched the outlines of a viable mixed view of moral responsibility, 
one that accepts hard determinist arguments against the possibility of desert, but at 
the same time makes a case for maintaining our moral responsibility norms by 
drawing compatibilist distinctions for consequentialist reasons. There is a lot that 
still remains uncertain with this mixed view—for example, it is not clear whether it 
is possible to truly internalise our own and others’ lack of desert, nor whether doing 
so would adversely affect our ability to maintain our responsibility norms—but we 
must be content to hold off for the time being on trying to provide definitive answers 
to these issues. In any case, enough flesh has been put on the bones to show that 
there is an answer to the problem of whether we have the free will required for moral 
responsibility that relies neither on a perfunctory and shallow dismissal of the hard 
determinists’ arguments, nor on an implausible and unappealing call for the 
wholesale rejection of our moral responsibility practices.  
In this final section, then, let us return to where we began, with the PSR, in order to 
reflect upon what the present theory has to tell us about the principle’s limits. It was 
argued in Chapter 2 that we should adopt a presumption in its favour, meaning that, 
in the absence of proof to the contrary (in the form of either incontrovertible 
evidence for some event or occurrence that lacked a sufficient reason, or else an 
argument for the falsity of the principle whose soundness was beyond doubt), we 
should assume that the PSR is universally applicable. Since no proof of the falsity of 
the PSR was found, the presumption in its favour remained secure, and this in turn 
gave us reason to embrace determinism, whose truth it was thought to entail. The 
conclusion of our investigation was thus: there is a reason for everything that 
happens in terms of prior causes that determine its happening. 
However, as all-embracing as this statement of the PSR’s applicability may appear, 
one can in fact imagine it having a still wider scope than this. For instance, it might 
also supply moral reasons: for the facts of our character, for instance, and for the 
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circumstances into which we were born. We can wonder at the reason that some 
people are born with all the advantages that good genes and environment bring, 
while others are condemned to suffer from the lack of these advantages; but it seems 
that such a question, although perfectly intelligible, has no answer.25 On the question 
of moral reasons for facts about our world, then, it seems that we come up against 
the limits of the PSR: there simply are no moral reasons that explain the vast 
discrepancies in quality of life within and across communities and cultures—and 
hence neither is there is any justice to these discrepancies.26 
This absence of moral reasons for facts about our world gets to the heart of what is 
wrong with our tacit belief that true desert really is possible. In accepting the reality 
of true desert as most of us instinctively do, we erroneously ascribe responsibility to 
ourselves and each other for what is in fact the unchosen and adventitious raw 
material of our character and environment. We think and behave as though the 
praise, blame, reward, and punishment that we and others receive on account of our 
moral strengths and failings—and which are, after all, the product of the 
contingencies of our circumstances and character—are earned; but these could only 
be earned if there were some satisfactory—that is to say, moral—explanation for the 
contingencies of circumstance and character. There is no explanation for these, 
however, and so this absence of a sufficient reason for the moral facts obliges us to 
reconsider our instinctive belief in desert. 
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25 Some have certainly attempted to provide a satisfying answer to this question. Hindus and 
Buddhists, for example, would certainly argue that there are moral reasons that explain your 
circumstances in this life. The doctrine of karma, common to both of these religions, holds that we 
reap what we sow across countless lifetimes of rebirths, with the good or bad karma accrued in one 
life accounting for the blessings and hardships of the next. While I do not dismiss out of hand the 
possibility that the metaphysical doctrine of karma is correct, I do dismiss the idea that embracing this 
doctrine would, as a consequence, permit one to believe that praise, blame, reward and punishment 
can be truly deserved. If one’s character and circumstances in this lifetime are supposed to be one’s 
just deserts for the actions of the previous lifetime, the problem of explaining desert is merely 
deferred, since one can always ask: what did I do to deserve my character and circumstances from that 
previous lifetime? An infinite explanatory chain is set in process, whereby each incarnation is said to 
be deserved on the basis of the previous one. The condition of origination—the condition, that is, of 
being the source of one’s actions—can no more be met across countless lifetimes than it could within 
the one lifetime, and for this reason karma and rebirth are incapable of offering a means of moral 
explication for the contrasting fortunes of the mass of humanity. 
26 Perhaps there are other meaningful questions that arguably have no sufficient reason, such as: why 
is there something rather than nothing? Why do I exist rather than not exist? On the question of why 
there is something rather than nothing, recall from the first chapter how Russell (in Hick (1964: p. 
175)) argues that we need not suppose that there is any explanation for the universe as a whole. 
Rather, the universe is “just there, and that's all.”  
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It is this limit to the applicability of the PSR that forces us to confront a fact that we 
would rather avoid: that the world in which we live is inherently unjust. If asked, 
most (barring the Hindus and Buddhists among us) would accept that it is wrong-
headed to demand a moral reason as to why some people are born with good 
characters into an environment in which they can flourish, while others are born with 
bad characters and in bad circumstances. In other words, we know that the raw 
material of our personality and the environment in which we are born is purely a 
matter of our good or bad luck. Still, this knowledge rarely translates into the kind of 
deep understanding that is required in our everyday relations, an understanding that 
does not view people as deserving of the blame and punishment they must face as a 
consequence of their wrongdoing. It is perhaps simply easier to ignore this lack of 
ultimate desert—to disregard the inherent injustice that is the accident of birth, and 
instead to behave as though the virtuous and the vicious alike have earned their fate. 
Perhaps there is also a tacit belief among some that the moral responsibility system 
is contingent upon us living in a just world, and so any acknowledgement that one’s 
birth is a lottery is ignored whenever possible in order to protect and maintain this 
system. 
However, it is a mistake to think that our moral responsibility system requires that 
we live in a just world, or even that the system itself must be perfectly just. Instead, 
we must accept that it is an unjust tool for use in an unjust world. In stating that our 
moral responsibility system is an unjust tool, I do not wish to suggest that it either 
should or need be in any way arbitrary or inconsistent—it is merely to point out the 
injustice that blame and punishment will surely follow for those born with poor 
character and in unfortunate circumstances. As explained already, punishment and 
reward can be justified for the positive changes they are able to bring about; but it is 
ultimately unjust that one person is in a position to be rewarded while another person 
must face punishment.  
To say that the PSR has its limits, and that the apparent accident of our births 
provides evidence of this, is essentially to say that there are some questions that 
make sense and yet have no answer. However, perhaps this is the wrong way of 
looking at things. Instead, we can say that certain moral questions—for example, 
“why do bad things happen to good people?” and, “why are some people born with 
all the advantages life can offer while others must overcome the most formidable 
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obstacles?”—are unanswerable simply because they rely on a false supposition. In 
the case of these two questions, the supposition is that our world must be inherently 
just—that is, both questions demand reasons that will resolve what appear to be 
injustices, and provide a moral explanation for suffering and misfortune. Once the 
falsity of this supposition has been accepted, we can say that there is no reason that 
bad things happen to good people, or that some have all the advantages while others 
have only misfortune. Better still, we can say that the reason for these things is that 
we are born into a world that is indifferent to our sense of justice, and so it is a 
mistake to look for reasons to explain away injustice. Seen in this way there is 
actually no question to answer, and so it is a mistake to view it as a limit to the PSR 
that it is unable to provide one.  
In summation, while the PSR certainly applies to our universe and its physical order 
(in that it tells us that everything within our universe comes to exist through 
necessitating causes), it manifestly does not extend to the moral order in the way we 
might wish. That is to say, the PSR does not explain how we could deserve our 
happiness and sorrows, for the simple reason that these are not deserved. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of reasons for our respective fates in life, we must 
impose what moral order we can in order to make the best of our world. This is 
something we already do, of course, although in our confusion we are liable to 
assume that the targets of our moral responsibility judgements deserve these 
judgements in a way they could only if our universe were to have the kind of moral 
order it so evidently lacks. It is clear that the PSR is not applicable to the moral order 
in the same way that it is to the physical order—the apportioning of good and bad 
fortune is indeed a mere matter of fortune. What we must recognise, therefore, is 
that, to the extent that our moral responsibility judgments are justified, they are 
justified purely on utilitarian grounds. By balancing our clear-eyed, compatibilist, 
utilitarian judgments with the equally vivid apprehension of the impossibility of 
ultimate moral responsibility, there is hope that we might develop an interpersonal 
life that upholds moral standards without lacking compassion. 
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Conclusion 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The arguments of the preceding chapters have yielded the following four principal 
conclusions: that the PSR is true; that the PSR entails the truth of determinism; that, 
whether or not one accepts the truth of determinism, ultimate moral responsibility is 
not possible; and that the best (and perhaps only) way of justifying our moral 
responsibility practices is to adopt a consequentialist compatibilist theory. 
Additionally, empirical evidence has been collated which suggests that most of us 
are inclined towards adopting a folk libertarian position with regards to free will and 
moral responsibility—in other words, most of us believe this world to be both 
indeterministic and one in which we are fully morally responsible for at least some 
of our actions. This evidence provides some support to the mixed views of Vargas 
and Smilansky, both of which rely on the assumption that folk libertarianism is 
pervasive. However, it also reveals that our folk beliefs are perhaps more nuanced 
than these mixed views allow: rather than attempting to ascertain simply whether the 
majority of people are compatibilists or incompatibilists, majority opinion is better 
understood as conforming to a hierarchy of beliefs in which belief in moral 
responsibility is non-negotiable, while belief in libertarianism is strongly-held 
although not intractable. 
Various objections towards both the methods and conclusions of this thesis are to be 
anticipated, and I will here outline what I consider the three most significant among 
these. The first objection concerns the contention that the PSR is true. Where I saw 
arguments on both sides that were inconclusive but that gave us reason to adopt a 
presumption in favour of the PSR, others would doubtless adopt a presumption in 
favour of its falsity, or perhaps even find the arguments of Hume or van Inwagen 
decisive in proving its falsity. All I can say to such people is to acknowledge that I 
do not expect the arguments in the PSR’s favour to appear as compelling to others as 
they do to me. Schopenhauer’s admonition that it is foolish to seek to provide proof 
for a principle that is itself in some sense fundamental was never far from my 
consciousness as I sought to do just that, and my suspicion remains that neither 
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arguments for nor against would be likely to change anyone’s pre-existing intuitions 
on the PSR. My feeling, then, is that if one finds the arguments for the PSR 
compelling then that is probably only because one was convinced of the truth of the 
principle itself beforehand. Likewise, arguments against the PSR will only appear 
compelling to those who have a predisposition towards rejecting the principle. 
Despite the acknowledged difficulty of persuading anyone to accept the PSR if they 
are not already inclined to do so, I take some solace from the fact that others have 
attempted, however unprofitably, to do the same: Della Rocca, for instance, 
concedes that his own attempt to state the case for the PSR must look “quixotic” 
given the principle’s current unpopularity.1 For all that my own attempt to seek for a 
proof of the PSR may appear equally foolhardy, I hope that the discussion of the first 
two chapters at least leads others to reflect on the extent to which explanations for 
things and events are required and why. 
A second objection to consider is one that is likely to be raised by all those who are 
non-consequentialist compatibilists—a sizable number of people, in other words—
and it is that I am mistaken in considering it necessary to meet the origination 
condition if we are to ascribe true or ultimate moral responsibility to one another. 
Chapter 4 examined the arguments of van Inwagen and Galen Strawson and 
concluded that both were successful; but the success of these arguments is predicated 
on the belief that justification for our moral responsibility practices requires that the 
origination condition be met. In the case of van Inwagen’s argument, the key 
premise that expresses this commitment to the origination condition states: “No one 
has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every 
fact of the future, including one’s own actions.”2 In the case of Galen Strawson’s 
argument, the key premise reads: “If you do what you do because of the way you are, 
then in order to be ultimately morally responsible for what you do you must be 
ultimately responsible for the way you are.”3 Each in their own way expresses the 
idea that, if an action originates from some external source over which the agent has 
no control, then that is not an action for which the agent can be responsible. 
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1 Della Rocca (2010), p. 1. 
2 Van Inwagen (1983), p. 222. 
3 Strawson (2002), p. 443. 
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Non-consequentialist compatibilists must—and are happy to—deny the need to meet 
the origination condition, and indeed the case against it was at the heart of many of 
the compatiblist responses considered in Chapter 4. Slote, for example, claimed that, 
whether an action originates in a causal chain that begins outside of the agent is of 
little importance so long as the desires, abilities, and so forth of that agent are 
engaged in the right ways. The agent’s action cannot be said to be unavoidable and 
inevitable despite the lack of origination, and hence they retain moral responsibility 
for it. Similarly, Hurley contends that “a person need not be responsible for being 
what he is in order to be responsible for choices that are determined by what he is.”4 
Even though we are not responsible for our characters, Hurley claims that this is not 
to say that we cannot be responsible for the actions that spring from our characters. 
Once more, this amounts to a repudiation of the need for origination for justifying 
our moral responsibility ascriptions. 
I am not convinced that much more can be done besides noting this divergence in 
intuitions regarding the importance or otherwise of the origination condition. As far 
as I am concerned, there is a clear case for siding with van Inwagen in thinking that 
one cannot be responsible for something that is the unavoidable consequence of facts 
about the past before one’s birth plus the laws of nature. Equally, I am entirely 
sympathetic to Galen Strawson’s claim that, if you do what you do because of the 
way you are, then in order to be ultimately morally responsible for what you do you 
must be ultimately responsible for the way you are.  
We seem to have hit philosophical bedrock at this point, where all that can be said is 
that some share these intuitions while others—Slote and Hurley among them—
disagree. Certainly, I can see no further arguments from either Slote or Hurley to 
back up their assertions that the origination condition need not be met, and neither 
can I think of how to provide further arguments in favour of its necessity. Either one 
accepts that it is necessary—which, I contend, it manifestly is—or else one rejects 
this. Perhaps what both this and the previous objection illustrate, then, is the extent 
to which intuitions underpin so much of our philosophical thinking. While 
philosophy is ostensibly all about arguments—and these are of course extremely 
important—the fact is that, as van Inwagen notes with reference to his intuition in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Hurley (2000), p. 30. 
CONCLUSION!!!!!!!187!
!
favour of Davidson’s criterion of individuation, “arguments must come to an end 
somewhere.”5 When they do, we are often left with intuitions for which we find no 
further justification beyond simply being able to cite their intuitive appeal. Where 
Davidson’s criterion of individuation is for van Inwagen one such intuition without 
justification, so is the origination condition for me. And, in the light of 
Schopenhauer’s admonition discussed above, perhaps the PSR should be considered 
to be another. 
A final objection to anticipate concerns the case made for a consequentialist 
compatibilism, which is introduced in Chapter 6 and developed further in Chapter 7. 
In particular, the case for consequentialism is far from being fully worked-out in this 
thesis, and it might be felt that there remains a certain tension and lack of clarity in 
the arguments. This is perhaps most apparent in the account provided in Chapter 7 of 
how adopting a consequentialist justification of our moral responsibility practices 
should affect how we respond to and view one another. I made the case that, 
notwithstanding Bennett’s arguments to the contrary, we can continue to hold 
reactive attitudes towards each other even once we have embraced the notion that 
praise, blame, punishment and reward can never be truly deserved. So, we can still 
feel gratitude for our friend who goes to the trouble of baking us a birthday cake 
despite our knowing that gratitude can never be ultimately deserved, and we can still 
punish the thief for his thefts even though we understand that no punishment can 
ever be ultimately deserved either. The objection to this is that there is an 
insuperable tension between our knowledge that moral responsibility ascriptions can 
never be deserved, and the claim that we can persist in holding reactive attitudes in a 
way that seems to imply that they are deserved. 
I confess that the issue of what reactive attitudes are rational and/or permissible is a 
thorny one. Still, I believe it is possible to provide a coherent picture of what 
embracing a consequentialist justification of moral responsibility norms would entail 
for our interpersonal lives. The first thing to note is that exactly what it entails 
depends on the extent to which we are able to behave as fully rational beings—
beings that, inter alia, are capable of acting with a thorough understanding of the 
impossibility of desert. I have already expressed doubts about our ability to do this, 
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and as such I think it likely that we will always have a residual tendency to treat one 
another as though we truly deserve praise, blame, reward, and punishment. Given 
this assumption, the cake baking and thieving examples are potentially misleading if 
taken to imply that the consequentialist theory presented assumes that we will be 
able to form a complete understanding of the impossibility of desert. 
Imagining, however, that we were able to act as fully rational beings: how then 
would we react to our cake-baking friend and the thief? I think the answer must be 
that we could only feign praise and blame, and that we would feign these attitudes 
for consequentialist reasons—that is, in order to encourage acts of cake-baking, and 
discourage acts of thievery. Of course, a fully rational agent need not feign attitudes 
such as delight and disgust since these attitudes do not imply any belief in the moral 
culpability of the agent. Praise and blame, on the other hand, do imply moral 
culpability, and so the fully rational agent could only adopt these attitudes for 
consequentialist purposes. 
The key point to take from this, I believe, is that the perceived tension between the 
absence of desert on the one hand, and our holding of reactive attitudes that imply 
that desert is possible on the other, arises from the false assumption that we can be 
fully rational beings. While Smilansky says that we must maintain a motivated 
obscurity regarding the absence of ultimate responsibility, I say that we cannot help 
but (erroneously) see each other as deserving of moral responsibility ascriptions. 
Nevertheless, these erroneous judgements are permissible, since praising and 
blaming in this way can be justified on consequentialist grounds. A perfectly rational 
being, by contrast, would have correspondingly perfect insight into the fact that these 
moral responsibility ascriptions are not deserved; but they would not, for all that, 
choose to abandon all attitudes of praise and blame, since they would be able to 
appreciate at the same time the beneficial consequences of retaining our system of 
moral responsibility. 
There is much more to say about what a fully worked-out consequentialist 
justification of moral responsibility should look like. I think that perhaps the most 
difficult aspect of continuing in this task will be to persuade doubters that a 
consequentialist theory is actually able to capture what it is we are doing—or should 
be doing—when we hold each other morally responsible. Scanlon’s concern that the 
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beneficial consequences of expressing disapproval “depends on too many factors 
other than the nature of the act in question” is doubtless one that many others share, 
and more needs to be done to convince these sceptics that this concern can be 
surmounted.6 
Part of this case for the necessity of adopting a consequentialist approach to moral 
responsibility will come from continuing to state the case as assuredly as possible 
against belief in desert, since if desert were possible then we would have no need to 
seek an alternative justification for our moral responsibility norms. Of course, 
persuading people of the impossibility of desert will not by itself suffice to persuade 
them of the wisdom of embracing a consequentialist approach. Both Scanlon and 
Bennett, whose objections to consequentialism were rehearsed in Chapter 7, show 
some sympathy towards the view that desert is impossible (although ultimately 
neither of them fully embrace this position). Scanlon declares: “our attitude toward 
those who suffer or are blamed should not be “You asked for this” but rather “There 
but for the grace of God go I.””7 Bennett, meanwhile, suggests that “if a person is as 
God or Nature made him, and if how he is determines what he does, then it is [to 
quote Bernard Williams] ‘in some ultimate sense hideously unfair’ that he should be 
blamed for what he does.”8 So, sympathy for the case against ultimate desert does 
not automatically translate into sympathy for a consequentialist approach to moral 
responsibility. 
As for the positive arguments for consequentialism, more can be done to make the 
case that holding one another morally responsible when and only when the two 
conditions identified are met really would bring beneficial consequences. 
Additionally, more work is needed to persuade sceptics that there is a good fit 
between our moral responsibility practices as they stand and a consequentialist 
justification of these practices. Only by tackling these issues can we help to ensure 
the credibility of the theory. 
Finally, besides the possibility of providing a fuller consequentialist account, what 
other avenues for exploration are there following this thesis? There is certainly room 
for closer examination of arguments touched on in Chapter 2 concerning the 
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7 Scanlon (1995), p. 294. 
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metaphysical implications of quantum theory. The battle for supremacy between 
“hidden variable” theories such as Bohm’s and the “standard interpretation,” which 
hinges on a debate as to which provides the best model of what goes on at the 
quantum level, is very much ongoing. I took a stand on that debate by siding with 
those who say that “hidden variable” theories are to be preferred, but there is no 
doubt that these arguments could be examined in greater depth. Another avenue of 
exploration—one that that I passed over on account of my intuition in favour of the 
origination condition and which, for that reason, would appeal to those who do not 
share this intuition—would be to survey the various traditional compatibilist 
responses to the challenge of origination. That is, since non-consequentialist 
compatibilists must deny the need for origination, it would be interesting to see how 
they justify this denial, and interesting also to compare and contrast the conditions 
under which they propose we can be morally responsible. 
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